Starting in the middle of last week, one could hear strange complaints from military analysts in the media that there was no definition of the goals of the war. Carmela Menashe went into the loop on this issue with Minister Yoav Kish, and later also on one of the television channels. When this happens, like the reports that spread all over the Internet about the infiltration of unidentified aircraft, the conclusion is that the media reflects some kind of mood in the top echelons of the IDF.
IDF Chief of Staff in dialogue with commanders and fighters in the south: "I trust you, both on the wind and on the force" // Photo: IDF Spokesperson
Since this matter was troubling, because of its significance, I called a senior minister with a clear security background. He dismissed this claim altogether and advised me to read the orderly announcement that followed the government's decision. Already on Sunday night, the security cabinet made "a series of operational decisions aimed at destroying the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in a way that will negate their ability and desire to threaten and harm Israeli citizens for many years."
This is a clear statement that IDF commanders can take and do whatever they want with it. The cabinet is required to approve only major moves, it cannot replace plans of the senior command. Perhaps to approve in general the plan of the ground operation and its timing, although from past experience, it is actually forbidden to go into too much detail, for reasons of leakage.
The public may expect Churchill to rise up in a "dark hour." So the news is that we have Churchill. This is military leadership that comes from below and consists of some excellent field commanders who have been removed from the top echelons of the IDF by short-sighted chiefs of staff. The names are Chico Tamir, Ofer Winter and more, who should be recruited immediately.
In time of war, the IDF and the people never looked up to the political leadership, but to the warlords on the ground. "The political system will always collapse, and then only the army and soldiers close the breach," is a general situation defined for me nearly ten years ago by Brig. Gen. (res.) Zuri Sagi.
Those who will determine the fate of the campaign are the commanders of divisions and brigades. They are the ones who must give the most expansive interpretation of the government's decision and the will of the public. They are the ones who must first execute and then receive retroactive approval from the chief of staff or the defense minister, as was the case in 1967 and in the other major defensive wars.
We saw the ability to improvise and charge on the first day of the war, at the time of the massacre. Two important interviews indicate something about the action of the forces on the ground immediately after the first infiltrations. The first is an interview conducted by Lilach Shoval on this website with the helicopter pilot, Lt. Col. A., which contains important facts about the functioning of the Air Force; The second, an interview with Armored Company Commander Capt. Bar written by Tal Ariel Yakir, also on this website, gives a certain picture of the tanks' activity on the line.
It turns out that about half an hour after the attack began, two helicopters left, according to what they heard in the media, and about two hours later four more helicopters joined them. The Air Force Command did not function. The armored company commander received a warning immediately after the rocket fire began at dawn from the brigade commander; And like the helicopter pilots who came to the field on their own, Capt. Barr's tank was very effective. If only there were 20 helicopters and not six. Fifteen tanks rather than four.
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