Dr. Yoel Guzansky
Gulf Policy Expert
Ph.D. in International Relations, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University, and at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., USA.
Dr. Guzansky, Photo: Yehoshua Yosef
Dr. Yoel Guzansky, we are in the midst of a ground maneuver in Gaza, but a less discussed issue is that the end result of an iron sword war will be influenced quite a bit by the Gulf states.
"The center of gravity of the Arab region has now shifted completely to the Gulf, partly because of the weakness of traditional Arab actors such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Gulf states were surprised by Hamas' success on 7 October, and since then it can be said that they have influenced the course of the war, and will certainly have an impact on the final outcome. Most of them, with the exception of Qatar of course, have an interest in weakening Hamas and ending its sovereignty in the Gaza Strip."
Was Qatar also surprised by Hamas's move?
"I don't think the Qataris knew what Hamas was planning, let alone the exact timing. I appreciate that they were surprised by the 'success' of the opening blow, but were not surprised that Israel is perceived as weaker in recent months. As long as there is no change in the picture of war, Israel will be perceived in the Middle East as weakened and in need of American backing."
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh welcomes Iranian foreign minister in Qatar
The U.S. not only backs Israel, it is also an ally of some Gulf states. Is Israel's defense a kind of insurance policy for them?
"They undoubtedly view in a positive light the mobilization of the Americans, the diplomatic backing and the aircraft carriers stationed in our region. So yes, they have an interest in strengthening the American presence in the region, and they hope that the United States will do the same to them if they are attacked. It can be said that the intensive American activity in the region is intended not only to deter Iran and Hezbollah, but also to symbolize the moderate Arab region – the United States stands with its allies."
This is mainly relevant to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
"It's relevant to both, and maybe especially to Saudi Arabia. After all, it was in Hamas' interest to undermine regional normalization, and it seems that the Saudis are embarrassed now, especially over the humanitarian issue and the harm to Gaza's civilians. The U.S. involvement in the campaign obviously helps Saudi Arabia, and encourages its understanding that normalization was not a complete mistake on its part.
"In general, there are a series of tensions here. In the Iranian context, for example, the Gulf states understand that this is the first Axis war led by Iran. In other words, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraq, Syria, Yemen. There is still no full consolidation, but the situation could change at any moment, especially when Israel operates on the ground in Gaza. The Americans realized this very quickly, so they sent troops here. On the Gulf side, the fear is of Iranian harm, along with a desire to maintain a proper framework of relations with the Islamic Republic, which could also come at the expense of Israeli interests, as we saw in Saudi Arabia's announcement of freezing normalization."
President of the UAE with the Emir of Qatar. Two-Faced , Photo: GettyImages
What did you think of that?
"It's nonsense, because there were no conversations. The only meaning of this is a signal to Iran, and perhaps to the Palestinians: We are not on Israel's side. However, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states are trapped. They want Israel to strike Hamas hard. After previous rounds in Gaza, I spoke to senior Gulf officials who showed frustration: 'Why didn't you hit Hamas harder?' In the end, we fight their war, shedding blood that serves their interests, because Hamas is weakened and the Palestinian issue is coming to the fore."
You believe that all the Gulf states want to see Gaza without Hamas. It's a kind of coalition against Qatar.
"That's an interesting point. First, and I won't go into too much detail here, it is possible to undermine Qatar's commitment to Hamas, mainly through the Americans, and it is possible to create levers of influence there. As for your question, it is true that all the Gulf states except Qatar want Hamas to disappear or be completely weakened. On the other hand, none of them wants deep involvement in Gaza on their part. In other words, Israel can build a model for an arrangement in Gaza, and it will certainly be conditioned on defeating Hamas and maintaining the American presence in the region, but it is not at all certain that it will have other international partners for this. As for the United States, I'm not sure how many Americans will want to get into the Middle Eastern quagmire. It will be very difficult to build a new future in Gaza. Many people were comfortable that Hamas was the address in Gaza, and we also contributed to the strengthening of Hamas, as we know."
What else will the model include, beyond defeating Hamas and an American presence?
"The presence of the Palestinian Authority or some other moderate, secular element under the UN mandate and in cooperation with Arab countries that will take part in the conduct of daily life in the Gaza Strip. Israel will help in what it can. This process may also restart normalization with Saudi Arabia. In other words, through normalization, Saudi Arabia can be brought in as a significant player in the Gaza Strip."
Why does Saudi Arabia need this headache?
"Good question, and I'm not at all sure she's interested. After all, for years, none of the Gulf states except Qatar got their hands on the Gaza Strip. By the way, Qatar will be able to be part of the new mechanism in the Gaza Strip, provided it changes its policy. When there is no Hamas, Qatar can continue to support the Palestinian Authority, as it already does. In the absence of Hamas, we can see Qatar supporting a new and moderate sovereign in the Gaza Strip. There is such a scenario. It's not that it necessarily has to channel its cash to terrorism."
Buy fake silence
Let's talk about the POWs. The one behind the scenes in this matter is Qatar. What is in her interest?
"Qatar wants to maintain its influence in Gaza and the Middle East, because it derives a lot of dividends from it. Just recently, the US president thanked Qatar for its assistance in releasing the American hostages, which has tremendous significance for Qatar. Qatar has also assisted the United States in Afghanistan and is a mediator with Tehran. Qatar is an asset to the Americans."
Which cannot be said definitively about Israel.
"Qatar bought us false quiet vis-à-vis Hamas and the Gaza Strip. What other player would transfer those billions to Gaza? But this is Israel's dilemma vis-à-vis Qatar: it harms Israeli interests and serves other interests. Qatar can be used to try to establish a different model of arrangement, but in order to do so, Hamas must be critically damaged. Otherwise, it will continue to be Hamas' sponsor the day after, and we must not think otherwise."
Qatari soldiers at the parade, photo: AP
You describe it as a limited liability asset. Does Qatar even have an interest in bringing about the release of Israeli prisoners?
"Not really. Qatar and Hamas have an interest in releasing the foreigners, which will reduce pressure from Hamas from Western countries. Either way, if Israel takes action against Qatar, we could find ourselves on a collision course with the United States because of the close American relationship with Doha. The most significant leverage over Qatar is the Americans. The U.S. needs to pressure Qatar to act differently, and more concretely, to expel for example the Hamas leaders, who live in Qatar, enjoy immunity, sit in the pool and smoke a cigar."
Do you see a situation in which Qatar turns a blind eye to attempts by the US and Israel to enter its territory in order to gather information about Hamas leaders, perhaps in order to eliminate them?
"It's a sensitive point. Since I'm involved to some extent, I'd rather not comment."
More on visits by Israelis to the Gulf: It can be assumed that the visits by incumbent Mossad chief Dadi Barnea and former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen were intended to advance the cause of Israeli prisoners. Do we go there out of superiority, or beg for salvation?
"Not out of superiority and not in plea. The Mossad, as reported, coordinates the Israeli connection to Qatar, and there are working relations with other entities as well. The reason for the unique discourse with Qatar is the understanding in Israel that it has levers of influence and connection to Hamas, unlike other Gulf states, some of which see Hamas as nothing less than a threat to them."
The Victory: Normalization
It is interesting to understand, in light of recent times, what do the Gulf states think about Israel these days?
"I will tell you what my assessment is, as I see in the study and as I saw with my own eyes during visits to the Gulf: I think that the perception of Israel as an asset was fractured, and this was the perception that underpinned relations with the Gulf. A strong, attractive country that attracts allies. Once a player is weakened, he becomes vulnerable by those who want to harm him, but also less attractive to his allies. And Israel is in that situation now, and perhaps in the last ten months as well.
"For the Gulf states, the current situation was confirmation of their hypotheses that Israel has indeed weakened. I'm not sure how much the fact that Israel needed American aid early on will play in its favor. It could damage our image."
Our forces in the Gaza Strip, photo: IDF Spokesperson
A few months before the fighting, we saw a rapprochement between Hamas and Saudi Arabia. How will the current war affect their relations?
"This rapprochement was in its infancy. The Saudis released Hamas operatives from Saudi prisons, and two Hamas delegations visited Saudi Arabia. Of course, this is not similar to the relationship between Hamas and Qatar. It is in Saudi Arabia's interest that Hamas be weakened for two reasons: Hamas is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam, which poses a threat to a monarchy like Saudi Arabia. Second, Hamas is connected to Iran, and the Saudi desire is to prevent an Iranian achievement and weaken its Axis powers."
What do we know about the character of Gulf leaders?
"There are some important leaders in the Gulf states. The opening trio includes Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia; Mohammed bin Zayed, President of the United Arab Emirates; and Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Emir of Qatar.
"The leaders of these countries can one day be photographed and hugged, as we have seen, for example, during the World Cup in Qatar, and the next day try to stick a knife in the back – after all, the Saudis and Emiratis have tried to undermine Qatari rule, and more than once. There's a lot of duplicitousness there."
What else do we know about the dynamics between them?
"Until about two years ago, there was a boycott of Qatar by other Gulf countries. Recently, it has returned, at least theoretically, to the bosom of the states. Qatar has grown closer to Saudi Arabia, but when the UAE enters the triangle, matters become complex, with friction and tension. Relations between the UAE and Qatar have not been good for several years, and we have also seen a cooling in relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These tensions also have indirect implications for the situation in Gaza."
For example?
"The Gulf is not one piece. States have different interests, resources, and sensitivities. As a result, many are the differences of opinion between them. As far as Gaza is concerned, for example, Qatar does want Hamas as sovereign, while the UAE does not want to hear about it. The Gulf is not a single entity, and Israel also needs to tiptoe there. If we strengthen relations with Qatar or Saudi Arabia, for example, it could be perceived negatively by the UAE."
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Photo: AFP
Let's talk about the leader of the most important country in the Arab world - Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman has declared that he wants to lead the Arab world. To what extent is this desire cynical in the eyes of the Iranians?
"Very, and the same is true of the president of the UAE and the Emir of Qatar. Saudi diplomatic activity has been observed lately, and bin Salman may want to leverage the war to become a regional leader of greater stature. But it is not only the Iranians who stand in his way, but also his Arab neighbors, especially the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, who are challenging Saudi immigration. Imagine Hamas being defeated, the Iranian axis weakened, and the United States becoming stronger and more involved in the region – these are events that will strengthen bin Salman.
"Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, and it's tired of writing checks without coverage. Especially to Egypt, which in the past was perceived as the leader of the Arab world. The Saudis believe that they are the ones who need to lead the Arab region, become a regional power and gain more influence on the global level."
At the beginning of the conversation, you referred to normalization with Saudi Arabia. What will become of it in the wake of recent events?
"It depends on the outcome of the fighting. I think that the Saudis, the Israelis, and the Americans have an interest in the success of normalization, especially when the great desire behind the Hamas action, and Iran behind it, was to harm normalization, as mentioned. I think that winning the war in this case will not only be with bayonets, but by promoting normalization – this is the best way to prove to Iran and its proxies that they have failed."
In the pessimistic scenario, do you see a risk to the peace agreements with Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco? Jordan has already announced the recall of its ambassador.
"In a pessimistic scenario, I see a possible damage to these agreements if the humanitarian situation in Gaza worsens further. But don't get me wrong, I think that through quiet channels, these countries – especially the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia – are sending messages to Israel and saying: We want you to hit Hamas, but we can't say that. So we will condemn you publicly, but quietly - we will see how we can help you harm Hamas." √
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