The reality in Gaza is more complex than it appears at home. It has quite a few advantages and quite a few disadvantages. Since the truce was halted and fighting resumed exactly a week ago, the forces have been advancing faster than in the weeks preceding the truce. Contrary to politicians' declarations that there is no time limit, the IDF understands that there is. In the discussions, there is talk of two or three weeks maximum until the order is given to stop and redeploy.
During this time, the IDF will be required to hit as much Hamas infrastructure as possible. Most of the governmental infrastructure in the northern part of the Gaza Strip was damaged, and those in the south will now be damaged. In the north, it is still necessary to intensify the damage to Hamas' combat battalions, as well as to its operational infrastructure (mainly tunnels); In the south, this challenge has only just begun against four particularly strong battalions in Khan Yunis and its environs.
The fighting on the ground is harder than the public realizes, but less difficult than the IDF would like. The public is exposed to it only slightly, through the materials released from the Gaza Strip by the IDF Spokesperson, and those distributed by the Palestinians. We mainly show the exploitation of civilian infrastructure for terrorist purposes (weapons and headquarters in UNRWA hospitals and facilities), and mainly show the damage caused by the bombings and the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have gathered in the coastal area, and since the beginning of the week also in the Rafah sector.
The IDF is sweeping the area with impressive force. Those who claimed they could not do the job turned out to be a charlatan or an avowed pessimist. Many bad things have happened in the addiction to the combination of air-intelligence that has dictated the systems over the past decade and a half, mainly in the context of the degeneration of the will to fight, and as a result an unreasonable increase in the risk to the home front on all fronts. But something good also happened: the forces really trained, and they came to Gaza prepared. Together with the amazing candy box at their disposal - accurate fire from every possible source, tanks and engineering, quality intelligence - the results are good, in complicated conditions and against a particularly problematic enemy.
IDF Spokesperson
Hamas does not fight like an army. He hides, stings and runs away. This requires strong defense, and it makes the offense more difficult. Not all the patents will help: the IDF does not have a truly effective solution to the tunnel issue. It takes slow and dangerous work to take care of them, and that's a huge amount. So far, the engineering forces have neutralized hundreds of shafts in the northern Gaza Strip, and it is estimated that there are many times more that have not been treated, plus thousands of kilometers of tunnels in which Hamas operatives operate.
Israel had such a solution, but it wasted it for nothing. In 2015, immediately upon assuming the position of IDF Chief of Staff, Gadi Eizenkot instructed the Israeli Air Force and the Operations Directorate to prepare an operation that would severely harm Hamas. A kind of modern call center operation, which will deprive them of their operational core. The operational idea at the heart of Operation Lightning Strike was to implement a deceptive plan, which would include the movement of two divisions ostensibly maneuvering on the ground into the Gaza Strip, which would smuggle Hamas operatives into the tunnels, and then deliver a precise and timely strike of hundreds of bombs that would collapse the tunnels and their inhabitants.
This operation was prepared for an all-out war, like the one currently being waged. He was supposed to be the Joker who would bring Israel the decision. Instead, it was decided to use it in Operation Guardian of the Walls. It was a double fault: it was activated in the wrong operation out of a lack of achievement, and it was executed in a particularly negligent manner. Instead of two divisions, the IDF was assisted by a depleted force that failed to carry out effective deception, Hamas did not enter the tunnels, and the Air Force collapsed them on themselves (in an impressive operation in itself, which included about 150 planes, but whose goal was not achieved). In less than an hour, six years of preparation and a brilliant operational idea went down the drain.
If Israel had a similar operation now, it would bring Hamas to its knees. He would have lost one thousand people, and those who remained would have fled above the ground - straight into the hands of the superior and stronger IDF forces. In the absence of such a one-time patent conch, very dangerous ant labor is required. The IDF will win the battle if given the means, but it will happen on points, not by knockout, unless there is a succession of bingo in the elimination of the organization's top trio: Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa, and the layer of commanders operating under them.
Updated Judea and Samaria model
In the coming weeks, the IDF will complete the main part of the campaign. In the northern Gaza Strip, it will be completely completed: all the neighborhoods will be taken over, and the damage to infrastructure and Hamas personnel will deepen as much as possible. In the southern part it will be partially completed: the IDF will try to dismantle Khan Yunis (Sinwar's hometown) of its capabilities as much as possible, but it is doubtful whether it will reach Rafah due to time constraints and conditions.
The U.S. is still giving credit to the action, but it's impossible not to hear its growing impatience. President Biden has so far refrained from saying the two words that Israel fears in particular – ceasefire – even though there are quite a few elements around him urging him to do so, especially in the radical parts of the Democratic Party. Israel would do well to synchronize its moves with the Americans before accepting a directive, and in the background of which Congress has not yet received approval for the more than $14 billion that the administration has pledged to transfer as emergency aid.
Only an avowed optimist would believe that an agreement on the northern border would be honored. IDF bombings in southern Lebanon, photo: EFP
This synchronization is also important in the context of the northern sector. The Americans believe that the tensions can be resolved and the Radwan force can be removed from the border in a political move that will prevent war. Special envoy Amos Hochstein, who brokered the gas agreement (at the end of which Lebanon received only seawater, after the territories ceded to it turned out to be empty), is running between Jerusalem and Beirut in an attempt to find a compromise formula. This is a particularly complex formula, which will also guarantee Lebanon a generous economic package that will enable it to rise from the planks and begin the process of reconstruction.
You have to be an avowed optimist, and Hochstein is, to believe that the agreement will be honored. UN Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War, also stipulated that no weapons would enter southern Lebanon without the approval of the Lebanese government, and imposed an embargo on the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. We all know the reality: Hezbollah is armed to the teeth with enormous and advanced weapons, and it is deployed in hundreds of villages south of the Litani River.
Israel was burned once, and it is doubtful that it will be tempted again now. On the other hand, it has no good solution to the problem in the north other than war. The past two months have indeed enabled the IDF to deny Hezbollah quite a few capabilities, which also caused the Radwan force to change its deployment and partially withdraw from the border, but once the fire stops, it can easily redeploy along the fence, certainly with Iran urging friction and a constant threat with Israel on its rear.
In order to fundamentally change the reality in the north, something else is now needed in defense and offense. In defense, this will happen: the border in the north (and of course in the south) will no longer look the same. It will be more physically massive in terms of means, and it will be more massive in terms of forces. Instead of a few battalions, it will have several brigades: this will require an increase in forces, allocation of means, an increase in the budget, and perhaps also some extension of regular service, at least in some units.
Sinwar believes time is on his side; That the sensitivity to the abductees plus public pressure will lead Israel to make concessions. One must hope that he will not live long enough to know the answer, but hope alone will not help: it is necessary to act without delay, in every way, so that the abductees will return home immediately
The offensive part is more complex: in Gaza, the IDF intends to maintain full freedom of action. When the current part of the campaign ends, in a few weeks, as mentioned, the forces will redeploy along the border route. They will maintain a security zone west of it, where Palestinians will not be able to move. This will reduce the risk to the forces, and it will mainly give quiet to the communities and allow the beginning of the reconstruction process and their repopulation.
From Israeli territory, the IDF will launch attacks on roads of varying scope in Palestinian territory. Sometimes it will be an elimination from the air, sometimes a pinpoint raid and sometimes an operation with large forces. Everything - depending on the destination, intelligence and conditions on the ground. This will be an updated format of the reality that prevailed in Judea and Samaria after Operation Defensive Shield: from the moment the occupation of the cities was completed, the IDF deployed outside them and acted within them on the basis of need. At first, large forces were required for each operation, but as the area was shredded, wanted persons were arrested and infrastructure was cut off, it was possible to operate with much smaller forces, because the threat was dramatically reduced.
In Gaza, it will take longer and will be more aggressive, because Hamas there is much stronger and more entrenched than the terrorist organizations were in Judea and Samaria. Therefore, Israel is talking in terms of at least a year: not for a continuous stay inside Gaza, but for activity there that will take place of varying intensity. This will make it possible to gradually return the Palestinian citizens to their homes (or what remains of them) and begin to rehabilitate the infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, and most importantly – to establish a new regime there.
First signs of time smudging
Since this is just around the corner, Israel should wake up and define for itself what it wants to happen in Gaza the day after. At the moment, the idea in question is a kind of temporary government of international experts, with Western backing and Arab funding, who will manage Gaza's affairs until another regime is established. In order for this to happen, and especially in order for it to happen in a way that Israel will live in peace with, it is necessary to lead a complex international process that is only in its infancy, and which is likely to encounter a variety of external and internal pitfalls.
As with any other issue, leadership is required here. Not to be led, but to lead. To stand in front of the public and say honestly what Israel wants, what it means, what its red lines are. It is obligatory regarding Gaza, it is committed regarding the north, and it is also required regarding the issue of abductees. If this does not happen, the residents of the Gaza envelope and the northern border will not return, and there is concern that the abductees will not return either.
This is the kind of moment when, clearly, politics must be separated from state affairs. Benjamin Netanyahu has sworn that he is doing so: his recent moves, with an emphasis on the budget that passed its first reading this week, indicate otherwise. He capitulated to extremists and ultra-Orthodox, but also refrained from firing the ministers of the state camp who voted against the budget. The same political maneuver, designed first of all to ensure its survival and only then serving the state, guides it even now.
Netanyahu is acting as if the war will last forever, even in an attempt to avoid significant moves, chief among them the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the failures of Black Sabbath. It is doubtful whether this is entirely in his hands: once the IDF is redeployed, there will be a widespread public demand to overhaul systems. Senior security officials will go home, some immediately and some will lay down letters but will actually delay the departure. A similar demand will be made to those responsible in the political leadership, who will also be asked to begin the investigation process. There are hints that Netanyahu will try to establish a government commission of inquiry, whose personnel will be appointed by him and whose powers will be far more limited than those of a state commission of inquiry appointed by the president of the Supreme Court.
Such a scenario, which begins with an attempt to buy time and then an attempt to evade a real investigation into the worst failure in the history of the state, will inevitably lead to a storm that the events of the past year will look like child's play next to it. Israel may once again be divided into two camps, destroying all the good and common that has swept it since October 7. This fear must hover over anyone who wants a different, better future here, regardless of the identity of the leadership: if we return from this disaster to the starting point, our situation will be far worse from every point of view – social, economic, security and political.
On the way there, a few more matters need to be completed. Two were mentioned here: the main part of the operation in Gaza, and finding a new arrangement in the north that could go through a course of war of unknown scope. The third part is perhaps the most complicated of all – bringing all the abductees home.
It is forbidden to betray the abductees again
The return of the abductees is a national-social-moral task that is no superior: Israel will not be able to look in the mirror if it does not act to solve it immediately. For some reason, there are politicians in Israel who believe there is time. They are wrong: the testimonies of those who were released and the intelligence accumulated show that those who are there are living in a physical (and certainly mental) inferno. The full details are unnecessary in this case, because they are particularly difficult; It is enough to rely on the words of a spokesman for the US State Department, who said this week that Hamas may have refrained from releasing the last women so that they would not reveal what it went through, in order to understand what it was all about.
Israel was burned once, and it is doubtful that it will be tempted again. On the other hand, it has no good solution to the problem in the north other than war. The past two months have indeed enabled the IDF to deny Hezbollah quite a few capabilities, which also caused the Radwan force to partially withdraw from the border, but when the fire stops, it will be able to easily deploy along the fence
For those government ministers who still need a lesson in reality, it is recommended to meet with the parents of the abducted soldiers. They recently met with the chief of staff. Naturally, it was a difficult, and mostly frustrating, meeting. A lot of questions arose there about what happened and how it happened, and about what to do now. There were no good answers. One parent said he was afraid his daughter would return with a Hamas baby. There is no clearer way to explain what it is.
Hamas failed to abide by an agreement last week that stipulated that all women and children would be released, and Israel decided not to allow it to be deceived by changing criteria to include the bodies of elderly and sick men on the list. Those who supported this resolution argue that Sinwar understands only force: If Israel had folded now, it would have folded from now on. Others believe it was a mistake: that we should bring home whoever we can, whenever possible.
Time will tell which approach was more correct. Sinwar, meanwhile, is playing tough, resisting international pressure to speak seriously again. He believes that time is on his side; That Israel's sensitivity to the abductees plus public pressure will lead Israel to make concessions. One must hope that he will not live long enough to know the answer, but hope alone will not help: it is necessary to act without delay, in every way, so that the abductees will return home immediately.
In the beginning, two months ago, the hostages were not even part of the goals of the war. So much so that the government was out of touch with reality. This correction has since been carried out, but action is now needed. The state betrayed its people on Black Saturday. She must not betray them again.
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