On Monday morning, June 5, 1967, Israeli Air Force planes took off towards their targets deep in Egyptian territory. The Six-Day War began with a preemptive strike (Operation Hotline) on Egypt's airfields. Israel succeeded in destroying most of its great enemy's air power and putting it out of action for the duration of the war. The Egyptians were shocked, and did not believe that only the Israelis had a hand in this.
Between 10,000 and 15,5 dead and 000,70 prisoners took a lightning war from Egypt. The Egyptian army crashed, losing nearly 400 percent of its artillery equipment, some 300 aircraft and <> tanks. The Nasser regime crumbled to dust and ashes.
However, immediately after the Six-Day War, the Soviets began arming the Egyptian army in order to bring it to its pre-war armament. The process did not take long. Between the autumn of 1967 and the summer of 1968, the USSR returned to Egypt and Syria the weapons lost in the war, and in the second half of 1968, the USSR began arming Egypt, Syria and Iraq beyond the armament level of their armies on the eve of the war. In May 1970, the Soviets managed to arm the Egyptian Air Force to 150 percent of its previous level, and the Egyptian artillery and armored corps to 180 percent.
While the Israeli expectation was that Egypt would only be able to recover by 1975, the Egyptians, using the means at their disposal, launched a surprise attack on Yom Kippur in 1973, thereby changing the face of the Middle East. The Egyptian case of the Six-Day War, a war in which the enemy's power was broken and the Israeli victory over it was complete, demonstrates that military might can be restored. If the current war is to be consequenced, the Israeli government must define clear objectives vis-à-vis Hamas.
Until October 7, the Israeli concept was that we would succeed in moderating Hamas through economic benefits. This concept collapsed. Since 2007, the year Hamas took control of Gaza, we have looked at the satanic terrorist organization with Western eyes. Western logic has instructed us that Hamas will seek the good of its people, and if we only provide it with work permits, money, and perhaps seaports and airports, we will succeed in restraining the beast of prey and living alongside it. Round after round proved otherwise, but we refused to learn our lesson. Hamas has not abandoned its extremist ideology, and over the years has become more radicalized. By October 2023, he had already adopted ISIS's ideology. In his eyes, each round of fighting was defined as a victory. Israel rightly left rubble in Gaza in both Cast Lead and Protective Edge.
In the Gaza war, Israel must completely eliminate not only Hamas's military capabilities, but also its social and economic systems and mechanisms, and its political capabilities in Gaza and abroad. Only the physical abolition of the organization in Gaza will bring calm; any other alternative will bring us back to square one and lead to the next conflict
But buildings can be rebuilt, and so can military might. Indeed, as long as Hamas remained in power in Gaza, it only got stronger, improved its capabilities and increased its determination to fight harder in the next conflict. Iranian and Qatari money contributed its share to Hamas' buildup. Despite sanctions and the economic crisis in Iran, the ayatollahs' regime transferred more than $100 million a year to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, while since spring 2018, Qatar has transferred some $90 million a year to Hamas in Gaza – both directly and indirectly – (in 2021, the grant grew to $360 million a year). These millions of dollars helped him develop and expand his military capabilities.
Therefore, in the Gaza war, Israel must completely eliminate not only Hamas's military capabilities, but also its social and economic systems and mechanisms, and its political capabilities in Gaza and abroad. Only the physical abolition of the organization in Gaza will bring calm; any other alternative will bring us back to square one and lead to the next conflict.
Another important point for Hamas' decision is the need to restore the trust and security of Israeli citizens in state institutions and in the IDF. If the political echelon wants to resettle the moshavim and kibbutzim that were damaged near the Gaza Strip and strengthen the residents of the north who live near the border with Lebanon, eliminating Hamas is the way to go.
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