Minister Galit Distal Atabrian would have bought her world had she assumed responsibility, and in a move full of sincerity and public responsibility would have resigned. Due to the resignation or dismissal of the ministry's director-general, and instead of blaming the failure on the professional team she herself chose, she would write a simple truth: "In the State of Israel there are too many public actors engaged in public relations, and another government ministry that deals with the field has no moral, professional or budgetary justification." Distal Atabrian could have asked the prime minister to close the Ministry of Information and return to serving her constituents and the public from the Knesset. An elected official who tries, understands and accepts responsibility inspires respect. But that didn't happen.
It is worth reviewing the information system, or perhaps the information mess, to understand why the ministry was doomed to failure in the first place. There are at least five official bodies engaged in "hasbara": the IDF Spokesperson, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, the National Information Headquarters, and the Ministry of Information. Not only do they not work together, at best they barely talk to each other, and at worst they are busy playing ego games, authority and budgets. They also don't know how to work with civil society organizations, a task that can multiply power.
A national information bureau under the Prime Minister's Office is supposed to coordinate government messages to the public, various authorities, international bodies, and external communication networks. This important body has been abandoned for years, without defining tasks and without staffing standards and retaining quality personnel. The situation improved with the appointment of Elad Tene during the Bennett-Lapid government, but this successful episode was shattered by political instability.
The work of the Foreign Ministry has a dimension of information, but the main task is supposed to be at the official diplomatic level. The Foreign Ministry does not excel in pro-Israel advocacy, sometimes as a necessity, sometimes voluntarily.
The IDF Spokesperson, for example, should not mourn Israel's fate during combat. The vacuum and chaos that exist today leads to the fact that during combat, Dutz distributes infographics on his networks about Israeli casualties and the number of missiles fired at Israel, and uploads videos of children running in panic to the shelter. Is it right for the army to act in this way?
The Ministry of Diaspora Affairs has taken upon itself the war against delegitimization. A very important field, completely different from classical hasbara. A war to delegitimize Israel is a real war, which must incorporate more or less overt actions against elements that are often also involved in terrorism.
And finally, the Ministry of Information. What? What are its tasks? Israel's advocacy around the world or internal Israeli advocacy of government policy, such as the legal reform? What is the justification and what is the value of the success of the "hasbara" mission?
Take a look across the street, and we will see that the work of consciousness among the Palestinians is like a machine. They don't explain themselves like an apologetic child. With them, the messages come out quickly and systematically, with an understanding and knowledge of what perceives and what does not. There is no gray among them, there are good guys and there are bad guys, Israel and the Jews are the monster. It's true that it's easier when you're supposedly the victim and the world isn't for us, but today we're not even on the field.
Public consciousness is a rapidly developing professional field that requires knowledge, experience, technology and resources. It is precisely with us, instead of giving him what is required, that the tool has become empty of content, means and understanding.
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