In order to understand the atmosphere, what the Labor Party was like in the late 60s, Yossi Beilin tells me about what he found in the '68 protocols: "Dayan says that we have to pressure the Arabs to move from Gaza to the West Bank, and from there fly wherever they want – and Peres silences him." Shimon was more reserved, Beilin says, and Yitzhak Navon was not enthusiastic about such unbridled statements by Moshe Dayan. It was indeed a discussion in the Rafi secretariat, but Rafi is returning to the bosom of the parent party (Mapai), and thus from this curb the Labor Party is born.
Labor is the great loss of the Oslo Accords. Today, 30 years away, even if it seems that the agreements caused strategic political disability to Israel, the greatest damage was really in the domestic arena, and the question is only whether the Labor Party is the biggest victim of the results of the agreement with the PLO, or the most important loss on the list of casualties. Because the longing it evokes is not nostalgia. Today, Israeli politics, the democratic system, suffers a severe blow due to the fact that the main party of the left has disintegrated and is gone, and in its place have emerged two parties of generals and veterans of the bureaucratic security corporation, the technocratic administrative apparatus, which repeatedly clashes with the elected government.
A taste of HBO's "Oslo" // Archive photo
The void left by the Labor Party has given way to an atmosphere of anarchy and a judicial apparatus that purports to replace party democratic life. Eliad Shraga instead of Shraga Netzer. Even if Abba Eban called the internal political bloc of the Great Order Shraga Netzer a "political oligarchy," it was democracy; And Shraga II's mechanism of disruption of legal means, against the political system as a whole, is destroying democratic culture.
The party that young Labor Party members such as Uzi Baram and later Haim Ramon and Yossi Beilin met in the late 60s and 70s is a hawkish party. Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir were activist hawks no less and perhaps more than their security predecessors David Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan, argues Prof. Avi Bareli. Baram, who has managed to become a Knesset member and government minister since he was secretary of the Young Guard between 1965 and 1969, says that compared to today, Golda was not so hawkish. But I know right-wingers, who grew up on the legacy of a fanatical national right, who praise Golda and see her as a model of resilience and security activism far more than Menachem Begin, who became prime minister three years later.
Pigeon block
In those years of fighting and a stubborn stance of political rigidity, a significant bloc of pigeons was already establishing within the Labor Party. They do not form a group. "These are Abba Eban, Chaim Zadok, Yesh (Yaakov Shimshon Shapira). Pigeonism was not the characteristic of each of them," says Yossi Beilin. "You say Sapir – this is the ultimate finance minister, you don't think of him as a dove, because they didn't dare express themselves in the political sphere vis-à-vis Golda. People were afraid of her. She was a terrifying walker. 'I can't believe there's one sitting around the table even thinking it's Monday,' that's her typical statement."
Beilin. The territories have become a burden, photo: Arik Sultan
The experience of failure in 1973 was decisive for the future generation of the Party. This is also what pushed Yossi Beilin to enter intensively into political activity: "I understood that the territories, instead of being Israel's security zones, are Israel's disaster."
But the fact is that Pinchas Sapir, the almighty man in the party, is actually a dove, and under the wings of this dove Yossi Sarid grows. So Masfir and Melova Eliav and Yossi Sarid, with the flanked assistance of Abba Eban, Haim Zadok and Yaakov Shimshon Shapira, begins the process that will transform the Labor Party from a hawkish, activist settlement party to a dovish one.
A few months before the Yom Kippur War, after a political softening in the form of the Rogers Plan and the Jarring mission, Sapir presented a sober approach, not seeing blackness but somewhat pessimistic, and what lies behind his experiences is a willingness to give up extensive territory. Pinchas Sapir mercilessly pounds his colleagues at a discussion of the party's top brass, though his fist is padded with a glove: "There are those who claim that the term 'loggers and water cleaners' no longer has a topical meaning, but I myself do not see the difference between the meaning of this term and the reality we are witnessing now," the Finance Minister says of the workers from the territories who come every day to do the "black work." As he put it.
Sapir is not only appalled by the conditions in which Arabs sleep next to garbage cans, but he is concerned that cheap labor has "a negative impact on the economy. If the number increases, it will continue and slow down progress toward modernization and automation in various fields of activity."
He warns that annexation of the territories will lead to the creation of "inferior citizenship," and that this is unacceptable these days: "It goes without saying what character the Knesset will have then. A situation will arise in which the Arabs, including Israeli Arabs, will be the balance sheet on almost every issue that comes up on our agenda... With this weight, they will decide even matters between Jews and Jews, what we more simply call 'the Jewish wars.'"
While the country's leadership presents the public with an image of "our situation has never been better," Sapir says, "I wish I could share the opinion of those who see the current situation as de facto peace." That is, he is also afraid of war. This is the same Sapir who crowned Golda in 1969 after Eshkol's death, and who gave victory to Yitzhak Rabin in his bid against Shimon Peres for prime minister after Golda's resignation in 1974.
What Berl would do
There is some mistake on the part of the Oslo scholars and those who denounce Oslo when they look for the cause of the collapse in the ideological, political, and psychological development of Rabin and Peres. All these developments of the vertices are important for understanding the Oslo process, but the process that transformed the Labor Party from the party of hawks (Golda, Dayan, Galili, etc.) to a distinctly dovish party is, in the end, what pushed the two former hawkish leaders Rabin and Peres to accept the Oslo formula. Already when Shimon Peres became Labor leader in 1977, he was a hawk who discovered that his constituency was becoming dovish, and he had to fall in line.
Uzi Baram. Party veterans, photo: Arik Sultan
Uzi Baram sees the breaking point in July 2000, and not in the Oslo Accords themselves. The culprit is Ehud Barak, not Yitzhak Rabin and Peres: "Camp David dealt a fatal blow to the Labor Party, because Barak went to negotiate in a disintegrating government and returned unable to reach an agreement."
But the experience of 1973 was decisive for the party's future generation. This is also what pushed Yossi Beilin to enter intensively into political activity. "I understood that the territories, instead of being Israel's security bands, are Israel's disaster," he says. "They talked about the Golan Heights guarding the area beneath it, but it didn't protect us. So my token went down a lot."
Beilin was the editor of the Young Guard newspaper. His first meeting with Shimon Peres was in 1963 as a reporter for Maariv L'Noar who was sent to interview the then deputy defense minister. In the years following the Yom Kippur War, he met with Haim Zadok and told him: "I hear your positions (which are distinctly dovish)." Zadok replied: "We were all under Golda's blanket. It's not easy to be against the prime minister, it's not easy to go and argue with her."
This was also Sapir's situation, Uzi Baram notes.
There was a parallel movement. Young people at work are influenced to some extent by people like Amos Oz and by the atmosphere of "fighter discourse." The old, not to mention the old, see Alterman and Tabenkin, leaders of the labor movement, racing to the right. "And I can't tell you what Berl would have done after the six days, if he had been alive," Baram says in a conversation taking place in a large shopping mall in Gush Dan, which can accommodate both Terminal 3 and Heathrow Airport. "But Ben-Gurion didn't go with Alterman or Golda."
The Likud Negative
The earthquakes that shook Israeli society from 1967 to 1973 until the upheaval in 1977 contributed to the transformation of the Labor Party into a dovish left-wing party, against the backdrop of political polarization that forced the party to separate from the Likud. "1973 ended the rule of labor," Baram presents his thesis. "Not because of the Red Register and the discrimination it entails, nor because of the discrimination against Mizrahim. Until '73, the public did not agree to change the government, because the public did not trust Begin; They didn't believe he could run the country from a security standpoint. But after Labor was held responsible for the crash of '73, Begin becomes more legitimate. Add to that Yigal Yadin - he cracks the moral ground of the work. The Labor and Defense Party is one package: Rabin, Ben-Gurion, Eshkol."
All three were prime ministers and defense ministers or embodied security. The day after Rabin's assassination, Shimon Peres was offered to appoint Ehud Barak, who was already a government minister, as defense minister. But no, Peres refused. As prime minister, he also wanted to wear the security suit.
It has not been historically easy to turn Mapai, followed by Labor and the Alignment, into the Defense Party, a party that appears in one package with security. Until the Kadesh Operation in 1956, the party identified as the security party was the left-wing Stalinist Mapam party, with warlords of the War of Independence and a circle of officers within the army who partially disobeyed the party leaders. Moshe Dayan's appointment as chief of staff, the reprisals and subsequent Sinai War and the Dimona factory turned Ben-Gurion into a personality who embodies political-security unity.
Barak, Arafat and Clinton at Camp David, Photo: AP
Interestingly, the partisan-security unity has turned the two haters, Golda and Dayan, into allies who are almost one political entity. "The basic thesis of the work, represented by Golda and Dayan, was to hold the territories by force. That there is no real danger. And we saw that they were very successful in public opinion," says Uzi Baram. "Golda, before she was elected prime minister, won the support of one percent of the public. Then the two lions, Dayan and Yigal Alon, were lounging at her feet."
That '70s Show
The 70s are the turning point. These are years of moral and political collapse of the West, led by the United States, and thus Israel is once again experiencing a weakening, not to say a collapse, of its strategic support. Ten years earlier, it was France turning Algeria as de Gaulle began by turning its back on Israel, culminating in the embargo of '67 and the jumping-off shot for modern anti-Semitism with his statement about that "arrogant and arrogant people."
In the early 70s, the American regime nearly collapsed in the face of the blows in Vietnam, and at home with Watergate. Saudi Arabia's oil weapons are shaking the West, the PLO is becoming the shining new star of the radical salons, campuses and angry streets of Paris, London, Rome and Berlin. The old conservative regime in Western Europe is giving way to a simultaneous upheaval: three social democratic leaders emerge, one of whom is an outspoken anti-American and openly pro-PLO, Olof Palma of Sweden, and next to him the two leaders who turned Yasser Arafat into a so-called decent and acceptable guest in the living room.
These are Willy Brandt, who also signed surrender agreements with the PLO following the terrorist blitzkrieg in Munich in 1972, and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. The Labour Party, as a central member of the Socialist International, was deeply influenced by the ideological upheaval in the socialist universe. For a generation, European socialism has been pro-Zionist, and in the wake of the Six-Day War and the Vietnam War, it turns against Israel and sees the Palestinian terrorist organization as an inseparable part of the national liberation revolutions of the Third World.
Shimon Peres. The agreement in his name, photo: Amos Ben Gershom GPO
This leads to the fact that in 1975 and 1976, when Rabin was prime minister, he met with Uri Avnery every time he returned from another vibrating encounter with Issam Sartawi and Said Hamami. Rabin, according to Avnery's report, strongly opposed the PLO and claimed that an agreement with the organization would create a succession of enemies - from Tulkarm to Baghdad. But the Americans, led by Kissinger, seemed to be heading in the direction of contacts with the PLO, despite mega-terrorist attacks stemming from the growing security of the terrorist organizations. Rabin, therefore, had good reasons to hear through Uri Avnery what was happening on the Palestinian side with which the leaders of the Western world were negotiating.
In 1981 there was a point that marked a prominent dovish presence at work. "From my point of view, when Begin brought the annexation of the Golan Heights (November '81) he brought it with a wave, the Labor Party was caught by surprise," Baram says. "It's like Bibi opening the winter session with a rapid blitz of legislation to change the composition of the judicial selection committee. Work was in a dilemma. Sheves and Katz-Oz campaigned with the Golan, and then the faction convenes to decide what its position is. Peres suggests that the entire faction be prevented; He, as opposition leader, will say that they cannot oppose the Golan Law. The faction makes a decision. Most of the faction votes in favor of Shimon Peres, but Amos Hadar, Shlomo Hillel and Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino voted in favor of annexation (the Golan). Yossi Sarid, Nahmias, Ora Namir and I voted against it. And that exposed the internal division that exists within the party."
Throughout the '70s, Golda still terrorized the party, as if you could imagine LeBron James sitting injured on the bench scolding players from the line, defying the coach's orders. "Her worst statement," Beilin recalls, "was, 'Begin and Sadat deserve an Academy Prize, not a Nobel Prize.' I was present at the meeting when she said that. Praise Begin, damn it – he succeeded where you failed." When asked if he would go see the movie "Golda," Beilin says without hesitation: "I won't go see! In my eyes, she is the worst prime minister Israel has ever had. She was terrible, terrible. And it was as scary as a first-grader can scare other kids in the class."
Peace Lobby
During the same period of 1978-1979, the Peace Now movement was established. Suddenly, there was a large, activist extra-parliamentary peace movement, led by young veterans of the Yom Kippur War, which began to tail off in the Labor Party. They were from the socio-political environment of the labor movement. Strong affiliates in academia, in the media. When 82 came with the Shalag War, the party, led by Rabin and Peres, backed the decision of the Begin and Sharon governments to launch the operation. But in September of that year, following the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the largest demonstration to date took place in Israel. There is debate about the numbers, but it is remembered as the 400,<> demonstration. This was very much the wedding ceremony of the Labor Party with Peace Now, when Shimon Peres, the party's chairman, was invited to speak at the demonstration. Ostensibly, it was still the prize of Now Tomorrow, a book in which he argued most convincingly that a Palestinian PLO state would destroy Israel. Rabin, just the day before yesterday, in the first months of the war, became a kind of adviser to Sharon when he advocated tightening the siege on Beirut.
But in 1988, after the elections, when there was a dilemma of whether to join a unity government headed by Shamir or remain in the opposition, Uzi Baram, the party's secretary general, could already put together a bloc of 17 doves who demanded to go to the opposition. "When Rabin and Peres see that Shamir can form a government without them, and Shamir did not want to form a narrow government, Rabin begins to negotiate a joint government," Baram recalls.
"I am forming a group of 17 MKs, including Borg, Peretz, Beilin, as well as more hawkish people from the center like Micha Harish and Michael Bar-Zohar. We oppose unity with Shamir. We want the London Agreement line to win. There is a bureau meeting that will decide between the position of Rabin and Peres (who want to go to a unity government) and our position. By secret ballot, we're 60%! It was a political half. Going to the opposition would have required soul-searching and taking positions on 'peace and security.'"
Peres and Rabin wanted to turn the tables upside down by bringing the question of joining the Center against the Bureau's decision. "Rabin told Peres: If you want to win, announce that you will be finance minister and not foreign minister," Baram says. All economic interest groups, headed by the Histadrut, stabilized, and the two leaders reversed the decision and joined Shamir's government.
Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan, Photo: Saar Yaakov
This was already the first year of the first intifada. Peres initiated the establishment of the Council for Peace and Security through Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv. The council has become a lobby of senior officers, strengthening the dovish wing at work and pushing for a political settlement, perhaps even with the PLO. They are developing activities that include surveys of attitudes among senior reserve officers. At a board meeting on February 2, 1990, they discussed "the 'joint' document with Faisal al-Husseini. The members' opinion was that preserving the integrity of the Council is more important than a joint document... There is no impediment to continued contacts/talks. Faisal al-Husseini will be invited to appear before the Council plenum." This is already a group of senior officials that includes three generals, a former senior Shin Bet official and several other senior officials.
In the wake of the lost electorate
Baram sees the breaking point, like '73, in the Camp David summit in July 2000, and not in the Oslo Accords themselves. In other words, the culprit is Ehud Barak and not Yitzhak Rabin and Peres. "In '93, Peres said to me: Uzi, you must talk to Rabin – an agreement with Arafat can be reached within a few months. Rabin has faith in you, influence him to give a shame to the Oslo moves. Peres said: It's progressing, but Rabin has reservations. I went to Rabin. He was at a loss. First, he ruled out the PLO; Secondly, he said that he does not trust these guys (who are conducting the talks in Oslo). "But let me check it out," he added. As time went on, Rabin began to think there was an opportunity."
It's 1993, and Rabin is still opposed in principle to the PLO and Yasser Arafat, even though he soon signs and shakes hands with him on the White House lawn. "Nevertheless, until the day he dies, Rabin does not speak in favor of a Palestinian state," which would become the constant mantra of the left, which decided that the two-state solution was Rabin's legacy.
Michael. The current Labor Chairman is satisfied with only a few seats in the Knesset, Photo: Oren Ben Hakon
"Camp David dealt a fatal blow to the Labor Party," Baram asserts, "because Barak went to negotiate in a disintegrating government and came back unable to reach an agreement." Before Camp David, meetings were held with the PLO leadership and with Arafat, following an appeal from Ahmed Tibi. They don't want to go there because they don't see the ground ready for an agreement. They feared a Clinton-sponsored convention. The Labor Party's gradual decline in the public is palpable. Shimon Peres in '96 gets 10 fewer seats than Rabin, yet 34 seats in the Knesset. Barak in '99, with David Levy, drops to 26. In 2006, Amir Peretz was arrested on 19. Kadima's explosion hurts Labor more than the Likud, which thanks to Netanyahu comes back to life in 2009. Labor is led by Barak with only 13.
Throughout the years, in the shadow of the polarized ideological struggle between right and left, the more extreme left has actually attacked Labor more effectively – this is the legacy of Yossi Sarid and Uri Avnery. But in the second decade of the century, the left, led by Haaretz, is engaged in the elimination of the Labor leadership, which by its nature is in the dynamic of beheading it after every round of elections. Precisely after the achievement of Bouji Herzog and Tzipi Livni, who brought Labor in the guise of the "Zionist Camp" to 24 seats, Herzog is attacked and replaced by two failed leaders in the form of Avi Gabbay and Merav Michaeli, who in fact made the party a steamed cabbage.
The Labor electorate has not disappeared, it is on the streets. Benny Gantz ostensibly embodies the Gordian knot of the party and security today, but he does so only when he fulfills the stereotype of "Mr. Security." He has no connection to a party with a vibrant grassroots democratic life, and instead of branches and institutions he is connected to the well-known "gatekeepers." The comparison to Yitzhak Rabin shows the differences: Rabin was Mr. Confidence with an overarching national goal – to complete what was not achieved in the War of Independence and later in the Six-Day War. It is impossible to imagine Rabin being swept up in waves of demonstrations, road blockades and threats to harm the IDF.
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