The army must not be its own captain, not only for fear of authoritarian military rule, but also because military personnel tend to be limited in their strategic understanding. This rule is always true, and even in the present war.
Perhaps it can be illustrated by a historical comparison to the relations that developed between Ben-Gurion and the security personnel, the heads of the Haganah organization that the IDF had. Ben-Gurion began dealing directly with security matters in 1945, and in 1947 studied them in depth in interviews with Haganah officials, known as the "Seminar."
They came out of these meetings and told each other that the old man had gone crazy: he saw a confrontation with regular armies in the near future, and talked about artillery, tanks, planes and ships, while their present was limited to a semi-underground militia. They were preparing for a confrontation in the style of 1939-1936, perhaps a little more extended, namely, a war with the armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq.
Even in the conduct of the war itself, Ben-Gurion was the captain. For example, he forced the headquarters to concentrate its efforts on the way to Jerusalem while endangering the front in the north, and he blocked proposals to abandon the besieged Negev. And before the war, already in 1945, Ben-Gurion began to prepare for it in statesmanship, procurement, manpower. Had it been up to the Haganah commanders, in the spring of 1948 it would not have been possible to declare a state in the face of a certain invasion by the Arab armies.
And now, is there a captain's hand at the helm of war? The enlarged Netanyahu government has given the IDF a sufficiently clear and broad task required by the threat to us: to negate the enemy's military and governmental capabilities in the Gaza Strip and release the hostages from its claws. But at the current juncture of the war, questions arose about the War Cabinet's strategic oversight of the mission.
Can we expect that the government's order to the army will be fulfilled, when the Gaza-Egypt border is under Hamas control, and God forbid will continue to be under its control? Let's hope that the effort in Khan Yunis will achieve the release of the hostages, but even that cannot replace a military victory by Hamas, which requires intensifying maneuvers to Rafah and the border with Egypt.
In the meantime, we are reading press briefings that no ground offensive is planned there. There are reports that the Egyptians are threatening and demanding that we not attack near their border. It was also claimed that the non-combatant population – but observing, assisting and hiding within it – also crowded into Rafah and the Egyptian border (and not just on the beach in the southwest of Gaza), hindering the offensive there. But this fact was known to the planners of the campaign, military and political, when the population was directed south.
In such crowds, it was clear that a guerrilla war was expected in Rafah and Khan Yunis under the auspices of a sympathetic "non-combatant" population, due to which the IDF's fighting would be limited, for fear of harming it. Nevertheless, the order to the army was not classified with regard to the southern Gaza Strip – the south was not excluded from the order to dismantle Hamas' military and governmental capabilities. And it is clear that if excluded, the task will not be carried out.
The heads of the Haganah came out of these meetings and told each other that the old man had gone crazy: he saw a confrontation with regular armies in the near future, while their present was limited to a semi-underground militia. They were preparing for a 1939-1936-style confrontation with the armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq
Netanyahu declared that the task his government had assigned to the army would be carried out to the fullest, including taking control of the Gaza-Egypt border. He determined that this takeover was essential. Do his two partners with voting rights in the War Cabinet, Defense Minister Galant and Gantz, share his decision? The media gave the disturbing impression – albeit uncertain – that there was an intention to undermine the government's order regarding the southern Gaza Strip. If this happens, it is likely that a large majority of the Israeli public will react angrily, that the rehabilitation of the western Negev will be disrupted, and that there will be serious political consequences.
In any case, the position of the army's senior command deserves to be heard and considered, of course, but it is not supposed to decide such an issue. The army must be subordinate to the cabinet and the government. Such an issue requires a decision by the elected leadership, led by the prime minister. This is a necessary condition (albeit not a sufficient condition) for the war to be conducted properly and to end successfully.
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