The IDF's professional and important activity in Jenin is inevitable. It will indeed be able to stop the process of copying Gazan patterns of terrorism to northern Samaria, but it will not change the characteristics of the general reality in this region.
The escalation in shooting incidents and the detonation of IEDs against IDF forces operating in this sector, as well as the (failed) launching of rockets at the communities of Gilboa, illustrated the significance of the strengthening of terrorist elements in this area and left the IDF with no other choice but to operate deep in the area. Israel will not be able to allow a process similar to the one that took place in Gaza throughout the West Bank.
History of violent space
Jenin has a history of violent space. It is a geographic, political, social and economic periphery. From time immemorial, the central government's grip on it has been tenuous. This was already the case in the 30s, during the British Mandate, when its forces eliminated Izz ad-Din al-Qassam in this area, whose name has been borne over the years as an inspiration and symbol of Hamas' terror squads.
Inside documentation: This is what the operation in Jenin looks like // Credit: IDF Spokesperson
During the second intifada, this area was portrayed as a stronghold of Palestinian resistance. The battle in the Jenin refugee camp is considered one of the most difficult events of Operation Defensive Shield, during which our forces suffered many losses. As now, the cooperation between the various groups in this camp stood out, the use of IEDs and explosive traps, and the assistance of the population and civilian facilities for hiding and storing weapons. Jenin's ethos of resistance has become a symbol of terrorist organizations, inspiring Palestinian terrorists from all areas.
Twenty years after Defensive Shield, this area has once again established itself as a stronghold of terrorism in Samaria and as a center for the export of terrorists and terrorist attacks throughout Judea and Samaria and Israel. The objective of the IDF's operation is to damage the terrorist infrastructure, arrest or kill terrorists and collaborators, seize weapons, expose and destroy weapons manufacturing laboratories, and withdraw or at least halt the process of strengthening the terrorist elements that have established themselves there.
Maximum harm with minimal risk
The main goal of the defense establishment is to bring about maximum damage to the terrorist infrastructure, with minimal risk to our forces and without introducing additional arenas into the campaign, as well as criticism in the political arena. Against this background, it is important to make it clear to the IDF: With all the importance that must be given to these considerations, considerations relating to the security of our forces must be taken into account beforehand. Another challenge for the defense establishment is to monitor and thwart plans for revenge attacks from other arenas while fighting in Jenin. The desire to maintain routine life in areas outside the fighting, including the entry of Palestinians to work in Israel, increases the risk of attacks even by lone terrorists – inspired by the events in Jenin.
Destruction in Jenin refugee camp after IDF activity // Photo: Arab networks
The Shin Bet will be required to be vigilant in this matter vis-à-vis elements among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians (especially from northern Samaria) who have settled in Israel in the process of family reunification.
The PA won't do the job
Still, the question regarding this operation is related to its political purpose: what will happen the day after the operation in Jenin. The current definitions of the operation do not herald a change in the strategic sphere. After the end of the operation, control of this area will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority apparatuses.
Will the PA act more effectively to maintain the new situation? Doubtful. Already, its stand by the IDF's activity is perceived by some of the population as an act of treason. Presumably, Hamas and Islamic Jihad will continue to rebuke it for this and intensify their resentment against it. In such a reality, it is not at all certain that it will choose to hold the reins of prevention.
We will be required to continue to thwart terrorist acts ourselves. IDF activity in Jenin, photo: IDF Spokesperson
If we add to this the fundamental weaknesses of the PA (some of which contributed to the creation of the reality in Jenin) and the influence of the succession battles for Mahmoud Abbas, it will be difficult to establish optimism regarding the possibility that the Palestinian apparatuses will maintain the IDF's preventive achievement in the current operation.
The more likely possibility is that even the day after we will be required to continue to thwart terrorist attacks ourselves (using the "mowing the grass" method). The contribution of the current operation to this will be in the more favorable operational conditions it will provide for future operations of the security forces.
The writer is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem, served as head of the National Security Council between 2017-2021 and is a senior member of the Israel Security Agency
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