At the end of the fourth week of the war in the south, the IDF is talking about a four-stage effort aimed at achieving the strategic objectives set for the campaign: denying Hamas operational and governmental capability in Gaza.
The first stage, which had already ended, was stabilizing the defense and launching a fire attack on Gaza. The second, current, is on the ground, and includes a divisional maneuver that is supposed to last several weeks, during which the IDF hopes to significantly damage Hamas infrastructure, kill as many operatives as possible and, if possible, eliminate its senior operatives (and, of course, try to release hostages). At the end of this section, the IDF is supposed to reposition itself in Israeli territory, while maintaining a security zone in Palestinian territory.
The third stage, after the withdrawal, will include the continuation of operations inside Gaza by means of raids and attacks. Defensive Shield also went like this: a focused effort of about a month in the heart of Palestinian cities in the West Bank, and then another two years of heavy military pressure that finally defeated terrorism.
The fourth stage is supposed to include stabilizing a new regime in the Gaza Strip. This week, Israel began to deal with this conceptually (under American pressure), and the preferred option is an attempt to return control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. The IDF is preparing for the possibility that Gaza will for a time be without a central government: in the gang war that develops, Israel will be required to be the policeman who will prevent chaos (and danger).
IDF Spokesperson
In order for these four efforts to succeed, Israel must meet several conditions: de-escalation in the north and in other areas, with an emphasis on the West Bank; international legitimacy; supportive budgetary system; continued overwhelming public support for a complex situation of fatalities in combat and an unprecedented number of abductees and missing persons; friendly weather as winter approaches; Most importantly, work is synchronized between all branches of the state, some of which have been at odds since before the war and are busy preparing for future commissions of inquiry.
A senior source who was asked this week about the chances of success of the campaign said it depended mainly on us. Determination, understanding the challenge, the ability to put nonsense aside and focus on the task. It seems that he was delicate: this is the most complex campaign Israel has ever waged. In order for it to succeed, it also requires a great deal of luck.
The challenge: connect faces and names
Nitzan Alon put on his uniform and reported on the first Saturday night. The General Staff was in chaos at the time. It oscillates between the trauma of the surprise attack and the lack of control on the ground. He was looking for where he could help. When the numbers of abductees began to pour in, he realized that we were in a different movie.
Alon is one of the most respected officers in recent decades in the IDF. Not only because of his combat past: a long track in the General Staff unit to command the unit, commander of an elite reserve brigade and Bethlehem brigade, commander of the special forces in the Lebanon war, founder of the operations division of Military Intelligence after the war, commander of the Judea and Samaria Division and Central Command, and for three years head of the operations division of the General Staff. He ran against Aviv Kochavi for the position of chief of staff and was Avigdor Lieberman's candidate, But under pressure from right-wing elements, he was disqualified.
Since then he has been in the business world. When the war broke out, he left everything (giving up quite a bit of money) and reported voluntarily. Herzi Halevi, who was his deputy in the unit, charged him with dealing with the abductees. This is a sensitive field, in which super-skill is required in order to successfully walk the complex path between delicate statesmanship (including with elements and countries with which there is no relationship), military strategy and tactics (including the operation of military missions in the field for the purpose of the effort to free the hostages), intelligence at the highest levels of collection and classification, and the sensitivity required in contacts with the families.
Navy ship "Dvora", photo: IDF Spokesperson
Alon immediately settled into the Special Operations Brigade. This allowed him to work quietly and without external interference, while maximizing compartmentalization from the army as well; This gave him immediate and effective contact with the Mossad and the Shin Bet; Above all, this enabled him to use the powerful platform of the Intelligence and Operations Bureau, with its intelligence and operational infrastructures.
He built himself a lean headquarters, and brought in several other highly successful volunteers. Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav (Polly) Mordechai, formerly IDF Spokesperson and Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, operates skilled and sharp agents who in recent years has weaved a business and social network in the Arab world; Hagai Itkin, a former Mossad official; Brig. Gen. (res.) Oren Sater, who in his last position was head of the IDF's strategic division, and others.
The main effort of the headquarters was to build a clear picture of the situation. The first few days were particularly chaotic: no one knew how many had been killed, how many had been kidnapped, who had managed to return home and who was still lying in the field. It was understood that there was an unusual number of abductees in Gaza. Beyond that, there were far more question marks than exclamation points. Soldiers, for example, who were at bases raided and burned by Hamas, and it was unclear whether they were kidnapped alive or dead, or whose bodies were burned inside the buildings at the base.
The formulation of the situation took about a week. In fact, it continues today, but with relatively minor changes. Alon's headquarters built a professional work method from scratch, which required scanning quantities of data in order to produce clear information from them. For days, they went through thousands of videos on social media in order to collect every shred of photograph or information pertaining to the abductees, and to identify them. In some cases it was easy, in others difficult to impossible. One of the main tasks was to isolate irrelevant information: this week as well, the headquarters dealt with a video of a woman being burned, which after an examination turned out to be from Mexico.
At the same time, the body cameras of terrorists who infiltrated Israel and were killed or captured, road cameras, kibbutz security cameras, IDF cameras, and any other collection tool from which vital information could be extracted, were scanned. Alon and his team recruited members of the business world (as well as the team of Brothers in Arms, which has already begun to build a snapshot of the missing at the Expo) in order to extract the information to the maximum, and also in order to extract information from other sources.
Even after the initial snapshot was complete, black holes still remained. Some were declared missing until it became clear that they had managed to escape (mainly from the party in Reim). Some left part of their body in Israel and some were abducted to Gaza (this was the case of Shani Luke, who was pronounced dead this week). And there were those about whom there were, and in some cases still are, question marks. Therefore, from the outset, the Bureau also decided to build a kind of traffic light: abductees who are in Gaza for sure, those who have been abducted with a high probability, and those who have been abducted with low probability.
Capt. Orr: "The fighters did not see with their eyes and only strove for contact, especially those on their weapons. We killed dozens of terrorists at sea, as well as those who managed to reach the shore. It was a continuous effort that lasted until the evening."
It is estimated that of the 240 abductees (as of yesterday), Hamas is holding dozens of bodies. Some were kidnapped dead, some died on the way, some died in hospitals in Gaza or because they were not treated properly. The main effort is to restore life, but Israel wants to bring everyone home – in the hope that this will be possible, since Hamas may have dumped some of the bodies while fleeing to Gaza.
As part of building a picture of the situation, a file was built regarding each abductee - from his personal details and needs to where he was abducted. In some cases it was easy and chilling: in Bari, for example, the terrorists had tons of time. They gathered civilians at staging points and loaded them into every possible vehicle, some transported in Hamas vehicles and some in their own cars. They were ordered to move, people were put into the vehicle from every possible direction, including in the trunk, and at gunpoint they drove west, to the Gaza Strip.
"They fired at us with machine guns and automatic weapons, and at the same time mortar fire was fired from the shore." Captain Or, Photo: IDF Spokesperson
A significant challenge is mapping the foreign workers. Many of them were murdered, but they have no relatives from whom DNA can be taken for identification purposes. Others were kidnapped, but they seem to be less interesting to Hamas at the moment. As far as Alon's headquarters is concerned, they are, of course, included in the abductees who need to be brought home, and in their case there is also a parallel effort by the Thai government, which is trying to promote their release.
Alon's current effort is quadruped. The first is to complete a complete and stable picture of the situation, which will include a defined number of abductees with names and faces, and as clear information as possible about their situation. Hamas, of course, is trying to make this effort more difficult, refusing even to provide an orderly list of the abductees in its possession. It is estimated that this number could reach 250, and it also depends on the continued identification of bodies and the reduction of the missing persons list.
The second effort is intelligence, the purpose of which is to collect as much information as possible about the situation and location of the abductees. Such information crystallized this week into the breathtaking operation that enabled ISA fighters to release soldier Uri Magidish. On the other hand, Hamas is proving once again that it is a tough opponent, compartmentalized, determined to protect the assets it holds.
The third effort is negotiations, with the aim of advancing in various ways a deal for the release of the hostages. The Mossad coordinates this activity with elements in the region (especially Qatar), although there is a large gap between what is happening in Doha and what is happening in Gaza. The Qatari regime and Hamas' foreign leadership are far more pragmatic and willing to conclude than the leadership sitting in the tunnels in Gaza, with an emphasis on Yahya Sinwar, who runs the business himself and does not easily give up any card.
Partial concessions may occur
In recent weeks, quite a few offers and attempts at various deals have risen and fallen. Common sense says that children, women and adults will be released first. Hamas conducted tough negotiations, which at one point turned out to be mainly aimed at delaying the ground invasion of Gaza. Therefore, it was decided to proceed with the campaign, in the hope that the physical pressure on Hamas – combined with the pressure on the population in Gaza – would enable achievements on the issue of the abductees as well.
As of yesterday, that had not happened. Sinwar, drunk on power from the success of the October 7 offensive, poses impossible costs. If at first his people spoke of "everyone for everyone" – all the abductees in exchange for all the security prisoners imprisoned in Israel – now this is no longer on the agenda. In interviews and statements, Hamas talks about additional demands: from an end to the campaign and complete immunity for Sinwar, through Hamas' status on the Temple Mount to a governmental foothold in Judea and Samaria.
The goal: to work together with the families. A performance on the beach of Sydney, Australia, for the abductees, photo: EPA
Israel, of course, will not give any of these. It is likely to agree to advance partial deals in exchange for humanitarian benefits, which may also require certain concessions in the rules it has set for itself (mainly regarding the entry of fuel into the Gaza Strip). A possible direction is for Israel to agree to deals that include the release of prisoners, on condition that they move to the Gaza Strip. But deals that include a political price are out of the question; If Israel surrenders now, it will face much heavier costs in the future. Most importantly, Israel suspects, and rightly so, that even if agreements are reached, Sinwar will keep a few cards for himself – for example, bodies that he claims no one knows where they are, and will continue to trade them the day after.
Alon's fourth effort is with the families. His headquarters works with the ACA, and through him with the families, and each family has a companion who is in daily contact with it. No one is deluding themselves that the families will not exert every possible lever of pressure to advance the issue, but the desire is to work with them as much as possible in coordination in order to deny Hamas achievements (in this context, the decision of the Israeli media not to broadcast videos of abductees is significant).
Alon's headquarters operates in the shadows. The one who is visible is the civilian headquarters, headed by Gal Hirsch. In the early days, there was friction, as part of the tension between the security establishment and the prime minister, but that worked out too. In general, the work is done at Alon's, and its visible complement is done at Hirsch's. There are those who believe that this is unnecessary duplication of roles, but if it saves tension, so be it. The situation is already so complex that any Band-Aid is welcome. There is enough work for everyone.
Boxes of motivation
Over the past few weeks, I've been trying to hear the October 7 story from a different angle each time. This week I spoke with Capt. Or, commander of the "Dvora" ship at the Ashdod naval base. He had left for his shift two days earlier, on Thursday, when a Hamas attack caught him at sea - on the western vessel in the northern Gaza Strip, whose main job was to secure the gas platform off the coast of Gaza.
"At 06:30 a.m., rockets started firing around, and at the same time we and another ship to the east of us saw boats sailing north," he says. "The Mizrahi tool occupied the first targets, and I joined it. We also saw a few trying to get to the beach. They fired machine guns and automatic weapons at us. In retrospect, I know that they also tried to launch an RPG at us, but they had a malfunction. All this time, mortars were also fired from the shore.
"The bullets whistled around, but the fighters didn't see with their eyes and only strove for contact, especially those on the weapons. We killed dozens of terrorists at sea, including some who reached the shore. It was a continuous effort that continued until the evening, mainly in defense, in order to stop the terrorists who tried to penetrate from the sea. Unfortunately, some terrorists managed to arrive, and they were eliminated by Zikim's alert squad."
The Navy is functioning fine. Since Simchat Torah, he has been engaged in a dual effort in the southern arena: defensive, aimed at preventing the penetration of additional terrorists by sea, and offensive, which assists the overall effort in Gaza. In the first part, Orr's Bee participated last week in another raid attempt by Hamas' naval force, which was thwarted by Shayetet 13 fighters and the fighters in the ships, when it exited tunnels near the sea in an attempt to dive into Israeli territory. The offensive part is more classified: the navy actively participates in it both in assisting forces fighting on land with fire from the sea, but also as a platform that facilitates raids from the sea into Gaza. Such a raid was carried out on the eve of the ground campaign in the southern Gaza Strip and was crowned a success.
Or lives in Kibbutz Rosh Hanikra. His family was evacuated when the alert began in the north as well, and moved to live with relatives in Haifa. He is 23 years old, has been in command of the ship for eight months, and right now he is fully focused on what is happening in the south. "The house is fine. I talk to friends who serve in the northern theater, and I know they are on high alert there as well. We have already passed on the lessons from the investigations into what we went through here, so that they will learn. But at the moment the fighting is mostly here: the fighters with crates of motivation. For years you've been on alert and nothing happens, and now it's a war. We will win."
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