The statements of the political-security leadership that there will be no ceasefire are important for three reasons. The first is that they show that Israel is serious about meeting the strategic goal it has set for itself, of toppling the Hamas regime and negating its military capabilities. The second is that they send a clear message to the world and to Hamas, which could also serve as significant leverage in the negotiations for the release of the hostages. And third, because the powers are not playable yo-yos.
Galant: "The terrorists in Shifa hear the bulldozers and the soldiers - and tremble with fear" // GPO
Israel can agree to brief pauses of several hours at a time in order to reduce international pressure on the humanitarian issue and try to secure the release of some of the hostages. But she won't be able to agree to more than that at this point.
Longer pauses than these will serve only Hamas. He will be able to stock up on water, food and fuel, which he certainly lacks after five weeks in the tunnels. It will be able to transport forces to areas that have been hit and strengthen its lines of defense against the IDF. It will be able to change the location of commanders and abductees, and it will also be able to smuggle assets from the Gaza Strip to Sinai.
Reality required maneuvering
The demand for a ceasefire stems not only from global concern for the approximately one million refugees who fled from the northern and southern Gaza Strip. There is also a clear element of pressure within Hamas. It is doubtful whether its leader, Yahya Sinwar, regrets the October 7 attack, but it is likely that the pressure above ground is penetrating deep into the tunnels.
Even if Sinwar does not understand the magnitude of the damage to his organization, its infrastructure, and its people, he certainly understands (and sees in the media) that Gaza has changed its face and that Israel has no intention of stopping.
In the heart of the Gaza Strip: IDF forces take over a Hamas stronghold, photo: IDF Spokesperson
Sinwar is preparing for an Israeli airstrike. It is likely that he was also preparing for the ground maneuver, but it is doubtful whether he assessed that Israel would act with such intensity. In any case, it is not certain that he understands the true battle picture: many of his outposts have fallen, communications infrastructure has been damaged, and the IDF maintains ambiguity regarding the scope and location of the forces.
This allows Israel to intensify the process, to the point of allowing a full takeover of Gaza City within a few days. After that, the IDF will have to mop up the area, but will have to deal with the possibility of redeployment.
Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, photo: AP
This goal could not be achieved only from the air. For years, Israel fell in love with a combination of intelligence and fire from the air, in order to avoid the need for maneuvering. The successes of the air defense system and the thickened borders that were built have planted the illusion that Israel is protected.
The October 7 attack shattered these basic assumptions and forced the IDF to return to its sources, the essence of which was transferring the campaign to enemy territory in order to defeat it.
Doubt removed: IDF strong
In the weeks preceding the maneuver, there were quite a few voices calling for an extension of the air attack. They were echoed by the Prime Minister's Office, which at that point had lost faith in the IDF.
There were also claims that the army was not prepared and would find it difficult to achieve the goals set for it. Reality proved the opposite: Gaza is indeed a difficult nut to crack, but the forces arrived there well prepared and trained (and equipped) for the mission.
Defense Minister Galant in conversation with Yahalam fighters: "Promoting revolutionary solutions for destroying the tunnels in Gaza", Photo: Ariel Hermony, Ministry of Defense
The fighters fighting in the Gaza Strip, photo: IDF Spokesperson
The scope of the forces and their mix also shows that this time the IDF did not come to take a short action and return home, but to achieve a clear result. These are some particularly strong punches of infantry, armor, and engineering, which receive combat support from the air force and artillery fire.
All this happened after an intensive Israeli air force offensive, which changed the face of Gaza but assisted the ground forces in two prominent dimensions: it removed most of the population from the area and left it largely free for direct confrontation with Hamas, and it damaged a significant part of Hamas' underground positions (and in some cases tunnels).
Still, these are fierce battles, in complex terrain, against an enemy that has been going on for 15 years of this campaign. It attacks the IDF with every possible weapon it has, especially anti-tank missiles, RPG bombs, various IEDs dropped from drones, and, of course, sniping and sabotage.
Sisyphean and long course
The IDF has already suffered 40 dead and dozens more wounded in this campaign, while killing hundreds of terrorists and damaging extensive infrastructure. This is a painful price in blood, but inevitable in the face of the threat and the required achievement, and in the view of the disaster of Simchat Torah. Israel had no choice but to enter Gaza to win.
This time it is not a picture of victory, but rather a long Sisyphean move that will not end with the assassination of Yahya Sinwar or the Israeli flag on the roof of Shifa Hospital, but when another regime is established in Gaza. Until then, Israel will be required to operate in the Gaza Strip, of varying scope and intensity. The current large-scale move, which will continue for at least a few more weeks, will be replaced by large-scale and targeted raids that will seek to prevent Hamas from rehabilitating.
Herzi Halevi with soldiers at the conference grounds, photo: IDF Spokesperson
This activity is similar to that carried out in Judea and Samaria after Operation Defensive Shield, and has earned professional jargon the nickname "mowing the grass." But in Gaza it's not grass: it's a real forest that needs to be cut down and created from the ground up. This part will take months and perhaps years, but it is necessary to ensure quiet in the western Negev and prevent Hamas from retaking control of the Gaza Strip.
At the same time, Israel must already deal with the question of the day after. Failure to do so could turn the Gaza Strip into a Somalia controlled by gangs fighting each other and Israel.
If Israel wants to create a different reality in the south, it must work together with the international elements (and with the Arab states) that are now giving it extensive credit for the war and even urging it to win. The atrocities of October 7 created fertile ground for these moves.
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