The fact that the prime minister convened the security consultation after the attack on my husband at the Central Command on Tuesday is no coincidence. It is intended to symbolize that this is not just another routine assessment of the situation, but rather an emergency discussion whose purpose is to make operative decisions for operational implementation on the ground.
Time will tell whether that will be the case. The possibility of a large-scale operation against the terrorist infrastructure in northern Samaria has been being examined for many months. The reasons in favor are clear: terrorism in Samaria has raised its head over the past 18 months, and even more so since the beginning of 2023. To this must be added the insane quantity of standard and improvised weapons on the ground, including many IEDs such as those that exploded today in an operation that became entangled in the Jenin sector; The wild incitement on the part of the terrorist organizations and the lack of control by the Palestinian Authority, which leads to anarchy on the ground. The only thing standing between all this and a widespread outbreak is the unprecedented scope of killings by the Shin Bet and the IDF – 375 significant killings since the beginning of 2023 (including about 300 killings of shooting attacks), compared to 474 significant killings in all of 2022.
Four murdered in shooting attack at gas station near the community of Ali // Yoni Rikner
The main concern: lack of intelligence
All these will eventually lead the IDF to an extensive operation in northern Samaria. Such an operation could have two catalysts: the first, an exceptional attack, and the second, a backlog of high-quality, focused intelligence that would enable systematic, deep damage to the terrorist infrastructure.
The government must decide whether the attack meets the first criterion, and as of last night, it appears that the second criterion has not been sufficiently achieved, otherwise Israel would have embarked on the operation in question a long time ago. The political echelon can order this even with partial intelligence, but while understanding the risks: in the absence of sufficient intelligence, the operation may turn out, the forces may find themselves in too long a stay on the ground, and the result may be insufficient in terms of achievements and problematic in terms of damage – criticism in the Western and Arab worlds, damage in the Palestinian arena (perhaps also entanglement vis-à-vis Gaza and in the northern sector), many fatalities on the Palestinian side and casualties to IDF forces.
It is incumbent upon the political echelon to build international legitimacy. Ben-Gvir and Netanyahu (archive), photo: Oren Ben Hakon
All these must be taken into account in advance, before embarking on the operation. It is incumbent upon the political echelon to build international legitimacy not only for this specific operation, but also for the chain that may result from it. The fact that the two terrorists are Hamas operatives is of great importance, because it shows the organization's double game: while maintaining quiet in the Gaza Strip, it urges its operatives to carry out attacks from the West Bank.
It is precisely because of such a double game that Israel went over the head of Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Even now, it must ask itself whether it is playing tactically, only in Samaria, or whether it is clarifying to Hamas the borders of the sector, even at the price of a renewed escalation in the south (and perhaps also in the north). While the need for an immediate return of security and a sense of security in Judea and Samaria is on the agenda, the deterioration in security in recent months on all fronts shows that sooner or later those who do not deter in Samaria will sooner or later be challenged by them as well.
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