Israelis are well acquainted with the threat of rockets and missiles. Years of Katyusha rockets from Lebanon and later Qassam rockets from Gaza have taught civilians to prepare and prepare, and the State of Israel to develop capabilities and defend accordingly. Although a large-scale war will bring with it a completely different dimension of this threat because of the insane number of missiles in the hands of the enemy, mainly Hezbollah in the north, it is still a familiar challenge.
At the same time, with much less public relations, another threat has developed in recent years: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Although it had preliminary signs and several operational events that were published, and the war in Russia also created a strong resonance in this field, it is doubtful whether anyone in Israel – other than the professionals – is familiar with the scope of the incident and the widespread threat inherent in it.
This is a threat that is expected to challenge Israel on a significant scale in the future, both in routine times and especially in war. It stems from Iran's decision to invest dramatically in the development and production of UAVs, and from their serial distribution, in large numbers, to a variety of power elements in the region, which have also begun to produce UAVs based on Iranian assistance and knowledge.
In fact, this is such a significant challenge that it required the IDF and the defense industries to invest a parallel effort in order to prepare for it in a variety of ways – offensive, defensive and intelligence.
"We were surprised by the speed with which things happened," says a military source, "In the world of missiles and rockets, these processes took 30 years. Here everything developed very quickly, including the possibility of decentralizing production. Although we got on it relatively quickly and prepared accordingly, what is happening here is a new and particularly challenging threat."
Simple production, high efficiency
Iran's preoccupation with drones is not new. It began already in the 90s, with an attempt to produce the first models in order to diversify the force of the various Iranian units. Until then, Iran had focused on the development and production of missiles and rockets of various types and ranges, including long ranges. The sharp ones will undoubtedly repeat the headlines in Israel about the progress in the development of the Shihab missiles and other platforms that can cover the distance between Iran and Israel and carry heavy munitions (including nuclear weapons in the future).
At the same time, the Iranians understood that unmanned aerial vehicles allow them additional capabilities. Unlike a missile, which flies openly and clearly where it took off from and where it will hit, the UAV flies low, slowly and stealthily, and can be operated for special missions with a low signature, for a variety of missions – from intelligence gathering, through dropping munitions for attack purposes, to suicide (what is known in professional language as "kamikaze").
The production of drones is also much simpler than that of long-range missiles. "A surface-to-surface missile leaves the atmosphere and has to return to it, and severe structural loads and pressures are exerted on it," explains Capt. L., who is responsible for UAV research in the technological research branch of enemy fire capabilities in the Military Intelligence Research Division. "A UAV flies in the atmosphere, it is based on a simple piston engine, and it is much easier to manufacture."
From the outset, the method chosen by Iran to advance in the path of the drones is unique to it. Unlike Israel or the United States, which develop the tools themselves, the Iranians were based on the catch-up concept: to use the help of others in order to close the technological gap they had. They did so mainly by reverse-engineering American and Israeli drones that were shot down or shot down during missions across the region. Each such tool (or its fragments) was transported to Iran, analyzed to the brim by local experts, and perfectly copied. This saved Iran many years of research and experimentation in the production process, and enabled it to move relatively quickly to mass production of UAVs of various types and ranges.
"All Iranian platforms have an ancestor that came from somewhere else," L. says, "Shahed 136, which is now in the headlines because of the war in Ukraine, is based on an Israeli Elbit UAV. His brothers in the series, Shahed 141 and Shahed 197, are based on the American RQ-170 UAV."
Until the past decade, Iran has made relatively slow progress in the world of drones. Although she had some successes, she possessed abilities that were far from those she wanted. The dramatic technological changes that the civilian world has undergone have enabled it to close gaps at tremendous speed. Components that until then had been developed in secret laboratories and were the domain of a small group of technological powers, became public knowledge and could be purchased on the shelf at civilian sites – from flight computers and walkie-talkies, to navigation devices and even encryption devices.
However, over the past decade, Iran has been under heavy international sanctions, which have made procurement processes more difficult. In order to circumvent this obstacle, it has established a variety of companies and entities that specialize in purchasing various components and transferring them to Iran. After their arrival in Iran, these components are embedded in the various UAV programs, and mainly enable it to mass-produce large quantities of UAVs.
"The Iranians' ability to buy products off the shelve and implement them could not have been possible 15 years ago," says a military source who specializes in the field. "This has allowed them the significant leap that we've seen in recent years."
Big Money and Diplomacy
This progress was also made possible by another advantage Iran has: friction. Like Israel, it regularly rubs shoulders with its enemies in various arenas. Some of this, especially in the Persian Gulf region, is done directly by Israel, and some of it – in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen – through proxies, forces acting on its behalf and under its guidance. This allowed her to constantly experiment with the various tools she developed, learn lessons and quickly implement them in the development and production processes.
The technological advances and experience it has accumulated have also enabled it to transfer some of the production processes to the proxy itself. The savings are clear: not only the proliferation of capabilities and a significant increase in production surfaces, but the opening of the challenging bottleneck of the transfer of weapons to the various arenas. This is particularly evident in the northern arena, where Israel is waging a regular campaign against Iranian arms transfers (parts of which were recently exposed here).
Over the past decade, Israel has carried out thousands of attacks and operations to disrupt these Iranian attempts to smuggle a variety of means and capabilities – from missiles and rockets to drones of various types – and one of the methods that the Iranians have found to overcome this intensive Israeli campaign is to transfer production capabilities to their protégés – the Houthis in Yemen, the Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This process has turned the consumer into a manufacturer himself, but it has enabled the Iranians to become a major player in the field – and not only vis-à-vis its protégés. Iran has become a super-distributor of such capabilities to a variety of countries, including superpowers. Russia is the most prominent of them, a military power that had to rely on Iran to make capabilities in the field of drones accessible to itself. This is done first in procurement, and today in the process of production on Russian soil. Shahed 136, which became the world's most recognized and talked-about drone following the war in Ukraine, will now be given the Russian nickname Gran (short for geranium).
At the same time, the Russians are also operating Iranian Shahed 131 and Mohajer-6 UAVs in Ukraine. Russia has so far purchased about 1000,40 UAVs at an average price of about $<>,<> per unit, and intends to produce thousands of UAVs on its soil in the future, an issue that is of great concern to the West and to Israel, because it connects global evil (Russia) with regional evil (Iran).
Iran is carrying out a similar process vis-à-vis China. Here, too, a superpower that found itself lacking in this area, and turned to a smaller and much weaker country in order to close gaps. In the Chinese case, Shahed 136 is nicknamed Sunflower 200, and it too will be transferred to serial production on Chinese soil.
In both cases, the Russians and the Chinese, the Iranians are exploiting the process not only to put big money into their depleted coffers after many years of tough economic sanctions, but also for dangerous global and military diplomacy – from rapprochement between the two countries, to using Russia and China to obtain various knowledge and means that until now were far from their reach.
National-military enterprise
Iran's drone industry has become a household name in the past year following Russia's use of Iranian drones in the war in Ukraine. But Iran began using the tools it had developed – directly and through its proxies – many years earlier. Even during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Iranian Ababil drones were used by Hezbollah to attack Israel. They were intercepted by the Israeli Air Force or crashed, causing no casualties or damage.
Subsequently, Hezbollah made several more attempts to introduce various tools into Israel – from drones to drones, another field in which there has been a dramatic leap in the civilian world in recent years, which has enabled Iran to make significant progress in terms of the development and production of its military capabilities.
The Iranian drone industry operates simultaneously on two main axes. One under the Iranian Defense Ministry and the other under the Revolutionary Guards. On the side of the Department of Defense there are two industries engaged in the production of UAVs. The first is called HESA, it was founded in 1976 and is headquartered in Isfahan. This company initially manufactured light aircraft, but today it is also developing and manufacturing UAVs, mainly Ababil, which serve the Iranian army's air force and some of its shipments – from the Houthis in Yemen to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The two main models, Ababil 2 and Ababil 3, are drones with a range of about 100km that can be used for collection, attack and shattering.
The second industry is called QODS. Founded in 1985, it employs hundreds of people and is subject to sanctions by the U.S. Treasury Department. Its flagship series is the Mohajer: the Mohajer-6 is a reconnaissance and attack UAV with a range of thousands of kilometers and the ability to carry guided munitions (4-6 bombs), and the Mohajer-10, which was unveiled two weeks ago, reportedly has a range of about 2000,300 kilometers in Iran and the ability to carry a payload of up to <> kilograms.
The second axis, operated by the Revolutionary Guards, also owns two parallel industries. The first is called KIPAS, and it is extremely secretive. This industry operates under the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, whose goal is to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders and which, among other things, leads the war against Israel.
The second industry, called Shahed Aviation Industries, was originally intended to give the IRGC's air force the ability to manufacture and operate UAVs independently, without being dependent on the Defense Ministry or the Iranian Army Air Force. This was done as part of the process of accumulating power of the commander of the IRGC's air force, Amir Ali Haji Zadeh, who after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani became the strongman in the Revolutionary Guards and also the bitterest and most dangerous enemy of Israel, the moderate Sunni states and the West.
Shahed manufactures a variety of UAVs, all under the same name (but their number varies). The Shahed 197 is a UAV with a wingspan of 7 meters, a flight range of thousands of kilometers and a flight speed of about 200 kilometers per hour, capable of staying in the air for about 20 hours continuously. The Shahed 141 is an explosive UAV that can also be used for weapons transfers, has a flight range of about 1800 km at a flight speed of 185 km / h. The Shahed 101 is an explosive UAV that can also be used for reconnaissance purposes, weighing about 10 kg and a flight range of about 700 km.
The company's flagship product is Shahed 136. This is a suicide attack UAV, with a range of 2000,2200-185 km, that flies at a relatively low altitude and speed of about 136 km / h, making it difficult to detect and intercept it. Following the activation of Shahed <> in the war against Iran, the United States, Canada, and the European Union imposed sanctions on Shahed's industry, but the deals made with Russia (and now China) for procurement, and later for independent production, allow Shahed's aviation industries to continue to prosper.
UAV bypasses sanctions
Roughly speaking, the production processes can be divided as follows: the Iranian wings are poured on their own soil into molds that Iran builds and then dries and bakes, or in the country where the UAV is manufactured (Yemen, Lebanon or in the near future in Russia); She buys the engine (most often Chinese piston engines); It casts its warhead in Iran; And the technology is buying in the civilian market. The warheads change according to the mission, with spray sometimes added to increase damage and damage.
The Russians, for example, use mainly 50-kilogram warheads in Ukraine. They buy the drones in Iran and transfer them to Russia mainly by plane and, more recently, ships in the Caspian Sea, and the proceeds are transferred to Iran in cash or gold bullion in order to circumvent the sanctions.
This growing cooperation between the countries is also troubling to Israel because the Iranians are using it to make progress on a variety of other issues – information in various fields, including the development and production of hypersonic missiles and satellite launchers, through the promotion of deals (including Sukhoi-35 aircraft), to intelligence and operational cooperation. "They're trying to squeeze this lemon all the way," the source said.
The first two industries under the Ministry of Defense focus on Iran's interior: they are the main suppliers of drones to the Iranian military, with the main goal being to defend the country's soil. The two industries under the IRGC focus on external targets: either directly operated or through various proxies.
The IRGC's need for immediate solutions that meet needs on the ground means that the industries under their supervision work at a faster pace and for short periods of time, while the industries under the Ministry of Defense operate for the long term. It is not clear to what extent these industries exchange information and capabilities, but there is at least one clear identity between them that goes beyond state interests: Both are working hard to sell drones in every possible corner of the globe, both to bring in money and to increase influence. Some were included because they were involved in attacking various elements in the region, and others because of their involvement in the war in Ukraine. These sanctions do complicate the procurement processes for the Iranians, but the enormous boom in the field in Iran – and the growing demand for its UAVs – indicate that the effectiveness of the sanctions is extremely limited, especially when Russia and China joined the customer list.
"Since these are mostly civilian components that can be purchased simply on the free market, the Iranians manage to overcome the sanctions relatively easily," the military source said. "Even if they are blocked from purchasing one way or another, they immediately find a replacement."
Israel at the center of the crosshairs
Over the years, Iran has significantly increased its use of UAVs in all arenas in which it operates. The most intensive use – which was also the most effective testing ground for the Iranians – was made by the Houthis in Yemen. Hundreds of vehicles were used for a variety of purposes, including systematically attacking Saudi targets, including the capital Riyadh.
Iran itself has tried in the past to avoid direct use of the drones it has produced so as not to get involved in direct confrontations, leaving its proxies to confront Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even the United States. This Iranian octopus method of using force – which aims to constantly challenge its adversaries and keep Iran itself safe and out of the battle – is well known, and is a permanent headache for its enemies, first and foremost Israel, which is debating whether to settle for constant confrontation. Bleeding, in front of the proxies, or making Iran pay a heavy price itself, on its soil.
It is likely that this dilemma will intensify significantly in a major war event such as the Third Lebanon War, when Israel will decide between an attempt to deter by harming Iran and the fear that such a move will also directly join it in the war.
In recent years, Iran has loosened some of the cables and has begun operating drones directly for its various purposes. The first such attack against Israel was on February 10, 2018, when a Shahed 141 UAV was launched from Syrian Air Force Base T4 towards Israel, in response to Israeli attacks against Iranian targets on Syrian soil. Israel monitored the drone throughout its flight and intercepted it by Apache helicopters near Beit She'an.
On September 14, 2019, Iran carried out its most famous and effective attack to date, launching dozens of drones and cruise missiles at the facilities of Saudi Arabia's national oil company, Aramco. This surprise attack significantly damaged Saudi oil production capability, and caused shock in the region, mainly due to the American decision not to defend Saudi Arabia and to harm Iran's response. The lessons of this incident resonate to this day, and underlie some of the Saudi distrust of the United States and the Saudis' widespread demands for various types of weapons (including in the unmanned world) that will enable them to defend themselves in the future.
On the verge of escalation
The incessant blows suffered by the air strikes in Syria have caused Iran to look for a new medium by which it can take revenge on Israel. As part of this, a wave of attacks began two years ago against ships in the Persian Gulf, which are wholly or partially owned by Israel but sail under a foreign flag and with foreign crews.
On March 25, 2021, Iranian drones hit the ship LORI, which is partly owned by Israel and was sailing in the Arabian Sea. ON APRIL 13, 2021, A DRONE HIT ANOTHER SHIP, PARTLY OWNED BY ISRAELI, HYPERION RAY, AND ON JULY 3, 2021, A THIRD ATTEMPT WAS MADE, ALSO AGAINST AN ISRAELI-OWNED SHIP – CSAV TYNDALL.
The fourth attack in the series was on July 29, 2021. A SHAHAD 136 DRONE HIT THE MERCER STREET SHIP, KILLING A BRITISH CITIZEN AND A ROMANIAN CITIZEN. Britain was outraged, and a severe diplomatic crisis broke out between the countries, following which the Revolutionary Guards – apparently under the orders of Supreme Leader Khamenei – stopped attacking ships in the Gulf region. The Iranians, who sought to lift the sanctions imposed on them due to the nuclear program, feared an intensification of friction with the West and decided to calm this arena.
But in another arena, the Iranians remained active – against Israel. On March 15, 2021, two Shahed 197 UAVs launched from Iran into Israel were intercepted. It was the first operational downing of an F-35, and it was kept secret for about a year until it was allowed for publication. In another incident, on April 2 of this year, a Shahed 101 drone crossing the border from Syria into Israeli territory was intercepted. This drone was intercepted using electronic jams and crashed in the southern Golan Heights near the Sea of Galilee. Among its fragments collected were a wing, engine, flight computer and navigation unit.
Since the Iranian industries operate separately, there are quite a few factors involved in the production and development processes, and later in the operation and distribution to the various parties. Some of them belong to the Ministry of Defense and are responsible for HESA and QODS, some operate under the IRGC and are responsible for KIPAS and Shahed Aviation Industries, and some for the end elements in the Quds Force or various proxies.
As noted, Haji Zadeh is the dominant among them, mainly against the background of the accelerated operating and procurement processes carried out in the past year vis-à-vis Russia (and China). He was also responsible for attacks in Saudi Arabia – including Aramco facilities – and for attempts to operate Iranian long-range drones that would reach Israel.
Another senior IRGC official active in the field is Abdullah Mehrabi, who is responsible for the IRGC's drone industries, including Shahed's industries.
A third senior figure is Sa'id Izadi, head of the Palestine branch of the Quds Force's Lebanon Corps, which is responsible for all support to the Palestinian organizations and Iran's relations with them, including the transfer of funds, know-how and weapons to the various organizations (mainly Hamas and Islamic Jihad). Izadi is also involved in efforts to develop Gaza's drone industry, which encounters objective difficulties because Gaza is closed and relies solely on self-development, and also because Israel exploits every round of fighting or attacks in Gaza to deprive the organizations of the facilities, means and capabilities they have developed.
The Iranian Defense Ministry has two key figures active in the field. The first is Seyyed Hajtullah Qurishi, head of the logistics division at the Ministry of Defense, who is responsible for defense exports and also manages defense relations with Russia. Qureshi led the process of selling the drones to Russia, and was widely praised for his success. He is also trying to promote similar processes with other countries, and is currently active in establishing a UAV factory in Tajikistan, as well as in efforts to help Armenia as part of its war against Azerbaijan. Another factor is Qassem Damoundian, who is responsible for the QODS industries that produce the Mohajer series.
Under these factors there are hundreds of employees and experts from various fields – from various types of engineering and the worlds of technology, to intelligence and operations. Since Iran's capability has advanced dramatically in recent years, it has also enabled a significant leap forward and a variety of options for the use of force. Against Israel, for example, this enables Iran to attack with a variety of tools and ranges, from its close proxies in Lebanon and Syria (and Gaza), to its distant proxies in Iraq and Yemen, to self-launching drones from any point in Iran.
Any such attack requires careful planning. From choosing the right tool (intelligence gathering, attack, suicide), through the selection of munitions, to planning the flight path to reduce the risk of exposure and interception. This creates quite a headache for Israel, which is forced to adapt its defense systems to the new threat: not only missiles that come from above, but drones (and cruise missiles) that arrive slowly and at low altitudes, challenging the radars that are supposed to detect them (and on the other hand, making them easier to intercept, because of the low flight speed, compared to the complex interception of missiles and rockets).
In fact, the Iranians are so enthusiastic about the new world of drone opportunities that they are now focusing their focus primarily on it. The IRGC's air force has no planes, and its weapons include a variety of missiles and rockets, drones and various air defense systems, which it also distributes to its proxies. "This allows him to implement his policy of using force below the threshold of escalation, that is, attacking targets without risking war himself," the military source said.
The Challenge: Counterterrorism and Interception
With Israel, this is a particularly dramatic change. "This is not a missile launch, which is a red line above the threshold of escalation and will certainly lead to war. UAVs make it possible to operate relatively secretly, even from a distance, although we now see a clear fear of an Israeli response on Iranian soil."
This occurred, among other things, following attacks attributed to Israel in Iran. One such attack, attributed to the Mossad, was carried out by drones in March 2022, destroying dozens of Shahed drones on the ground at a factory in the city of Kermanshah in Iran. Another strike, in February of this year (also carried out by drones and attributed to the Mossad), hit a factory where Iran manufactured drones near the city of Karaj.
These attacks caused some damage to Iran and probably sent a message, but they did not stop the process. "The Iranians are already good enough," says Capt. Y., head of the warning section of the Iran branch of the Research Department. "They know how to produce, they know how to launch and they know how to hit the target. Even if they are not of the best quality in the world, their idea is to work on quantities: launch a lot, some will fall along the way or be intercepted, but some will come. As far as they are concerned, this is a good means of realizing their concept of exercising their power."
As far as Israel is concerned, this is a major headache. The next war could bring not only a rain of missiles and rockets, but also a challenging multi-front drone threat that will be employed by a variety of actors – from Hezbollah's drone units and pro-Iranian militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, to the Iranians themselves. The role of intelligence is not only to warn in advance in order to enable prevention or interception so as not to rely only on strong defense, but also to collect information that will enable the Air Force and the defense industries to become familiar with the various tools and threats and their capabilities and to develop an appropriate response in the areas of detection and interception by various means.
The future, professionals believe, is no less challenging. "We live in a world where in a moment deliveries are made with drones, where vehicles can talk or transmit information and images between each other," says Capt. L. "Obviously, diversity will stop at some point because every tool requires different experts, technicians, logistics and operation, but the quantity will only increase – and with it the challenge."
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