Even before 2007, we waged a campaign there, but from the moment Hamas took over the Gaza Strip and became sovereign, we have been working against a satanic organization that does not shy away from anything and whose only desire is to destroy Israel. And this is nothing new, especially when it comes to a gang that is willing to descend to the lowest level of humanity and negotiate with us over body parts.
In this organization, which has grown to dimensions that are not committed to reality, we are required to decide - and this is not a question of whether it is right and how it is right - it is a necessity of reality, and there is no other way.
In the present article, I will detail several dimensions to the process required to achieve this result - it is not simple and has many complexities, especially when they have dozens and perhaps more captives and abductees.
The collapse of Hamas
Since it is an ideological political movement, we must understand that expressions of "erasure" or "collapse" are irrelevant – Israel must act in a configuration that will realistically enable achieving its goal. Hence, in my understanding, the systemic objective required is the destruction of the organization's military wing. This is the minimum achievement in light of the events of the past few days, for it must be clear to all of us that we cannot afford this monster that is not controlled on the threshold of our settlements. It has to end.
How do you destroy a military wing?
In military terms, it is necessary to specify three possibilities for achieving the achievement: severely damaging the organization's fighting force, subduing it, or fleeing to the point of abandoning the Gaza Strip exactly as Arafat and his men left Beirut during the Peace for Galilee War. Any result that does not align with these 3 options or a combination of them is far from enough.
IDF strikes in Gaza October 07, 2023/official website, Atia Mohammed
The actions required of the IDF The
IDF is required to carry out a significant, continuous and deep ground operation, when it can be carried out gradually while declaring that our goal is to remove Hamas forces from the Gaza Strip. A ground operation that is closing in on the centers of power in the Gaza Strip is intensifying, and has not stopped until this achievement is achieved. The IDF must be commanded: "You are going all the way and we will arrest you when we understand that the achievement has been achieved." As stated, either the destruction or surrender of the military wing (i.e., its extradition to prison or expulsion from the area). After that, cleaning the Gaza Strip of all combat infrastructure. The IDF knows how to do this, there are consequences and it takes time, but after last weekend we understand that there is no choice here - this organization committed a crime against humanity, against us, and it no longer has any right to exist.
Complexity
This is complex fighting in densely built-up areas – it will draw many forces, and it will have significant costs in lives and economically. We need international backing and patience – these for now we seem to have all that is required.
The fighting will be in a civilian medium, and a system that will know how to deal with the local population will be required - we must allow it to flee - preferably towards Egypt - direct them there and make a continuous effort to empty this area as much as possible - but some will remain in their homes, and they will be besieged in war - this is a price - the State of Gaza has declared war on the State of Israel. Humanitarian aid will be conducted vis-à-vis the besieged – the IDF is required to establish a significant and strategic arm to manage this need.
Another complication involved in "pumping forces" to the south is the conflagration of additional arenas – this is not a hypothesis. The starting point is that Iran initiated this incident and is coordinated with other sectors, at least Syria, Lebanon, and Judea and Samaria. Here we must provide a first defensive response at all levels, and this requires a general mobilization of the IDF - everything is mobilized because the weekend event is an incentive for masses of terrorists to imitate the act that came out of Gaza - Israel cannot accept this and it is impossible to take risks.
Moreover, the combined northern arena from Syria and Lebanon must be fortified with the best forces, and without risks. The Northern Command must be prepared for an all-out campaign with full mobilization, and it is possible that we will be required to operate simultaneously in both arenas – the IDF knows how to do this – priorities are required for what is decided first, and the North in this situation will be a top priority due to the fact that the potential threat from the northern arena is many times more dramatic than from the Gaza Strip.
The international
dimension in the immediate term: As stated, Israel must defeat Hamas (unless Hezbollah also launches a campaign), and in order to create the conditions for action, we need restraint in the full sense of the word on the part of the Iranians, and their proxies – only the United States can do this. The Americans, and it seems that this is how they operate, must make it clear to the ayatollahs' regime that opening a northern front means that their heads bleed. In Iran, the survival of the regime is first and foremost, and they must be under a clear and immediate threat.
The Egyptian Arena
Egypt has a very important role in this campaign – both guarding the Sinai border and an ally in the southern Gaza Strip. The Egyptians are a vital lever for the return of the hostages - perhaps the beginning of an Israeli move requires allowing Egypt an opportunity to return at least some of the captives, at least the elderly, women and children that Hamas and the other organizations kidnapped - it is right to enlist Egypt in helping the Americans in this matter - after all, it is also in their interest. Egypt is an ally in the south, and one must be very sober in communicating with them.
The Judea and Samaria arena is an explosive arena that can easily mimic the actions that took place in the south, i.e., the breaching of the barrier and the influx of masses of Palestinians into Israeli territory - the general mobilization of the IDF must create a defensive order of battle that does not allow a mass breach of the borders, certainly in Judea and Samaria
. There is no substitute for fighters defending the border – the barrier alone will not bring the required result. In Merbil, the defensive effort requires an offensive effort that stabilizes maximum control on the ground – not the occupation of Palestinian cities, but maximum spatial control, and a continuous intelligence picture.
The Internal
Arena In this context, the Home Front Command must be shoulder to shoulder with the Israel Police – the police alone cannot effectively cope with a "Guardian of the Walls"-style operation – the IDF needs open traffic routes for the flow of logistics, and therefore the home front is an arena that must be flooded with forces, and with appropriate reserves for reinforcements in particularly sensitive areas.
Communication These types of systems
are strongly influenced by consciousness – and it is mainly produced by the media. Between gloom in the context of omissions and costs, and awareness of the threat to the enemy, the media must be responsible – not empower the enemy, and certainly serve as a national aid to the war effort. This is an all-out campaign, and therefore all state resources, including the media, must be harnessed. The media must be responsible, not expose actions, and not give an exaggerated platform to human dramas, which is difficult but essential. Therefore, the cognitive effort must be headed by a skilled and professional person in these contexts – the challenges are far too significant to be managed by an IDF Spokesperson or a minister – it must be managed professionally and sharply, including the entire world of social networks. The State of Israel has the right people – they must be recruited for this campaign without oppression.
All in all, the overall operational effort is now directed at Gaza, but it must be supported by a general mobilization of all the country's capabilities. of forces that prevent deterioration, international assistance that enables isolation of the battle zone, and dealing with the issue of abductees, and communication whose main purpose is cognitive assistance to the operational effort, while preventing deterioration in other arenas, and providing a drastic response if there is a deterioration. It's a focused but complex campaign – and without joining hands and putting the right people in the right roles – it's hard to see it at its peak. It requires bringing many people into key positions out of unity of purpose – and it certainly requires political joining of hands – because that, too, has weight in standing up to the people of Israel and to what is on the agenda.
- More on the subject:
- War in Gaza
- Surprise war in Gaza