No Arab or Western country has so far expressed official willingness to undertake the ungrateful task of managing Gaza. Moreover, as the war progresses, that day after gets further and further away, and for several reasons. According to the defense establishment's approach, failure to set goals regarding the day after creates a lack of strategic clarity and makes it difficult for the defense establishment to achieve the goals of the war. In return for the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi demanded the cancellation of the plan to apply sovereignty in the West Bank. This time it could offer Israel an attractive reward: rebuilding the Gaza Strip.
Between buildings and in the open: Nahal Brigade fighters fighting in the area of Daraj Tufah in the northern Gaza Strip \\ IDF Spokesperson
It is doubtful whether a foreign country will liberate Israel from Gaza | Ariel Kahane
Three months after the outbreak of the war, Israel does not know what the "day after" will look like in the Gaza Strip. In fact, almost as on its third day, we can only say what will not happen: not Hamas, not a Palestinian Authority in its current form, not Israeli civilian control. There is a consensus on this.
What is? The same ideas that were thrown into the air over the past 90 days are still floating in his space. An international, or Arab, or Western, or local regime, a combination of several of them. The tiny problem is that no Arab or Western country has so far expressed official willingness to undertake the ungrateful task of running Gaza. Nurturing local forces also seems like a very difficult task.
The Israeli flag in the heart of the Gaza Strip,
Moreover, as the war progresses, that day after gets further and further away, and for several reasons. First, the IDF encountered tunneling infrastructure and weapons stockpiles on a scale many times larger than expected, not to mention that the IDF has not yet dealt with the Rafah area and not just the plague of smuggling along the Philadelphi route. As long as these tasks are not completed – which could take years – it will not be possible to begin building a new control mechanism.
Second, when Gaza is not free of terrorism, it endangers any foreign power that enters it. This is true of the tunnels, missile stockpiles and explosives everywhere. This is even more true for armed squads, who will challenge any foreign policeman. Why should a foreign country endanger its people?
Third, in particular for Arab regimes, it will be difficult to be seen as coming to control Gaza with IDF bayonets. Such an act could be perceived as turning its back on the Palestinian cause and provoking unrest in the streets. Massive public persuasion work will be needed before the act.
Moreover, some government ministers insist on the principle that there is no rehabilitation before demilitarization. In their view, it is inconceivable that the residents of Gaza will return to normal life when they have at their fingertips the ability to attack Israel again.
A New Illusion
Despite all these hurdles, both Israel's defense establishment and the U.S. administration are clinging to the idea of a foreign regime that will somehow emerge and take the reins. This hope is about as realistic as a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, which some have also fantasized about for 17 years. But blessed be the believer.
Alongside the conventional proposal for a foreign power, two more tracks are being advanced. One is the voluntary departure of Gazans to other countries. The second, which seems more realistic than others, is Israeli control of Gaza. This is the direction of Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir. In their opinion, whether voluntarily – to return to the territories of the homeland, or out of necessity – without any other foreign power, Israel will have no choice but to rule itself in Gaza.
After all, they say, no one wants to touch Gaza, nor will anyone keep it from exploding again. Not sure they are wrong.
The defense establishment is troubled by the procrastination of the political echelon | Lilach Shoval
The fact that the political echelon has not yet held an official discussion about the "day after" the IDF's intensive military operation in the Gaza Strip is of great concern to senior defense officials.
According to the defense establishment's approach, failure to set goals for the day after creates a lack of strategic clarity and makes it difficult for the defense establishment to achieve the goals of the war, and it exacerbates the tension between Israel and the American administration, which seeks to coordinate positions with Israel. In addition, the defense establishment believes that the discussion regarding Israel's goals the day after Hamas is also an opportunity not to be missed, since setting the goal will allow the IDF to at least try to shape the reality in the Gaza Strip in accordance with an approved and coordinated policy.
Defense Minister Yoav Galant in the Gaza Strip,
The professional echelons of the defense establishment did not wait for instructions from the political echelon, and held professional discussions on the question of who should control the Gaza Strip the day after the war.
The results of the discussions were presented in recent days by Defense Minister Yoav Galant on the question of whether the Palestinian Authority should control the Gaza Strip the day after. It seems that the defense establishment supports Prime Minister Netanyahu's public position that the PA cannot control the Gaza Strip.
The reason for this is that even the defense establishment understands that the PA is unable to establish its control even in Judea and Samaria, much less in the Gaza Strip, which is dozens of times more complex.
According to the approach of the defense establishment presented by the defense minister, after the war Hamas will of course not control the Gaza Strip, nor will any other element hostile to Israel. On the other hand, Galant made it clear that Israel would not control a civilian Gaza either.
According to this approach, after the war, a civilian control mechanism should be established in the Gaza Strip, consisting of four elements: the first is a multinational task force led by the United States, Western European countries, and moderate Arab countries, which will assume responsibility for rebuilding the Gaza Strip; the second is a Palestinian civil-administrative body composed of local committees and elements not hostile to Israel; The third is Egypt, which will control the Rafah border crossing and, in cooperation with Israel, will supervise what enters the Gaza Strip.
The fourth factor is Israel itself, which will direct the multinational force, supervise the entry of goods into the Gaza Strip, and maintain the freedom of security action in the Gaza Strip in accordance with intelligence and operational needs.
Fundamental tier
The defense establishment is interested in advancing the issue of the day after in favor of relations with the United States. Beyond the fact that Washington provides the Israeli defense establishment with breathing space in the form of many munitions and weapons, its support for Israel is a significant element in Israel's deterrence in the entire region.
Moreover, without the US veto in the UN Security Council, Israel would be in a completely different place.
The covert competition between Qatar and the UAE | Shahar Kleiman
"The UAE has made a strategic decision – and strategic decisions are long-term," Anwar Gargesh, political adviser to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, said recently.
It was another conference held in Dubai, and Gargash was asked to address the continuation of the normalization agreement with Israel. He made it clear that there is no military alternative to resolving the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, and that the only solution is a political process. Indeed, this is, it seems, the Emirati plan.
The Emirati President,
Since the outbreak of the war, criticism of Abu Dhabi over its relations with Jerusalem has increased. The UAE's answer is to exert political pressure on Israel to return to a political process with the Palestinian Authority while attempting to bring about a ceasefire resolution in the Security Council, even if they are destined to fail in advance because of the American veto. Outwardly, it prides itself on these steps, without sacrificing the dividends of normalization.
In return for the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi demanded the cancellation of the sovereignty plan in the West Bank. This time it could offer an attractive return – dealing with the Gaza population in the first stage, and perhaps even rehabilitating and managing the Gaza Strip through its allies.
In fact, the UAE already operates a field hospital in Rafah, water desalination plants and a humanitarian helpline. It also took in hundreds of Gazan patients for medical treatment.
The mirror image of the UAE is Qatar, which does not have official relations with Israel. Doha's Islamist Emirate, which hosts the Hamas leadership, has already announced that it intends to inject tens of millions of dollars into the Gaza Strip in the future. Qatar does not condition aid on a political process, but its interest is particularly dangerous: the survival of Hamas and its rebuilding after the war.
As reported in the foreign media, and despite vehement denials, the Qataris have for years fattened up the Hamas monster, including its military wing. They are now trying to rehabilitate their image through mediation efforts, a move that has been quite successful.
It is likely that in this covert competition between Qatar and the UAE for the day after, Israel will have to decide. It will have to make a difficult decision and choose between an ally that is open about its intentions, but clashes through them with the perception of the political echelon, and a country that acts against us in the dark but ostensibly demands nothing.
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