The word "conception" invaded the Hebrew dictionary half a century ago, gained a foothold in its pages and became a full-fledged member. No successor was found for Eliezer Ben-Yehuda to dress her in Hebrew-sounding letters.
It is commonly believed that it failed the Intelligence Directorate in 1973, and now in 2023 it has again stung Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet. It is forgotten by many that the concept caused three national lapses, not just two. In 1967, Military Intelligence, headed by Aharon Yariv, determined that no war was expected in the foreseeable future, and reality slapped him in the face. But the jubilation of victory in the Six-Day War underscored the failure based on the erroneous conception that befell Israel.
It did not exist in the intelligence sphere as a word in itself, but reached the decision-makers' table with the addition of a pair of words - "low probability" or "high probability." In all three incidents, in 1967, 1973 and 2023, the danger of war was ruled to be "unlikely".
Immediately after the Kippur War, the term was thrown into the junkyard. Its use was almost banned until Moshe Dayan appointed Major General Shlomo Gazit as head of Military Intelligence, and the latter, in his first meeting with Golda, held his breath and told the prime minister that he would return to using "low probability," because there is no more effective term. She looked at him, and was silent.
Basically the concept is collecting the information coming from all sources, analyzing it and determining a position according to it. A kind of verdict. A kind of decision made by a doctor based on the results of the patient's examination, who, because of a variety of conflicting data, is forced to decide which of his ailments to treat, knowing that this will cause a deterioration in his condition in other health issues.
It is true that there are ways to statistically reduce the error. The National Security Council was established after the Yom Kippur War to deal with the perceptions of the Mossad, the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, so what? After all, five days before the crisis on the Gaza front, National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi also said that the likelihood of war was very low. He had a conception. Maybe we will be dragged after the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence? And if so, what's the use of the NSC?
Nevertheless, there is probably no responsible country in the world that does not have a conception of its national security and other issues of importance. While the "probable" tools increase the chances of questioning the concept as formulated by the heads of the defense establishments, they may also reinforce the trend that negates the correct conclusion.
It is possible that the role of academia is to issue definitions of the status of conception in the management of policy systems, but it seems that without the concept, summarizing the position of the organizations responsible for formulating the national opinion is meaningless. Only there is always a danger that it deceives those who hold it. For example, the head of Military Intelligence in 1973 had the concept that as long as Egypt did not receive certain Soviet equipment, it could not attack Israel. But no less important was another concept: since 1970, Golda Meir has adopted the assumption that Anwar Sadat is a hedonist and not a man of war. Because it wanted to avoid negotiations over a Chinese future. The concepts merged.
The National Security Council was established after the Yom Kippur War to deal with the perceptions of the Mossad, the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, so what? After all, five days before the crisis on the Gaza front, National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi also said that the likelihood of war was very low. He had a conception
This non-unique example leaves open the question of to what extent does the professional echelon influence the decision of statesmen. And most importantly, to what extent do politicians dangerously influence, even subconsciously, the conclusion of the professional-security echelon when it comes to summarizing its recommendations?
In 1973, did the intelligence organizations feel that Golda Meir was not interested in political negotiations, and were influenced by this unprofessional political tendency?
And in 2023, did the fact that Benjamin Netanyahu wanted Hamas rule in Gaza in order to avoid negotiations with the Palestinians in Ramallah subconsciously affect the perception in Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet and Mossad, which warned of a deterioration in the situation, but referred only to the Hezbollah and Iranian fronts and skipped Gaza?
It is doubtful that historians will ever be able to answer these questions.
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