Three months into the Gaza war, Israel's achievements are good, but additional efforts and sustained action are required to achieve the goals.
As long as there are tunnels, the state of fighting will continue. The huge tunnel near Erez Crossing, photo: IDF Spokesperson
Israel's political-security leadership faces a series of challenges and dilemmas regarding the next steps. In order to decide them correctly, one must watch films from the events of October 7 evening and morning, and remember that this is a war of no choice, forced on Israel and beginning under extremely difficult opening conditions, and precisely for this reason Israel must end it with a clear victory. In order to achieve the goals marked, it is necessary to deal with three main challenges, which the State of Israel and the IDF are capable of.
Coping with the Tunnel Network
Israel cannot allow Hamas' monstrous network of tunnels, with all its contents, to exist in the Gaza Strip. However, the price of exposing and destroying this network is heavy. Continued efforts to systematically deal with the tunnels will prolong the fighting, exact additional costs from our forces, and also increase political pressure on Israel. In order not to get into a time brace and to direct the pressure on the other side, Israel must make it clear that as long as there are tunnels, the state of hostilities will continue. An area with tunnels will be defined as a "combat zone", and anyone found there will be considered an enemy and will be treated accordingly, regardless of the physical presence of ground forces in these areas (such as by an airstrike). All this, until the tunnels are dismantled, and indefinitely.
Operational activity to destroy the tunnels in the Gaza Strip, photo: Ziv Koren
The significance of this decision is that residents of Gaza, the city and the northern Gaza Strip will not be able to return to their homes as long as there are tunnels beneath them. Apart from the benefit of dealing with the tunnels, it can be assumed that this will increase the pressure and public anger on Hamas.
IDF forces in the Hamas tunnel in the Gaza Strip, photo: Reuters
Rafah and the Philadelphi Route
Past experience has shown that arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip cannot be prevented without effective control of the Philadelphi Route and the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. The mechanisms for supervision and reliance on other arrangements in this area have failed miserably. As long as the free flow of weapons from Sinai to the Gaza Strip continues, it will not be possible to ensure the security demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and there will be little value to the efforts invested by the IDF and Shin Bet in locating and destroying the weapons inside the Gaza Strip.
Philadelphi axis (archive), photo: AP
An effective buffer between Gaza and Egypt would serve not only Israel's security need, but also Egypt's national security interest – to prevent Hamas terrorists from Gaza from reaching Egyptian territory. The Muslim Brotherhood is the bitter rival of the incumbent Egyptian regime, and Hamas is the strongest armed group of this movement. Moreover, it is in Egypt's interest to prevent Hamas operatives from reaching even Sinai territory. In the not-too-distant past, the connection between Hamas elements from Gaza and global jihad elements in Sinai intensified the security threat against the Egyptian forces.
Rafah (archive), photo: AFP
Even assuming that understandings can be reached with the Egyptians on this issue, two operational challenges will have to be addressed: how to operate militarily in the crowded area that has absorbed thousands of people evacuated from the northern Gaza Strip; and the method by which it will be possible to safely and long-term protect the narrow border strip. The defense establishment remembers well the attacks in this sector from the period before the withdrawal, and also considers the lessons learned then.
Reducing the damage caused by civilian aid
Much has been said about the price Israel pays for bringing humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. Assuming that this is an insurmountable condition for U.S. support and assistance, it is still possible to influence that Hamas will not enjoy the many profits it currently derives from it.
There is no reason to allow Hamas to control the distribution of aid. Terrorists on an aid truck in Gaza, Photo: AP
First, it is not too late to define a "de-escalation" zone inside Gaza, where only humanitarian aid can be received and distributed. Israel will be able to allow anyone interested to bring humanitarian aid into this area, and invite Gaza residents to come and benefit from it, within the borders of this area.
Second, even in the current format, there is no reason to allow Hamas to control the distribution of aid, thereby maintaining its power and control. Israel must harm any Hamas policeman or other operative sent by the organization on this mission. In order to topple the de-facto Hamas administration, it must expropriate its control over resources that maintain its power vis-à-vis the public. There is no fear of the disorder that may arise as a result. This is the only way that will bring about a real (and not ostensible) collapse of the Gaza administration.
A new reality in the Gaza Strip
Victory over Hamas requires creating a reality in the Gaza Strip that will not allow the renewed growth of terrorist elements. Security officials rightly make it clear that such a fundamental change requires determined and sustained action, without standing with the stopwatch in hand. In the Gaza Strip of 2024, with its high rates of support for Hamas, as long as it remains a strong, organized and armed core of this organization, it will be the main force in the Gaza Strip, regardless of the identity and definition of the entity that will officially manage its civilian affairs.
A fuel truck enters the Gaza Strip at the Rafah crossing, photo: AFP
An Israeli takeover of the entire territory, leaving the northern Gaza Strip and Gaza City as uninhabited areas, expropriating humanitarian aid from Hamas, and harming Hamas' police and supervisory bodies that express its de facto control over the Gaza Strip will give Israel the leverage it needs to release the hostages. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it will continue to take a stubborn stance on the issue of abductees.
The writer serves as head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy
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