This was the most difficult week so far in the fighting in Gaza. It seemed as if Israel was climbing a particularly steep mountain, in an attempt to reach its two overarching goals: returning the hostages, toppling the Hamas regime and negating its military capabilities.
The first seems unresolved at the moment. Two bodies were brought to Israel (that of Eden Zakaria and Ziv Dado), and it was determined that two other abductees were not alive (Tal Haimi and Tanzanian citizen Joshua Loito), but 135 abductees are still in Gaza, dead or alive, and real negotiations for their release are not taking place. Both sides are playing it hard to achieve: Yahya Sinwar has cut off contact and seems willing to absorb all the damage caused by the war, as long as he remains at the end of the war with the spoils in his hands, and Israel responds in a similar way – not initiating talks but only responding to proposals.
The claim that the military campaign advances the issue of abductees still requires proof. There is no evidence that this happened in the previous round, and there is no evidence that it has happened since the fighting resumed two weeks ago. It is enough to look at the dry data to understand which route has so far turned out to be more effective: one abductee was returned to Israel alive in a military operation (Uri Magidish), as well as four bodies, while 113 abductees were returned in negotiations.
The War Cabinet seems to be stuck in a kind of mental fixation. Gadi Eizenkot's return to the discussions at the end of the shiva on his son, Gal, will challenge the discourse. Eizenkot believed that Israel had made a mistake in allowing the explosion of the previous plan, on the grounds that Hamas should have fulfilled its commitment to release all the women and children in its possession. He believed that the framework should have been flexible for the release of men – adults, sick people, fathers kidnapped with their minor children – and to bring home whoever was possible, whenever possible.
IDF Spokesperson
Eizenkot Jr. was killed during a mission to locate abductees in the northern Gaza Strip. Other fighters were killed in an effort to defeat Hamas. The Sajaiya neighborhood has emerged as the main stronghold of resistance, just as it was in Cast Lead in 2008 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Whoever hastened to declare that it had been defeated was wrong: the Golani Brigade once again paid a high price in blood – nine fighters, most of them officers, including the commander of Battalion 13 and the commander of the brigade's command post.
Front command stands out in this war. It is evident in the number of fallen on Black Saturday and afterwards. But the claim that Hamas commanders do not leave the tunnels is inaccurate. This is true at the highest levels, certainly in the leadership, and less so at the grassroots levels. In Sejaiya alone, one battalion commander was eliminated, and immediately afterwards his replacement was also eliminated. This did not prevent the battalion – considered the strongest of the Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip – from continuing to fight, while its command and control system was functioning relatively efficiently.
Despite the heavy price, Sajaiya's decision has three important reasons: First, that Hamas' military force in it must not continue to exist, as part of the necessary decision. The second is that his defeat will signal to other battalions, especially in Khan Yunis, that their day is also approaching. And the third is that at some point the day after will come, and Sejaiya is too close to the border, to Nahal Oz, and it must not be an obstacle to the planned future activity of raids and continued military activity in the Gaza Strip.
The IDF assessed that the activity in Sejaiya would end by now (the intention was to move the forces south, in order to advance the decisive victory there as well). Similar assessments were made for other areas. In practice, the fighting took longer than expected. This indicates the magnitude of the challenge, but also a certain exaggeration of estimates. Sometimes it takes three times as long to reach your destination. It's worth learning from this, especially when presenting destinations to the public and foreign guests.
The world is beginning to lose patience
Yesterday, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan visited Israel. Contrary to assurances to the Israeli public that the war will continue for as long as necessary, until a complete and complete victory, the discourse with the Americans is more complex and less populist. It's about deadlines - January 10, when the Western world returns to work from the New Year's holiday; And on objectives - the transition from war to combat.The issue of timing is subject to change. if
It will take Israel a few more weeks, it will receive them from the administration. It will be required in return, mainly in humanitarian relief. This past week, Israel allowed the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing for the inspection of goods, in order to ease the traffic jam at Rafah Crossing. This does not satisfy the Americans, who demand that Kerem Shalom not only inspect, but also transport goods.
The IDF assessed that the activity in Sejaiya would end by now (the intention was to move the forces south, in order to advance the decisive victory there as well). Similar assessments were made for other areas. In practice, the fighting took longer than expected. This indicates the magnitude of the challenge, but also a certain exaggeration of estimates
As far as Israel is concerned, this is a dramatic change. These are not only the significant humanitarian reliefs, knowing that Hamas is stealing a significant portion of the equipment transferred for its purposes. The cabinet decided to sever itself completely from Gaza, with the aim of separating from it forever. Resuming the entry of goods from Israel means reviving the Israeli oxygen pipeline and maintaining Gaza's dependence on Israel. This is precisely what prevented Israel from completely disengaging from Gaza, despite the physical disengagement in 2005.
It is likely that Israel will allow quite a few more measures that were overwhelmingly opposed at the beginning of the war, in order to buy time. That would help it against Washington, less so in other capitals. With the exception of Britain, which looks in the mirror and fears the consequences of Islam on what is happening in its territory, Europe has sunk into its winter sleep. The abductees and atrocities in the envelope and the Nova party were forgotten in favor of caring for the Palestinian refugees, and Israel returned to its place as the regional and global villain.
The transition from war to war, expected in January, will not significantly reduce international pressure on Israel. There will remain some notable rocks of contention. First, there will remain hundreds of thousands of refugees in Gaza, whose return to the northern Gaza Strip will be prevented by Israel in the foreseeable future. It is likely that we will see an international effort to allow at least some return, although it is not clear exactly where: the vast majority of the buildings are destroyed, and others are uninhabitable. There is no real process of orderly rehabilitation on the horizon: Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced this week that they have no interest in taking part in it or financing it. This message was aimed at the Palestinians, who were asked to look for another wallet; to Qatar, which will be left with Gaza's headache; And to Israel, which once again hinted that only a two-state solution would change the Gulf decision.
This message is likely to be coordinated between Washington and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. This axis demands that Israel not only say what is not (not to the Hamas regime, not to the Palestinian Authority, not to Israeli control of Gaza), but also to what Israel plans for the day after. Benjamin Netanyahu is constantly running away from the issue. This is what he has done over the past decade whenever the future of the Gaza Strip came up for strategic discussion. The absence of these decisions had dramatic weight on the way to the Black Sabbath. Whoever wants a different fate in the future must carry out a different process in the present.
Another reason for the dispute between Israel and the world will be the continued stay in Gaza. Israel has already made it clear that it will not return to the international border in the foreseeable future. The intention now is to reconvene in the border area, but to maintain a security buffer zone (perimeter) that will protect the communities and serve as a springboard for continued activity in Gaza, in a different format of raids and targeted operations from the air and land. This fighting is expected to continue for many months, perhaps years, until victory is declared. A similar move in Judea and Samaria continued for several years after Operation Defensive Shield; Gaza is much more complex and armed, so those who expect a quick victory are likely to be alone.
The only chance for a shortened track is the elimination of the Hamas leadership. The Shin Bet and the IDF are invested up to their necks in this, so far with meager results. The battalion commanders and company commanders in Hamas have indeed suffered a severe blow, but the level of brigade commanders, and certainly the political-security leadership, continues to function. Harming them, especially Sinwar, who has already become a symbol, will carry great weight. Hamas may not wave a white flag, but it will seek long-term solutions, as it did two decades ago, after a series of assassinations of its senior officials at the time, led by its founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and his successor, Abdulaziz Rantisi.
Such harm will also have enormous weight on the issue of abductees. At the moment, there seems to be no solution that will allow them to be returned home at a reasonable price. On the contrary: not only Sinwar is playing bear no-no, but there will also be ministers in our cabinet who will oppose proposals that would include the release of heavy murderers from Israeli prisons. It's a familiar argument that ignores three facts that have changed substantially from previous cases: the high number of abductees, the fact that they are mostly civilians, and the terrible abandonment of October 7.
What does he want from Ben-Gurion?
Israel will not be able to look itself in the eye if it does not return the abductees, and anyone who thinks otherwise is either messianic or heartless. The state has obligations towards its citizens. In this case, they stretch almost infinitely. Even so, it is clear to anyone familiar with the details that not everyone will return; There are those who disappeared along the way, when they were kidnapped, there are those who are buried under the rubble, and there are those who even those who kidnapped or buried them are already dead and no one knows where they are. It would have been desirable for the government or anyone acting on its behalf to coordinate expectations on this issue with the public and with the families. Unfortunately, this happens very partially.
The only chance for a shortened path to victory is the elimination of the Hamas leadership. The Shin Bet and the IDF are invested up to their necks in this, so far with meager results. The battalion commanders and company commanders in Hamas have indeed suffered a severe blow, but the level of brigade commanders, and certainly the political-security leadership, continues to function
Last week we spoke here about the difficult encounter that IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy had with the parents of the abducted soldiers. He had two of them: the second meeting was with the parents of the abducted soldiers. Halevi did not have good answers to the difficult questions he was asked. To his credit, he looked straight ahead, vowing to turn over every stone. So does Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, who also meets constantly with the families of the abductees, and a few members of the government – Benny Gantz at their head – who remember that this is one of the two overarching goals of the war.
The rest of the ministers act as if it's none of their business. Netanyahu meets only when he is urged, or when he feels that there is a public price to pay. As always, everything with him is measured by cost-benefit considerations. Not what we will get out of it, but what will come of it. Every visit is prepared in advance: you won't catch him visiting the evacuees of Kfar Gaza in Shfayim, or the evacuees of Bari at the Dead Sea, or the evacuees of Nir Oz in Eilat – he will arrive at the empty kibbutzim, take pictures in them and lament their fate, without having to encounter those who paid the price for the abandonment.
The same applies to the wounded and soldiers. His visits to units and bases are a public relations circus. Those who are marked as potential for a problem or criticism are removed from the scene in advance. A prime minister who claims to be strong against Hamas and strong against the Americans and strong against terror is weak against his citizens and soldiers. Not because of the vest he wears and the weapons taken from them – these are matters largely decided by security officials – but because he is afraid of criticism.
In general, in the universe in which Netanyahu lives, there is only one important factor: Netanyahu. Everything is designed to serve him. Not that proof was required, but the past week has put a final stamp on it and evokes a particularly harsh sense of cavity. The claim that Ben-Gurion was a weak leader who did not know how to stand up to the Americans was twice brazen – both because of what Ben-Gurion did as prime minister, and because of everything Netanyahu did not do.
The comparison to Oslo was also twice ugly – partly because it was a paragon of escaping responsibility for the Black Sabbath Holocaust, and partly because Netanyahu had a jubilee to free himself from the shackles of Oslo (in practice, he signed the Wye and Hebron Accords, embraced Arafat and met with Mahmoud Abbas, and preserved almost every practical trace of those agreements). Not to mention the battle with the administration in Washington, which for the past two months has been lying on the floor for Israel in every possible way, and found itself in the unbelievable role of villain in a script designed to rehabilitate Netanyahu's image and leadership.
Netanyahu's real destination
The climax was a return to the divisive politics that lasted here until October 6. For budgets intended to lubricate a particular sector, while the country is engaged in a complex, bloody and very expensive war. For surveys on how to bring the base home. To the divisive interviews, just after it was claimed that "politics is not done in war." And to statements in his immediate and distant surroundings and with his partners, which were literally blood-freezing.
This was most conspicuous of all Orit Strock, Minister of National Missions. Her ministry's budget increased fivefold this week, in political combines and budgetary tricks that were essentially robbing the public purse for sectoral purposes. At a time when the only national missions were rebuilding the envelope, assisting evacuees, honoring reservists, and strengthening internal cohesion, Strzok and her dispatchers continued to wreak havoc and venom.
Her statement that pensions of military service members should be cut summarized everything. These are many dedicated people who gave their lives, and sometimes their lives, for the security of the state. Take Eisenkot (until a moment ago this group used the term "fat" not only to describe his pension), who paid the heaviest possible price for the country. And not only him: Yuval Bezeq, Dadi Simhi, Roni Belkin and Moshe Shelly – four brigadier generals in the reserves whose sons fell in battle, along with four other colonels and several permanent lieutenant colonels who paid with their lives. This is their undoubted Zionism, and this is the Zionism on whose knees they educated their children.
Strzok has several family members currently serving in the fighting. They deserve all praise for that. It is, on the other hand, damage that becomes strategic. Just like her direct boss, Bezalel Smotrich. Last August, Saleh Arouri, a senior Hamas figure, was interviewed. In retrospect, he then gave strategic warning of an attack that came less than two months later. He listed several reasons for this: the constant excuse that the Al-Aqsa Mosque is in danger, the warming relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the internal rift in Israel, and Smotrich's emigration and deportation plan for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria.
The finance minister is not responsible for the Hamas attack, but anyone whose name is directly linked to it by the enemy is required at least to be modest. Instead, he continues on his own: pressing forward, as much as possible, followed by the flood. And Niha is the extremist – but where is Netanyahu, the strategic genius? Unfortunately, the answer is obvious. While the IDF sheds blood in Gaza and the abductees and their families lose years of life, the prime minister is campaigning. As far as he is concerned, the real goal of the war is not defeating Hamas and returning the hostages, but evading its responsibility for the Black Sabbath and the disgraceful treatment of its results. Not an Iron Sword War: A War for Peace Netanyahu.
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