There is not a day that Israel, or Israeli bodies and companies, are not attacked by cyber.
Most of the attacks do not reach the public at all.
In the absence of harm, or potential for harm, they do not arouse real interest.
The matter arises only when public, economic or personal interests are at stake.
In recent weeks there have been several such attacks.
The most serious of which was the cyber attack on Hillel Yaffe Hospital in Hadera, which has not been able to recover to this day.
In other cases, the Atref dating community's dating site and the Moore Institute's site were attacked.
From both, users' information was extracted, some of which were also published online.
Data from the national cyber array show an insane number of attacks.
Millions a year.
Most are automatic attacks, mainly against civilians, in order to make money.
Someone sends someone an infected file, the recipient opens the file and infects his computer, and the attacker locks the computer and asks for money in exchange for reopening it.
Quite a few people pay to get their computer and information back.
The more significant attacks are directed against bodies and companies.
They are divided into two: attacks by hostile elements in order to cause damage and embarrass the State of Israel, and attacks by criminal elements aimed at making money.
The latter are more common, and seemingly also easier to treat.
The attackers extract the information or lock the computers (or both), and demand ransom to restore the status quo.
From here it is possible to negotiate with them (there are quite a few factors that have developed expertise in this), sometimes discreetly, to pay and close the affair.
According to foreign publications, Israel launched a cyber war against Iran and significantly delayed the nuclear program, Photo: Photo: IPI
The bigger problem is with the attacks for which countries are responsible.
The Black Shadow group, which is known to be operated by Iran, is responsible for breaking into the Atref website, and last year it was responsible for an attack on some of Israel's urban water infrastructure.
This group and its like are negotiating as if it were a criminal attack, but they have no real interest in money: their whole desire is to embarrass and harm the State of Israel.
It is part of an all-out war that Israel and Iran have waged in recent years in almost every possible arena.
This war has obvious sides: the attacks attributed to the Syrian Air Force, for example.
It has parts that are only partially visible: the naval campaign against Iranian oil smuggling, which led to Iranian damage to Israeli-owned ships.
And it has completely secret parts: cyber is the most prominent of them.
Israel is the one that started the cyber war against Iran (according to foreign publications, of course). The "Stuxnet" worm, which was introduced more than a decade ago into the computers responsible for centrifugation at the Natanz nuclear facility, disrupted the uranium enrichment process, significantly delaying Iran's nuclear program. This operation - dubbed the "Olympic Games" and carried out in Israeli-American cooperation - was groundbreaking, but not the last of its kind. In the last year alone, there have been reports of damage to Iran's main commercial port, train traffic, and more recently - the shutdown of thousands of gas stations by disrupting the payment system for refueling tickets.
Such attacks can only be carried out by a state.
They require an extensive technological infrastructure, big money and a lot of professional people.
Israel is a powerhouse in this area of offensive cyber: it stands in the top five with the United States, Russia, China and the United Kingdom. Iran lags far behind, but it is steadily improving. Until scandalous.
Neglected in defense
The vast majority of cyber attacks can be prevented.
Every year, the national cyber system publishes tens of thousands of vulnerabilities that are exposed in the various programs, and the way to close them.
These are loopholes through which an attacker could log in and take over a computer.
In most cases, the vulnerability can be closed relatively easily, while updating software.
The problem is that many bodies - including public ones - are negligent in their defense.
Some save on standards of information security officers;
Some save on purchasing advanced protection software;
And some simply disobey the guidelines, thereby endangering themselves and their customers.
The "Shirbit" insurance company that was attacked this year is a good example of this: if it had done what was required of it, the attack (which actually led to its sale) would have been avoided or at least significantly reduced.
The potential for damage is huge
The cyber system protects only what has been defined as vital interests of the state - a closed list of issues and bodies (from the electricity company to the oil and gas infrastructure).
The rest of the officials he just guides.
The person responsible for enforcing the guidelines on them is the relevant ministry: the Ministry of Health on the homes and health funds, the Ministry of Finance on the capital market and insurance bodies, the Ministry of the Interior on the local authorities, etc.
Some enforcement is done effectively, and some is not.
It largely depends on the seriousness of the factors themselves: quite a few municipalities in Israel have realized the potential for damage, and are treating it as required.
Others (especially the poor ones) do little and hope for the best.
The problem is that we, the citizens, are in the hands of a variety of factors, some of which do not perform their work as required.
Our personal details - names, IDs, credit card details and more - are in the municipality, school, health fund and more.
Hence, the road to exposing our privacy is short, along with the danger of financial harm as a result of credit card theft.
These dangers threaten us all, but they are the small dangers.
The greater dangers are directed at truly sensitive infrastructures, on which our lives depend.
Aircraft, trains, traffic routing systems, energy - the damage to which has the potential to disrupt life in Israel, and we have not yet talked about the various bodies in the defense system that also rely heavily on computers - from information systems and intelligence and operational information, to combat systems based entirely on technology .
There have been attempts in the past to disrupt, for example, the activities of the Iron Dome, and it is likely that such cyber attacks will be an integral part of future wars as well.
As stated, Israel is a power in the cyber field.
It allows it a huge technological advantage over its enemies (and also huge economic gains that are part of being a start-up nation), but it also requires it to significantly protect itself and its citizens.
This protection is carried out only in part;
It requires more decisive action to minimize damage in the face of a host of cyber threats, which are only likely to be overcome by both hostile and criminal elements.
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