The justices of the panel: President (ret.) A. Hayut, Acting President A. Fogelman and Justices Y. Amit, N. Solberg, D. Barak-Erez, A. Baron (ret.), D. Mintz, Y. Elron, Y. Willner, A. Grosskopf, A. Stein, G. Kanfi-Steinitz, H. Kabov, Y. Kasher and R. Ronen.
Today, the Supreme Court ruled in a majority opinion (12 out of 15 justices) thatit has the authority to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws and to intervene in exceptional and extreme cases in which the Knesset exceeded its constituent authority.
The Supreme Court further ruled in a majority opinion (8 out of 15 justices) that Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: Judiciary should be declared null and void, which categorically denied judicial review of the reasonableness of decisions made by the government, the prime minister, and ministers. This is due to the severe and unprecedented damage to the nuclear characteristics of the State of Israel as a democratic state.
In light of the importance of the issues that arose in the petitions against Amendment No. 3, the hearing on them took place on September 12, 9 before a full panel of 2023 Supreme Court justices. About a month after the hearing, on October 15, the reality of our lives changed beyond recognition, and since then we have been engaged in fierce and determined fighting against murderous terrorist organizations. However, when Amendment No. 7 remains in place, and taking into account the deadline by which President (ret.) Hayut and Justice (ret.) Baron are entitled to issue judgments in accordance with the provisions of the Courts Law [Combined Version], 3-1984, the judgment was given in the petitions.
Most of the justices of the panel (President (ret.) Hayut, Acting President Fogelman, and Justices Amit, Barak-Erez, Baron (ret.), Willner, Grosskopf, Stein, Kanfi-Steinitz, Kabov, Kasher and Ronen) ruled that in exceptional and extreme cases, the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, is authorized to declare the nullity of a Basic Law that constitutes a deviation from the Knesset's constituent authority. In this regard, HCJ 5555/18Hasson v. Knesset (2021) (regarding the "Basic Law on the Nation-State") has already ruled that the Knesset as a constituent authority is not "omnipotent," and that it has no authority – not even in a Basic Law – to deny or contradict head-on the nuclear characteristics of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Taking into account these limitations and in order to enforce them, most justices believed that the court's authority to conduct judicial review of the Basic Laws should be recognized. Some justices based this conclusion on our extraordinary constitutional structure, which is characterized, inter alia, by the absence of any dedicated and separate procedure for establishing constitutional norms; the problematic practice of establishing and amending Basic Laws, which attests to their contempt and their transformation into pawns in the hands of the political majority; and the role played by the court in protecting the constitutional enterprise. In this context, several justices emphasized the Declaration of Independence as the basis for judicial review of the Basic Laws; Others found the anchor of authority in Basic Law: Judiciary, according to which the High Court of Justice was granted the authority to grant remedies for justice and orders to all state authorities.
In the ruling, a majority opinion (President (ret.) Hayut, Acting President Fogelman and Justices Amit, Barak-Erez, Baron (ret.), Grosskopf, Kabub and Ronen) ruled that the amendment at the center of the petitions – Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: Judiciary – is an extreme case in which the Knesset exceeded its constituent authority, and therefore there is no choice but to declare it null and void. It was emphasized that this is an amendment whose exceptional and sweeping wording prevents all courts from hearing and hearing arguments regarding the reasonableness of decisions by the government, the prime minister and ministers, in relation to any decision, including a decision to refrain from exercising authority. The majority opinion further held that the interpretation of the amendment leaves no room for doubt that it also applies to absurd decisions and extremely unreasonable decisions. As a result, an unprecedented damage has been caused to two of Israel's nuclear characteristics as a democratic state – the principle of separation of powers and the principle of the rule of law. In this context, it was noted that the amendment significantly increases the great power already concentrated in the hands of the government and its ministers, and blocks the individual's ability to receive relief in a number of situations in which serious harm to his important interests may be caused as a result of the government's actions. It was also emphasized that the amendment leads to the fact that the most significant elements in the executive branch are actually exempt from the duty of reasonableness. It leaves entire areas without effective judicial review; prevents protection of public interests such as integrity and propriety of the administration; and could lead to a fundamental change in the face of the country's civil service, as well as severely damage to the independence of the law enforcement system and abuse of governmental resources in order to gain political advantages during election season.
Justice J. Wilner was of the opinion that the amendment should be given a sustainable interpretation and therefore there is no room to discuss the possibility of canceling it. Justices A. Stein and G. Kanfi-Steinitz were of the opinion that the amendment can and should be interpreted narrowly, and therefore there is no reason to intervene in it because it is a long way from those cases in which it can be said that the Knesset exceeded its constituent authority. Accordingly, Justices Willner, Stein and Kanfi-Steinitz were of the opinion that the amendment should be interpreted to block only judicial review on the grounds of reasonableness, as has developed since the decision in HCJ 389/80Golden Pages Ltd. v. Israel Broadcasting Authority (1980), which focuses on examining the balance between the various considerations in the governmental decision ("balancing reasonableness"). According to them, the amendment, according to this interpretation, still allows intervention in cases of unfounded decisions, which could have been intervened even before the Yellow Pages ruling. Justice Kasher refrained from ruling on the question of whether the amendment can be interpreted narrowly as stated, and his position is that despite the amendment's harm to the separation of powers and the rule of law, it does not reach the high threshold that justifies intervention in a Basic Law.
Justices Solberg and Mintz disagreed with the majority's position regarding the Court's authority in principle to conduct judicial review of the Basic Laws, and even its authority to decide on this question, noting that there is no source of authority that allows such review to be conducted. In their view, even setting aside the problem of the court's authority, the amendment is a long way from the narrow limitation that, according to the majority justices, applies to the Knesset's constituent authority. Justice Elron also disagreed with the majority's position, noting that even if it were correct to adopt a narrow exception that would allow intervention in the Basic Laws in extreme cases of violation of the basic rights of the individual, in any case the arguments regarding Amendment No. 3 are not ripe for a decision since no interpretation of the amendment has yet been cast and its limits have not yet been clarified, and therefore it cannot be assumed that its consequences will be as severe as claimed.
Attached below are summaries of the opinions of each of the judges of the panel (in the order in which they appeared in the judgment):
President (ret.) A. Hayut:
President (ret.) Hayut reiterated in her opinion the court's ruling in HCJ 5555/18Hasson v. Knesset (2021), according to which the Knesset's authority in its capacity as a constituent authority is not unlimited and that it is not authorized to enact a Basic Law that negates or directly contradicts the characteristics of Israel's nuclear identity as a Jewish and democratic state. This conclusion, according to the President (ret.), is learned from the "constitutional data" as they have developed since the early days of the state – the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws and laws enacted by the Knesset, and court rulings over the years. The President further ruled that given the unique characteristics of our constitutional structure – the formulation of the constitution "chapters by chapter", the absence of a rigid process for its establishment and amendment, and the control of the political majority in exercising the constituent authority – the limitations on the Knesset's authority cannot be left unenforceable, and without judicial review by virtue of which the court can intervene in those extreme and exceptional cases in which the Knesset exceeded the limits of its constituent authority by enacting a Basic Law.
According to the President (ret.), Amendment No. 3 to the Basic Law on Judiciary is an extreme case in which the Knesset exceeded its constituent authority. In this context, it was emphasized that in the current reality in Israel, judicial review is theonlyeffective check on the great power concentrated in the hands of the government and its ministers. Therefore, the amendment that is the subject of the petitions – whichsweepinglydenies the authority of the courts to conduct judicial review of the reasonableness of all decisions made by the government, the prime minister and its ministers, and even blocks any possibility of hearing such claims – severely harms the principle of separation of powers and the principle of the rule of law. This severe blow to two of the most distinctive characteristics of the State of Israel as a democratic state (the significance of which was detailed at length by the President (ret.) in her opinion) has the potential to have a significant and unprecedented impact on the individual and the public as a whole. Therefore, the President (ret.) ruled that there is no escape from the determination that in enacting Amendment No. 3, the Knesset exceeded its constituent authority and that the amendment should be repealed.
Justice J. Willner:
Justice Y. Wilner joined the position that this court has the authority to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws. This, according to her, is also by virtue of section 15(c) of Basic Law: Judiciary, which authorizes the court to grant "relief from justice." It further held that in view of the ambiguity of the term "reasonableness" used by the constituent in the framework of the amendment, an interpretive question arises as to its meaning. On this question, Justice Willner decides by way of a sustainable interpretation, according to which the cancellation of the cause of reasonableness relates only to the "balancing reasonableness," that is, in the sense cast for it in the YellowPages case. This conclusion requires, in its view, the entrenched rulings of this Court, according to which an interpretation that satisfies the law should be preferred to an interpretation that is liable to lead to its annulment. In her view, sustainable interpretation is linguistically possible; It has an element in the subjective purpose; And it optimally fulfills the objective purpose. Given this interpretation, the amendment does not severely harm the democratic identity of the State of Israel. This is partly in view of the fact that the amendment does not detract from the duty of the government and ministers to act lawfully; and does not prevent effective judicial review, in view of the existence of additional grounds for judicial review. It should be noted that although cases may arise in which it will not be possible to grant judicial relief as in the past, even if it is to be regretted, these decisions will be made with authority; after proper administrative procedure; in good faith; without extraneous considerations; proportionate decisions; non-arbitrary; are not discriminatory; And they are not unfounded. Justice Willner also noted that the approaches that have called over the years to restore reasonableness to its original meaning have never been perceived as anti-democratic. Yes, she argued that in examining the constitutionality of the amendment, the court should take into account only the existing legal situation, and not suspend arguments regarding future bills. Therefore, Justice Willner ruled that the petitions should be dismissed, while the amendment would be interpreted in accordance with the existing interpretation.
Justice Y. Elron:
According to Justice Elron Dean, the petitions should be dismissed. Justice Elron reiterated his principled position that the mandate given to the High Court of Justice to examine the justification underlying the decisions of Knesset members is limited: and that in the absence of an explicit norm that limits the Knesset's authority to enact Basic Laws or determines how it should be implemented, the further development of doctrines granting the Court the authority to shape the boundaries of the establishment of the constitution constitutes a reversal of the authority. Justice Elron also noted his position regarding the possibility of a narrow exception in exceptional and extreme cases of violation of the basic rights of the individual and as a last resort only. With regard to the "grounds of reasonableness," Justice Elron emphasized that if the reduction made in Amendment No. 3 meets the test set for intervention in basic legislation, the opening opened for this court's intervention is not narrow at all. Beyond his principled position, Justice Elron was of the opinion that the petitions could also be dismissed because the arguments regarding Amendment No. 3 were not ripe for a decision. It is reasoned that where the court believes that it is right to consider interfering with the content of a Basic Law, it is necessary that this be done only after examining its implementation and shaping its boundaries in the court's interpretation. In this case, the courts may determine that the meaning of the amendment is the annulment of the Yellow Pages ruling and nothing more, and if so, then the intensity of the amendment's violation of the various democratic principles is far from justifying the cancellation of a section of the Basic Law. In conclusion, he wrote: "I am firmly of the opinion that this is not the time to shake the constitutional foundations of our country. The dispute which is the object of the petitions before us should be postponed to an appropriate date if and when its decision is necessitated by the facts of the case. I am afraid that at the present time, the damage caused by undermining the foundations of constitutional law in Israel due to the disqualification of Amendment No. 3 may far exceed the damage caused by leaving it in place."
Justice A. Stein:
Justice Alex Stein ruled that the enactment of laws and Basic Laws by the Knesset is subject to the boundaries outlined in the Declaration of Independence – this is because the Proclamation and the Government and Justice Orders Ordinance, which were enacted and published upon the establishment of the State, explicitly stated that the legislative powers of the Provisional Council of State, which transferred these powers to subsequent conferences, are anchored in the Declaration of Independence. In addition, Justice Stein ruled that the amendment to the Basic Law discussed in the present petitions does not contradict the principles of the Declaration of Independence, since it only nullifies the Supreme Court's authority to invalidate government decisions due to unreasonableness as an independent and exclusive ground, while retaining its authority to invalidate government decisions that were found to be unfounded on their face due to extraneous considerations, arbitrariness, bad faith and other grounds for disqualification. In Justice Stein's opinion, this reduction of judicial review returns administrative law to its pre-Yellow Pages ruling – in which the unreasonableness of a governmental decision was recognized as an independent ground for its disqualification – as explicitly stated in the explanatory notes to the proposed amendment that is the subject of discussion. For this reason, Justice Stein ruled that the amendment at issue does not sterilize judicial review, and therefore does not violate the basic requirement of justice in the Declaration of Independence. This ruling led Justice Stein to conclude that the amendment was constitutional.
השופט י' עמית:
בפסק דינו התייחס השופט עמית להיעדרם של מנגנוני איזונים ובלמים בשיטת המשפט בישראל המרסנים את כוחה של הממשלה, באופן המעניק לה עוצמה מיוחדת. המסקנה המתבקשת ממצב זה היא שנדרשת הוספה של מנגנונים לחיזוק המשטר הדמוקרטי, ואילו התיקון נושא דיוננו צועד בכיוון ההפוך; הוא מעצים עוד יותר את כוחה של הרשות המבצעת ופוגע בעקרונות יסוד של שיטתנו המשפטית.
השופט עמית עמד על נוסחו הגורף של החוק, שלכאורה חל על עילת הסבירות על כל מופעיה הרבים בפסיקה ואינו מבחין בין סוגים שונים של החלטות. הוסבר כי עילת הסבירות עוסקת בחיי היום-יום של האזרח במדינתו, ועיקר כוחה ופועלה אינו בבחינה של ההחלטה המינהלית בדיעבד בבית המשפט, אלא מלכתחילה בשלב גיבוש ועיצוב ההחלטה. בהיעדר עילת סבירות, תידלדל חובת הסבירות ותיעלם, דבר שעלול להותיר את הציבור ללא הגנה ולשנות את פניו של השירות הציבורי. לא נמצא כי הכלים האחרים שמציע המשפט המינהלי יכולים להשלים את הפער שנוצר, וגם האפשרות לבקר את ההחלטה באמצעות כלי הביקורת הפרלמנטריים או באמצעות לחץ ציבורי, אינה יכולה להוות תחליף של ממש לביקורת שיפוטית.
התיקון לחוק היסוד פוגע בגרעין הדמוקרטי של המדינה: בזכות הגישה לערכאות; בעיקרון הפרדת הרשויות ובעקרון ביזור הכוח שעומד ביסודה; בזכויות יסוד חוקתיות. התיקון אף פוגע בשלטון החוק בהיבטים שונים – הצבת הממשלה ושריה מעל החוק; מינויים ופיטורים בלתי ראויים, לרבות של שומרי סף; חסינות מפני אי הפעלת סמכות מינהלית והתעלמות משיקולים מקצועיים; היעדר פיקוח על ממשלת מעבר; חשש לפגיעה בטוהר הבחירות.
השופטת ג' כנפי-שטייניץ:
השופטת ג' כנפי-שטייניץ מסכימה כי לבית המשפט העליון נתונה סמכות לקיים ביקורת שיפוטית על חקיקת-יסוד, אולם לעמדתה, בחינתו של התיקון, על-פי פרשנותו הראויה, מובילה למסקנה כי זה אינו עומד באמות המידה הצרות ביותר המצדיקות פסילתו של חוק-יסוד.
סוגית קיומה של ביקורת שיפוטית על חקיקת-יסוד מעוררת שאלות מורכבות, שמוטב היה שיוכרעו בזירה הציבורית. משנדרש בית המשפט לשאלה זו, עמדתה של השופטת היא, שקיימת בחקיקת היסוד תשתית טקסטואלית לקיומה של מגבלה מהותית שנטלה הכנסת על עצמה, המכפיפה את כוחה המכונן לשימור אופייה של מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית. מגבלה זו מעוגנת בחוקי-היסוד הקיימים, לרבות בהוראת סעיף 7א(א)(1) לחוק-יסוד: הכנסת, שתכליתו להגן על ליבת זהותה החוקתית של המדינה ולמנוע שינוי השיטה "מתוכה". סמכות בית המשפט לבקר חקיקת-יסוד נגזרת מהמגבלה האמורה, מקום בו הכנסת חרגה מגבולותיה החוקתיים – אולם זו צרה כ"קוף המחט" ויש להפעילה רק במקרים נדירים שבנדירים, של פגיעה אנושה בליבת זהותה של המדינה.
התיקון חוקק על רקע מחלוקת ארוכת שנים על היקפה של עילת הסבירות. הגם שהתיקון מעורר קשיים, בהיותו רחב וגורף, אין מדובר בחוק המאיים למוטט את אושיות הדמוקרטיה בישראל, הרחק מכך. במישור הפרשני, יש לתת לתיקון פרשנות מצמצמת, שלפיה הוא מונע ביקורת שיפוטית רק בעילת הסבירות "האיזונית" ולא בעילת הסבירות "הצרה". בפרשנותו זו, השלכותיו של התיקון מבחינה מעשית מצומצמות ביותר, משניתן להמיר את השימוש בעילת הסבירות האיזונית בעילות ביקורת אחרות הקיימות במשפט המנהלי. ההחלטות המועטות שאותן לא ניתן יהיה לבקר על-פי התיקון, הן החלטות שלפי טיבן ולפי עמדתו הנורמטיבית של המחוקק, שיש לכבדה, אין מקום לבחון את סבירותן האיזונית – מבלי שהדבר פוגע בצורה אנושה בשלטון החוק או בעקרון הפרדת הרשויות.
השופטת ר' רונן:
השופטת רונן מצטרפת לחוות דעתה של הנשיאה (בדימ') חיות. היא קובעת כי הכנסת כרשות מכוננת מוגבלת בסמכותה, ואינה רשאית לחוקק חוקי-יסוד הפוגעים באופן משמעותי בשני מאפייני הזהות הגרעיניים של מדינת ישראל – היותה יהודית ודמוקרטית. כן היא קובעת כי בית המשפט העליון מוסמך לערוך ביקורת שיפוטית על חוקי-יסוד.
עוד נקבע שיש לדחות את הפרשנות המצמצמת לתיקון – פרשנות שאין לה אחיזה בלשון התיקון; מנוגדת בבירור לתכליתו הסובייקטיבית; ואף אינה מספקת לבית המשפט כל הנחיה ברורה ואופרטיבית ביחס לאופן בו יש לבחון בעתיד החלטות של הממשלה ושריה. זאת בין היתר לאור ניתוח המצב המשפטי לפני פסק הדין בעניין דפי זהב ואחריו, ושלילת ההנחה לפיה הנחיה המורה על חזרה למצב "טרום דפי זהב" היא בעלת משמעות. לכן, נקבע שהתיקון על-פי פרשנותו הנכונה שולל מבית המשפט אפשרות לדון בכל טענה שהיא הנוגעת לסבירות.
השופטת רונן התייחסה גם לסטנדרט הביקורת שיש להפעיל בבחינת התיקון, וקבעה כי מאחר שהתיקון פוגע ביכולת הרשות השופטת לבקר את הרשות המבצעת, תוך שינוי מהותי של מערך האיזונים הקיים בין הרשויות, הוא מעורר חשש לניגוד עניינים מובנה של הכנסת. חשש זה מתעצם מאחר שהתיקון התקבל ללא הסכמת מי מחברי האופוזיציה ותחולתו היא מיידית. משכך, נקבע שיש להחיל סטנדרט ביקורת מחמיר במעט בשאלה האם הפגיעה במאפיינים הדמוקרטיים מהווה חריגה של הרשות המכוננת מסמכותה.
לנוכח פרשנות התיקון ושלילת הביקורת השיפוטית בכל היבטי עילת הסבירות, המסקנה היא כי התיקון פוגע באופן משמעותי בליבת עקרונות השיטה הדמוקרטית. בהקשר זה הודגש בין היתר הנושא של מינויים ופיטורים של שומרי סף. על-כן, ובהתחשב בסטנדרט הביקורת שהוזכר לעיל, נקבע שהכנסת חרגה מסמכותה בחקיקת התיקון, ויש להורות על פסילתו.
השופט י' כשר:
השופט כשר הצטרף לעמדת הנשיאה (בדימוס) לפיה סמכות הכנסת כרשות מכוננת מוגבלת בכך שהינה כפופה להגדרתה של מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית. כמו כן, לדעתו לבית המשפט הגבוה לצדק, מוקנית הסמכות לקבוע כי הכנסת חרגה מסמכותה המכוננת, ולהורות על בטלות תיקון לחוק יסוד. המבחן לעניין חריגת הכנסת מסמכותה המכוננת הוא זה שנקבע בעניין חסון – מבחן צר המגולם בשאלה האם התיקון שולל את ליבת הזהות הדמוקרטית של המדינה או פוגע פגיעה אנושה במאפייני הזהות הגרעיניים המינימאליים של מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית או כמדינה דמוקרטית.
לדעתו של השופט כשר התיקון נושא העתירה מחליש את הביקורת השיפוטית על הממשלה ושריה, ובכך פוגע בעקרונות הפרדת הרשויות ושלטון החוק. יחד עם זאת, לא כל הסטת נקודת האיזון בין הרשות השופטת לרשות המבצעת, על דרך הצרת הביקורת השיפוטית על הרשות המבצעת, מגיעה כדי שלילת ליבת הזהות הדמוקרטית של המדינה. לדעתו, התיקון יוביל להחלשה מסוימת של הביקורת השיפוטית על הרשות המבצעת. ברם, הוא אינו צפוי להוביל למצב בו הביקורת הנ"ל תהיה בלתי אפקטיבית, ומכאן שאין הצדקה להורות על ביטולו.
השופט כשר סיים באמירה לפיה השאלה שהיה עליו להכריע בה אינה עד כמה התיקון הוא לרוחו והאם, להשקפתו, מוטב היה שלא היה נחקק כלל, אלא האם התיקון נושא העתירות מגיע לכדי הנסיבות הקיצוניות – פגיעה אנושה במאפייני הזהות הגרעיניים המינימאליים של מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית – שרק בהתרחשותן, יעשה בית משפט זה שימוש בסמכות המאוד מרחיקת לכת, המוקנית לו, להורות על ביטול תיקון לחוק יסוד. השופט כשר ציין כי לדעתו, יש להשיב על השאלה דלעיל בשלילה, ומכאן התוצאה שאליה הגיע.
ממלא מקום הנשיא ע' פוגלמן:
מ"מ הנשיא פסק כי הרשות המכוננת אינה יכולה לערער את זהותה היהודית והדמוקרטית של המדינה, וכי מאפייניו של המפעל החוקתי הישראלי והשימוש בפועל בסמכות המכוננת מוליכים למסקנה שבית המשפט הוא המוסד שמוסמך לקבוע אם הכנסת חרגה מסמכותה המכוננת. מ"מ הנשיא קבע כי המצב הייחודי בישראל, שבו השליטה בסמכויות הביצוע, החקיקה והכינון מוחזקת למעשה בידי הממשלה, כמו גם חולשת המנגנון לקביעת הוראות בחוקה, מקרינים על רף התערבותו של בית המשפט בשאלה זו.
אשר לתיקון מס' 3, מ"מ הנשיא קבע כי חסימת כל אפשרות לדון בבתי המשפט בטענת חוסר סבירות ביחס לדרג המיניסטריאלי מגלמת פגיעה אנושה בעקרון שלטון החוק ובעקרון הפרדת הרשויות. פגיעה זו באה לידי ביטוי בשלושה מעגלים: ראשית, ביחס לפרט שנפגע מהחלטה בלתי סבירה והתיקון נועל בפניו את שערי בית המשפט; שנית, ביחס לדרג המיניסטריאלי, שהתיקון מסיר מגבלה משמעותית על כוחו ומכרסם במערכת האיזונים והבלמים הרעועה ממילא בשיטת המשפט הישראלית; ושלישית ביחס לשיטת המשפט בכללותה, מאחר שהתיקון יוצר במכוון מצב שבו "יש דין ואין דיין".
פגיעת התיקון במעגלים אלה חמורה במיוחד מאחר שהוא גורף ומוחלט: הוא מונע מכל בית משפט לדון בעילת הסבירות ביחס להחלטות הדרג המיניסטריאלי; תחולתו מתפרסת על כל החלטה של דרג זה; הוא נעדר מנגנוני פיקוח או איזונים אחרים; ואין בכוחן של יתר עילות המשפט המינהלי לשמש חלופה אפקטיבית.
מ"מ הנשיא הוסיף שצמצום פרשני של התיקון אינו אפשרי במקרה דנן. זאת, בין היתר, משום שהתזות הפרשניות שהוצעו נעדרות אחיזה בלשון התיקון ואינן מציגות חלופות קוהרנטיות. ממילא, כך נקבע, גם פרשנות כאמור תותיר על כנה פגיעה חמורה בשלטון החוק ובהפרדת הרשויות.
השופט ד' מינץ:
Justice D. Mintz emphasized that every authority and every judicial instance is not entitled to act except within the limits of the authority given to them by law. The court must take care to act only within the scope of its powers, with the same care it takes when the issue of authority arises with respect to other authorities. In this context, the authority to review laws is not based on solid foundations, and there is certainly no source of authority that allows the court to discuss the validity of a Basic Law or to invalidate it. The development of doctrines that criticize the content and essence of the Basic Laws "out of nowhere" undermines basic democratic values, including the principle of separation of powers, the principle of legality, and the principle of the rule of law. Repeal of a Basic Law based on vague doctrine and an indeterminate formula carries a heavy price from a democratic point of view, certainly when it comes to an issue on which the court itself finds itself in an "institutional conflict of interest."
From this starting point, discussion of the merits of the amendment is not required. In any case, the discussion of its interpretation is earlier than its boundaries have not yet been implemented and shaped. With regard to the position of the majority of the members of the panel, it was emphasized that a constitutional provision should be interpreted from a "broad perspective" and not "technically," in a way that reflects the "basic concepts" that it is intended to realize as a constitutional text. that it is difficult to determine that the language of the amendment is "sweeping", unqualified and leaves no room for "any doubt" as to its scope; And that there is nothing wrong with the fact that this is a general concept that requires interpretation. In addition, the amendment does not completely prevent judicial review of government and ministerial decisions, does not grant them absolute and sweeping discretion, and does not grant immunity to their decisions. The State of Israel is a strong democracy, and it remains so even after the amendment. The fact that there is a slim majority of the justices' positions to conclude that this is a fatal blow to the most fundamental democratic principles of the state also speaks for itself.
Justice H. Kabob:
Justice Kabov insisted that recognition of the limitations imposed on the legislative branch in a democratic state does not necessarily come at the expense of popular sovereignty; It may protect the people if their representatives in the legislative branch undermine the existence of democracy. It was explained that the best conceptualization of such limitations has to do with the fact that the people did not authorize the Knesset to do whatever it pleased. Therefore, for example, the Knesset is not authorized to extend its term beyond four years in the absence of special circumstances, even if its one hundred and twenty members vote on such a law in three readings and call it a Basic Law. It was also held that, in view of the structure of the system of government in Israel, it is impossible to obtain a result according to which there will be no judicial review of Basic Laws established in excess of authority at all. However, such criticism must be done with special caution and only in extreme events.
After reviewing the development of the reasonableness cause in Israeli law, Justice Kabov reached the conclusion that it is based on the perception that the legislature did not grant the Administration the authority to make a baseless and capricious decision. Over time, the tests of reasonableness expanded, and in the matter of the Yellow Pages, the balance of interests test was designed, which was criticized mainly because of its vague boundaries. Notwithstanding the above, the correct interpretation of Amendment No. 3 shows that the Knesset did not abolish the balancing of interests test alone, but rather the judicial review of the reasonableness of decisions by the ministerial echelon in a sweeping manner.
It was emphasized that exempting the ministerial echelon from its obligation to answer when it exceeds its authority means that the people are ruled by individuals; This is in contrast to the most refined description of popular sovereignty, which is the rule of laws. Therefore, there is no escape from judicial intervention. However, it was clarified that we must listen to the longstanding criticism voiced regarding the balance of interests test, which reached the Knesset plenum and led to the amendment of the Basic Law. And that it is right to give expression to this in case law.
Justice (ret.) A. Baron:
Justice Anat Baron insists that 75 years after that historic moment of the Declaration of Independence, Israeli democracy is in domestic danger – embodied in the amendment to the Basic Law: Judiciary. The amendment is intended to bring about a fundamental regime change. It removes from the government and its ministers the shackles of judicial review on thegrounds of reasonableness, and gives the executive branch power that lacks effective checks and balances. The significance of the amendment is asweeping exemptionfor the government and ministers from the obligation to act reasonably in their decisions, in a manner that grants the government unprecedented governmental power and the status of an executive-legislative-constituent "supreme authority." This is a fatal blow to the principle of separation of powers, to the rule of law and to the democratic character of the state.
Justice Baron clarifies that there is no proper substitute for reasonableness in maintaining the integrity of public administration and protecting individual rights. At the same time, the amendment opens the door to the "distribution of jobs" in the public service and harms the independence and independence of professional officials, with an emphasis on gatekeepers – since their appointment and removal from office are at the mercy of ministers and the government. According to the judge, the Supreme Court has the authority to determine that a constitutional norm is void, in extreme cases where the Knesset exceeds the boundaries of the constituent authority given to it; In this case, adopting a sustainable interpretation of the amendment to the Basic Law is impossible, since it is the writing of anew Basic Law – and this is neither within the authority nor the role of the Supreme Court. There are those who try to downplay the magnitude of the event, to attribute negligible casualness to the amendment, as if it were a minor and marginal matter. But this is an acute hour in which it is impossible to stand idly by, and the law of correction is void. In the words of the age-old song: "Never send to ask whom the bells rang – to you they ring."
Justice A. Grosskopf:
Justice Ofer Grosskopf joins the position of President (ret.) Esther Hayut that the law of petitions should be accepted and the law of amendment should be annulled. According to him, the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, is subject both by virtue of the Basic Law: Judiciary and by virtue of substantive justifications stemming from the unique nature of the Israeli constitutional enterprise, the authority to criticize the Knesset's compliance with the limitations imposed on it in its act as the constituent authority. These limitations are three: the limitation of propriety (the requirement to pass a Basic Law or amend it in the required legal procedure); the limitation of trust (the prohibition against using the constituent authority for foreign purposes); Limitation of authority (limitations on the current Knesset's power to deviate from the constitutional enterprise designed by its predecessors).
Insofar as the limitation of authority at the center of the discussion is concerned, given the nature of the incumbent Knesset's authority in shaping the "constitution in the making" (the continuation of the constitutional enterprise, and not its creation from the beginning), and taking into account the main purpose of the constitution (limiting the power of the occasional majority in the Knesset in its capacity as the legislative branch), the incumbent Knesset is subject (in the absence of Basic Law: Legislation) to two restrictions: first, the incumbent Knesset is not authorized at all to undermine the basic principles already established in the "constitution in the making", Chief among them is the fact that the state is Jewish and democratic (the "constitutional data"), in a way that collapses the constitutional structure created by its predecessors; Second, the authority of the sitting Knesset to make changes that constitute a marked deviation from the "constitutional data" is contingent on the formulation of broad consensus, and it is not enough for an occasional majority whose power the constitution is intended to limit.
With regard to Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: Judiciary, Justice Grosskopf accepts the interpretive approach according to which he prevents any judicial oversight of the reasonableness of the decision of the government echelon. Given this, the amendment constitutes a serious blow to the "constitution in the making," as shaped by previous revenues, mainly because it places the government level above the law. As a result, the amendment has severe negative consequential consequences, and above all, its violation of the principle of the rule of law is fatal, since it exempts those who head the executive branch from judicial review on the grounds of reasonableness in a sweeping and absolute manner. Therefore, the amendment must be invalidated according to the first qualification (the collapse of the "constitution in the making" enterprise), and alternatively according to the second exception (a marked deviation from the "constitutional data" without broad consensus).
Justice D. Barak-Erez:
Justice Barak-Erez believes that the constituent authority is limited according to the basic definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and argues that the limitation is anchored in the Declaration of Independence (which does not constitute a constitution, but determines the limits of the constituent authority). Accordingly, the court's authority to exercise judicial review in cases of deviation from the constituent authority is derived from this limitation and cannot depend on the wording of the Basic Laws themselves.
Justice Barak-Erez reiterated her position that only in extreme cases of "breaking tools" will this court intervene in the content of a Basic Law. However, according to her, this is the case in the present case. The amendment to the Basic Law severely damages the democratic infrastructure by granting the government broad immunity from effective criticism. In practice, it leads to harm on three levels: blocking the way to obtaining judicial relief in relation to decisions that harm the interests of individuals; lack of effective oversight of transitional governments to the extent of potentially influencing regime changes (for example, by promoting "popular" policies on the eve of elections); and severe damage to criticism of the government by officials who are "gatekeepers" and independent regulators as a result of a significant weakening of judicial review of their appointments and dismissals (an issue for which insufficient guarantees have been established in legislation). Justice Barak-Erez added that the proposal to return to the reasonableness "of yesteryear" grounds ignores the broad legal and constitutional context and the balances between the authorities in which judicial review was rooted in the past, in the spirit of the aphorism, "You cannot enter the same river twice."
Finally, Justice Barak-Erez reasoned that the amendment "did not even seek to replace judicial review with another binding review mechanism," and therefore "metaphorically it can be said that this is a situation in which not only a foot was dropped on the table, but no other support was added to it. The result is an unstable constitutional structure that is falling apart."
Justice N. Solberg:
Justice Sohlberg believes that it would have been better to reject the petitions out of hand due to lack of authority.
According to him, a determination that there is some limitation on the authority of the constituent authority "de facto" nullifies the basic democratic foundation of popular sovereignty through its elected representatives. Justice Solberg adds that this is not just his own position. The first seven presidents of this court, the eighth president, Aharon Barak, at the beginning of his judicial career, together with a distinguished faction of judges who served here for decades, all like teachers with a finger: Remove your hand from the basic legislation of the State of Israel!
Members of the majority opinion point to different sources of authority. There is no single source of authority agreed upon by all. Justice Sohlberg is of the opinion that even according to the majority system, it cannot be concluded from those sources of authority that Basic Laws can be invalidated where the opinions of the justices themselves were divided, let alone by a narrow majority, on the side of a vote.
Later in his remarks, Justice Sohlberg insists that the majority opinion represents the position of the judiciary. On the other hand, the Constituent Authority believes that not only does the court lack the authority to invalidate Basic Laws, but it also lacks the authority to decide the earlier question: whether the Court has the power to decide whether it has the authority to invalidate Basic Laws. Such a 'confrontation' between the authorities does not take place at all in the legal world, and cannot be decided by legal means.
Regarding the grounds of reasonableness: Justice Sohlberg's position is that even if we ignore the problem of authority, then even according to the President (ret.), the question is one: Does the Basic Law negate 'the very fact that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state'? Since this is the question, and there is no reason for it, the conclusion is near: the Basic Law is a long way from coming within the scope of that narrow limitation, far from it. In any case, even if there was authority, there would be no reason to invalidate the law.
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