Is Israel losing the war in Gaza?

This article is an installment of the newsletter Apuntes de Geopolítica, exclusively for subscribers of EL PAÍS. You can sign up here.

The United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday approved a resolution that, despite being non-binding, represents a very heavy political defeat for Israel and its great supporter, the United States. 153 countries voted in favor of a text calling for an immediate ceasefire, with 10 against and 23 abstaining. Hours earlier, U.S. President Joe Biden had warned that Israel is losing international support and urged a change in the makeup of Israel's government. The diplomatic setback and the harshest White House message since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack lend new strength to a seemingly paradoxical question: Is Israel losing the Gaza war?

The enormous asymmetry of military capabilities between Israel and Hamas may lead one to consider the question absurd. Obviously, in the short term and on a strictly military level, Israel cannot lose, its superiority is overwhelming. But the final outcome of a war depends on a wide range of factors, not just purely military, and the balance is often elucidated only in the medium and long term. And it is in this expanded perspective that the question makes more and more sense.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin warned Israel in no uncertain terms on Dec. 2 of the risk of a tactical victory turning into a strategic defeat in a speech of great interest to all those who follow geopolitics.

There are at least three areas in which a military campaign such as the Israeli one, which is causing immense suffering to the Gazan civilian population, can turn into a strategic defeat. One, which Austin underlined in his speech, is to foment a hatred and a desire for revenge in the population that will fuel resistance and future risks. Another is the consequences of outrage in international politics. A third is the impact of the Hamas attack and Israel's response on Israeli society, an issue that, with a suggestive parallel to the Vietnam conflict, has been addressed by Tony Karon and Daniel Levy in an interesting article published in The Nation.

See.

The Palestinian Factor

In his speech, Austin said the following: "I learned a thing or two about urban warfare when I fought in Iraq and led the campaign to defeat ISIS. Like Hamas, ISIS was deeply entrenched in urban areas. (...) The lesson is not that urban warfare can be won by protecting civilians. The lesson is that urban warfare can only be won by protecting civilians. In this type of fighting, the center of gravity is the civilian population. And if you throw them into the arms of the enemy, you substitute a tactical victory for a strategic defeat."

Israel's response has caused more than 18,000 deaths, according to local authorities, the vast majority of whom are women and children. Some 18 percent of all structures in Gaza had been destroyed or damaged as of Nov. 26, according to data released yesterday by the United Nations Satellite Center.

The New York Times has just published a very visual piece that clearly shows the level of destruction.

The Financial Times cited estimates that the destruction in Gaza in two months of conflict is comparable to that of German cities in two years of World War II.

There can be little doubt that Israel's military action is sowing thousands and thousands of seeds in Palestinian society for the future recomposition of the ranks of Hamas that it is now trying to annihilate, with a desire for revenge probably greater than at any time in decades in view of the brutality of the response to the infamous attack of October 7.

This dynamic, moreover, plausibly, reinforces Hamas vis-à-vis Fatah as a national political reference for the Palestinians, with a dynamic that favors a view of the Palestinian Authority as a useless and subjugated institution. It should be recalled that in 2006 Hamas won elections throughout Palestine – both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank.

Result of the UN vote on ceasefire in Gaza on December 12, 2023.

The International Factor

Developments in international politics pose another risk to Israel. Social outrage over his war in Gaza is widespread in much of the world. As evidenced by an excellent piece by my colleague Monica Ceberio, experts agree that there are abundant indications that Israel is committing war crimes. Of course, Hamas has also committed them, horrific and to begin with, but the disproportionality of a democracy's response is sinking in.

That outrage is what underpins the political vote at the UN. In October, 121 voted for a truce; this time, 153. The U.S. is the only major country that voted with Israel.

First, this greatly complicates the normalization of relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries, a central strategic objective of the Israeli Government. Although the leaders of the countries that were considering taking the step – especially Saudi Arabia – still have the political will to move forward, the popular rejection is such that it is now implausible that this could happen in the short and medium term.

On a broader scale, there is a possibility that this same outrage will eventually generate enough pressure for international politics to take seriously the task of facilitating the establishment of a viable Palestinian state as the only real solution to unblocking the conflict. Israel has actively tried to prevent this outcome for decades, with very broad political and social support, beyond Netanyahu and his ultra partners. Any tangible progress towards Palestinian statehood would represent a strategic defeat for that Israel.

At the level of international risks, there is also that of a regional escalation of the conflict. This is not likely. In these two months it has become clear that Iran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah, have no interest in feeding it, they consider the current wear and tear that Israel suffers in the eyes of the world with its action more profitable. But armed incidents occur frequently in different parts of the region and, as long as this level of tension continues, the risk of escalation, even accidental, is not negligible

The reality on the ground and the ironclad support of the US – which, despite Biden's rebuke, sends new ammunition to Israel, even bypassing its own Congress – invite us not to take for granted that these developments in the international arena will occur. But, even on other levels, Israel can suffer considerable damage from an international stigmatization that produces boycotts, sanctions, in short, a progressive isolation. Even in the U.S., even if government support remains, a deep rift may open up in society on this issue. And it is worth remembering that apartheid in South Africa fell because it became unpalatable to a majority of world public opinion.

The Internal Factor

For the time being, Israeli society shows a high degree of cohesion, as recently explained in a report by my colleague Antonio Pita in EL PAÍS. After an attack has occurred, there is usually a closing of ranks of the attacked society.

But, while it is not rational to think that in the medium term there will be a radical change in a society in which the consensus on oppressive occupation and colonization has been very high, it is also not rational that what is happening will not stir the political waters in Israel later on. It is plausible to think that voices critical of the model will become more abundant and vigorous in the future than in the past. If not because it is unfair, then at least because it is ineffective.

The history of the last few decades is a process with ups and downs but in which, substantially, Israel has not suffered any strategic defeats. The chances of this happening now should not be overestimated. But it is important not to dismiss them.

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