Video: Hamas publishes documentation of the training for the fighting/documentation on social networks
Hamas has waged a protracted campaign of deception over the past two years to convince Israel that it does not want a confrontation, while in the meantime it is planning the unprecedented surprise attack on Saturday, a source close to the group described the meticulous preparations made to Reuters, which revealed behind-the-scenes details of planning the most dramatic attack on Israel since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
The same source said that while Israel believed Hamas could be restrained through economic benefits for workers from Gaza, Hamas fighters conducted training exercises and exercises, which were sometimes visible to all. "Hamas gave Israel the feeling that it was not ready to fight," said the source close to Hamas. "Hamas has used unprecedented intelligence tactics to mislead Israel in recent months, giving the public impression that it does not want to enter into fighting or confrontation with Israel while preparing for this massive operation."
Hamas exercise in urban warfare in Gaza/Reuters
The attack, which included parachute drones, motorcycles and bulldozers at the start of the invasion, shocked Israel, leaving at least 700 dead and dozens of abductees. "It's our September 11," Capt. Nir Diner of the IDF Spokesperson told Reuters. "They caught us. They surprised us and arrived quickly from many points – air, land and sea."
Osama Hamdan, Hamas' representative in Lebanon, told Reuters that the attack showed the Palestinians had the determination to achieve their goals, "despite Israel's might and military capabilities."
According to a source close to Hamas, during preparations for the attack, Hamas built a model of a settlement in Gaza where it practiced military raids and storming. For many years, the organization did not hide its preparations and exercises in the Gaza Strip, and published countless documents that were interpreted as psychological warfare only.
"I'm convinced that Israel saw them, but was convinced that Hamas didn't want to get into a confrontation," the source told Reuters.
In the period leading up to the attack, Hamas tried to convince Israel that it was more concerned about the welfare of workers in Gaza seeking work in its territory, and that it had no interest in starting a new war. "Hamas managed to create a complete picture that it was not ready for a military adventure against Israel," he said.
Israel believed that economic stability in Gaza, by granting thousands of work permits to Gazans, would restrain Hamas. "We believed that if they came to work and returned to Gaza with money, it would create a degree of calm. We were wrong," another IDF source told Reuters.
An Israeli security source admitted that the security establishment had fallen into the trap of Hamas. "They made us believe they wanted money," he told Reuters. "And all this time they were involved in training and drills until they got out of control."
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Hamas's exercises were open. Training on Gaza's shores, December 2020/Reuters
As part of the campaign of deception, Hamas has refrained over the past two years from joining the fighting alongside Islamic Jihad and was even criticized by some of its supporters, who saw it as preferring power to the struggle against Israel. Fatah, headed by Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, also ridiculed Hamas. In June last year, the rival group reported that Hamas leaders had fled to Arab capitals to live in "hotels and luxury mansions," leaving their members in Gaza to live in poverty.
Another Israeli security source told Reuters that there was a time when Israel believed Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, was more concerned with running Gaza "than killing Jews." He added that at the same time, Israel had diverted its attention from Hamas to promote normalization with Saudi Arabia.
Prevent leaks
The source close to Hamas said that the organization placed great emphasis on preventing leaks in planning the attack. For years, Israel prided itself on its ability to penetrate the ranks of terrorist organizations and obtain critical information, but not this time. According to the source, many Hamas leaders were unaware of the plans, while the 3,000 fighters who had been trained for the attack did not know the exact purpose of the training.
He said that on the day of the attack, the operation was divided into four parts. The first was a barrage of thousands of rockets – it punctured 2,500, while in Israel it pierced <>,<> – at the same time as paragliding infiltrations into Israeli territory.
After they landed in the area, they secured it to allow Hamas' elite units to storm the smart fence, which was supposed to be fortified and prevent infiltrations. The terrorists detonated IEDs to penetrate it and deployed motorcycles around the Gaza Strip. At the same time, bulldozers widened the breaches in the fence and additional terrorists entered Israeli territory in vehicles.
Subsequently, Hamas' elite forces attacked the headquarters of the Gaza Division and disrupted its means of communication, thus preventing the forces from calling for reinforcements or communicating with each other. In the final stage, the many abductees were taken to Gaza, many of them young people who were at a party near Kibbutz Reim, as well as children, women and adults.
One of the Israeli security sources who spoke to Reuters criticized the decision to hold the party so close to Gaza. He added that IDF forces were not fully deployed near the border with Gaza, because some of them had been transferred to the West Bank following the wave of terrorism there in recent months.
"Hamas took advantage of this," he said.
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