A foreigner, had he found himself here this week, would have been convinced that Israel had defeated Stalingrad. The crazy build-up that lasted for weeks, the open waves in the media, the statements of politicians – all these created a sense that something dramatic had changed in the war on terror, as the prime minister was quick to declare.
The reality, how to put it mildly, is a little different. Nothing started in Jenin this week, and nothing ends. After a long period in which it refrained from operating in the refugee camp, for various reasons, the IDF entered there with relatively large forces, but also quickly left. The achievements he made along the way were tactical and propaganda, but not tiebreakers.
In order for this to happen, time, determination and strategy are required. Time is not a commodity leaders have: they want results here and now. Israel actually has determination: this is what has enabled it to fight terrorism and win, since time immemorial. Strategy is the main problem: Try to find out what Israel wants from the Palestinians – not tomorrow morning, but in a few months or years – and you won't get an answer.
The problem is that reality is not waiting for us. If Israel does not shape it, it will shape itself. This is what happened in Jenin in recent months, and it is what will happen there again – and elsewhere in Judea and Samaria – if Israel does not change the diskette. But the IDF and Shin Bet alone, world champions as they may be, will not change the situation. For this to happen, a broad plan is needed to save Israel and the Palestinians from themselves.
No secrets
The operation in Jenin was successful overall. Since modest goals were set for him, even modest achievements were sufficient. Their main objective: damaging the image of the city of refuge (or "fortress") that the terrorists of the refugee camp glued to themselves, and on the way collecting and destroying weapons, mainly IEDs, and command and hiding rooms. In terms of harming wanted persons, the achievements were less good: most of them fled and will now return to activity. If the IDF does not enter the camp again soon to arrest or harm them, Jenin will refill the empty warehouses.
In this area, Jenin is a trailblazer, but the gaze must also be directed to other sectors. In recent months, there has been systematic and serial production of IEDs in the refugee camp, some of them powerful IEDs. Such an IED exploded about two weeks ago on the outskirts of Jenin, disabling a Puma combat vehicle. Only by luck (and thanks to protection) did the incident end with seven wounded, but in the IDF the token fell. It was clear that double the speed action was required: more protection for vehicles, and immediate damage to infrastructure before a critical mass of IEDs was created. Since the operation had been known in advance for weeks (a troubling matter in itself; no secret can be kept in Israel today), the terrorists in Jenin had time to prepare. IEDs were placed under the access routes to the camp, the IDF surprised by launching an airstrike, but the IEDs must be neutralized. With the knowledge of the Shin Bet, it was possible to do this precisely, at the cost of severe damage to the city's infrastructure.
At the moment, Israel is particularly concerned about Tulkarm's Nur ash Shams refugee camp, which has recently been lively. If systematic, daily activity is not carried out in it as well, in the near future major operations will be required to break through
This knowledge accumulated in Jenin can be replicated in other sectors as well. At the moment, Israel is particularly concerned about Tulkarm's Nur ash Shams refugee camp, which has recently been lively. If it is not also carried out systematically, daily activity, large operations will be required in the near future in order to score inside. This is the lesson from Jenin: What you don't do today with a small force, you will have to do tomorrow with much larger forces.
The quality of the commando brigade's forces and their experience made it possible to finish the operation quickly and successfully, except for the death during the exit from the city of Egoz fighter David Yehuda Yitzhak, who may have been hit by friendly fire. But it is very worthwhile not to be confused: the battle in Jenin was not really "forces". Israel came with all its military might – mainly in fire and intelligence – in order to defeat a few dozen armed men who had barricaded themselves in a relatively complex place to operate, but one that characterizes half of the arenas with which the IDF will have to deal in a future war – in the West Bank, Gaza or Lebanon.
This lesson is important, because there are those who may be confused and think that a successful war was waged in Jenin this week. So that's it, no. It was, as mentioned, a very limited operation, not without risks, but one that the IDF is supposed to do with its eye closed and with one hand tied behind its back. An addiction to what happened there may confuse the IDF again, as it did on the eve of the Second Lebanon War. Therefore, the senior command should hurry to make it clear to its juniors, and through them to the soldiers, that the next war (in any arena) will be much harder and dirtier.
This message should have been conveyed to the public as well. Instead, leaders were quick to talk about victory. This disproportion between the size of the operation and its achievements and the amount of text spilled on it may explode in our faces soon, in light of the level of threats and warnings, which is only on the rise. If words are not accompanied by actions – military, but also political and economic – Israel will soon find itself at a lower point than on the eve of the operation. As mentioned, not only Jenin is bubbling, but all of Judea and Samaria; And when Abbas counts down days, you have to be particularly naïve or irresponsible to believe that what and whoever comes after him will be better.
The protest is still here
One positive point in this operation was the disconnect between Jenin and other sectors. Rockets were fired from Gaza the night after the forces left Jenin, but it was a symbolic barrage, for visibility purposes only.
In contrast to previous incidents in which events in Judea and Samaria triggered an automatic response from Gaza, this time the Gaza Strip was careful not to attack Israel (which was prepared in advance with iron domes and forces in case there was an escalation in the south).
Here, too, you should not indulge too much. This case is only self-evident, and stems from the internal interests of the various forces in Gaza. Islamic Jihad is still licking the wounds of Operation Shield and Arrow, and Hamas is not interested in escalation now. This is a matter that may change depending on the circumstances or pressures, especially on Iran's part. In the face of the recently growing audacity and security in Tehran, there is certainly cause for concern; Hezbollah's recent provocations in the north are a signal of this.
Even those who think that the IDF has been vaccinated against the public protest against the legal legislation are advised to wait with the summaries. The operation in Jenin was limited, and relied solely on regular forces (with the exception of specific reservists in specific positions). Any other operation, in any other arena, will require a broader mobilization of reserves, certainly if a massive operation of the air force is required.
The events of recent days – from the acceleration of legal legislation in the Knesset to the resounding retirement of Commissioner Ami Eshed – signal that nothing has calmed down. Quite the opposite: Israel is in a dangerous internal clash. This message has not gone unnoticed.
Last March, the terrorist organizations translated it as weakness and rushed to act on all fronts. It may happen again now, and with greater intensity. Summer in the Middle East is always prone to calamity. If Israel does not regain its senses soon, it will soon discover that what happened this week in Jenin was really child's play.
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