The security reality presents the State of Israel with a new strategic situation that has not been recognized until now. It is not easy to identify a strategic shift at the moment of its formation. The State of Israel is currently dealing with such a turnaround. Since March 2022, in a fairly successful sequence of special forces operations directed by the Shin Bet, the IDF has coped well with terrorism that has intensified throughout Judea and Samaria. However, in recent weeks, a new kind of threat has emerged, which is not only an increase in the frequency and quality of attacks. This is a shift in overall purpose that guides enemies in all arenas to a new logic and a new method.
Terrorism has never amounted to just the actions of bad people and bad intentions. Every act of terror has a purpose that connects murder and destruction to a managed and calculated campaign. Similarly, the change currently taking place in terrorism throughout Judea and Samaria is aimed at the idea of a campaign.
Vehicular attack near the Maccabim checkpoint \\ Yoni Rikner
The change in the new threat outline in Judea and Samaria is reflected in the purpose, the weapons, the organization, and the fighting spirit. The new purpose for terrorism seeks to exhaust the conditions of weakness in which the Israeli political leadership and society find themselves – a wave of armed uprising. The goal is to bring the State of Israel to withdraw from Judea and Samaria in the same way that it withdrew under pressure from the Hezbollah fighting from the security zone in Lebanon, as well as the way Israel withdrew from Gaza in the summer of 2005 under pressure from Hamas resistance.
The abundance of weapons that entered Judea and Samaria – including standard rifles as well as sniper rifles, including IEDs and means of production for IEDs – generated a momentum of combat that enabled streamlining of terrorist attacks and decentralization throughout the entire region.
The innovation in the organizational dimension is manifested, first of all, in the unification of the factions of Hamas, Palestinian Jihad and the Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs. In addition, the organization enables the armed groups to plan, coordinate and centralize control through operations rooms. The ability to control gives them the possibility of reinforcing forces and responding in battle that the terrorist squads have not had until now.
The scene of the attack at the Maccabim checkpoint, photo: Jonathan Shaul
The new fighting spirit is motivated to a large extent by the spirit of the times – both from the winds of war blowing from Ukraine, and also from the consciousness of success of what they see as the exhaustion of a happy opportunity.
As we mark the 30th anniversary of the Oslo Accords, the Israeli leadership should return to the two basic assumptions set by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the time. The first assumption was the expectation that with the transfer of the territory to the control of the Palestinian Authority, a sovereign entity would be established there that would be demilitarized from offensive weapons that threaten the State of Israel, and that the weapons it would possess for internal security purposes would be operated by institutional mechanisms, with the full authority and control of the political leadership.
The second assumption stated that if the security reality changes for the worse, Israel will be wise enough to act to protect its security. Rabin stressed that the process vis-à-vis the PA is not a return and, if necessary, the IDF will be able to cancel the threat and re-ensure Israel's security.
Rabin's first assumption collapsed in the early years, and has since collapsed again and again. Over the past year, the PA has lost all control over the armed groups. At this time, even strengthening it will not be able to suppress the rogue armed network, which has grown very strong. Israel can only turn to Rabin's second assumption, expecting that once the scope of the threat has emerged, the Israeli government will be able to instruct the IDF what Prime Minister Ariel Sharon instructed it in preparation for Operation Defensive Shield.
Of course, it has been more than two decades since Defensive Shield, and what is right to do in the new context requires a new operational idea. It is presumed that the IDF and the defense establishment, in coordination with the political leadership, will propose an innovative and appropriate idea with useful creativity.
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