What exposes the struggle of the organization of the abductees, the part run by advertising agencies, as essentially political, is the fact that better conditions have now been created for their release. Apparently, Israel, led by the much-maligned Prime Minister Netanyahu, has succeeded in removing the threat of the Time Guillotine. Israel has taken control of the timeline of the Gaza war. Netanyahu, with the help of the military leadership, actually succeeded in removing the problem of the end time or expiration date from the agenda.
As long as there was talk of a "running out hourglass," as some experts put it a month and a half ago, Hamas had an advantage. He only had to hold out with the hostages under his control until the American administration and international elements arrested Israel, and then Israel's bargaining was very difficult and dictated intolerable concessions. Now that the time dimension does not really burden Israel, Hamas has an interest in creating a truce – and it can do so by releasing hostages.
But the networks that supposedly speak in the name of releasing the hostages are not interested in this. The organizers have an interest in undermining the leadership of the war, in creating a rift of mistrust between the public and the leadership, and lately they have also not shy away from particularly vile attempts to break the bond of trust and love between the people and the soldiers. Every tragic incident that causes unnecessary death at the scene of a terrorist attack, such as at the entrance to Jerusalem, when Castleman was shot dead, or right on the battlefield, when three hostages who fled from their abductors were shot, is exploited for a storm of media-protest-politics. The latest incident is the attack on Brigadier General Barak Hiram. Clearly, Hiram is one of the senior commanders destined for greatness later in his career, but indiscretionary leftists emerge from every shaft of the political struggle. And if you shut up the last shaft, there are always horror movie scenes, when a political monster stretches its jagged head out of the toilet.
Yachimovitch and Rosiglio did not and will not succeed in getting Hiram ousted. But they spray it. The left, the judiciary and the media already see him in a certain light, reminiscent of outstanding combat commanders from the past such as Effi Eitam and Ofer Winter.
IDF Spokesperson
Taking control of the time dimension in Gaza could also help increase pressure on Hezbollah in the north. The Gaza campaign will probably not end with a ceasefire, but will be a fade of fire. Hamas will fade away, will be gradually eliminated, and the IDF will continue to control with limited forces. There will be no agreement, so as not to create a situation in which Hamas takes over the funds for the "reconstruction" and plans the next massacre. The Wall Street Journal's revelation that Netanyahu, ostensibly on Biden's advice, had called off a preliminary attack on Hezbollah on October 11 is further proof of the prime minister's excessive, correct judgment in leading the war. Had Israel opened in Lebanon, it is very likely that the IDF would be stuck there now with limited but indecisive achievements. And in the Gaza Strip, air action is limited and has no effect of pressure to release the hostages and destroy Hamas.
For the thousandth time: no partner
The problem for proponents of the two-state concept is that even the Palestinian Authority, which they care so much about preserving, does not want and cannot grant effective rule to the residents of Gaza
The ideological struggle over the "day after" has begun. A distinctly left-wing body funded by the Berl Katznelson Foundation (foreign money), the Mitvim Institute, simplifies the picture: the immediate mission is to save the Palestinian Authority. The left sees the right's message that creates equality between the PA and Hamas. One body is Palestinian-Nazi and the other is Islamo-Nazi. And according to the polls that the left sees, this view, attributed to the radical right, is increasingly accepted by the general public. The left's problem is that even the Palestinian Authority, which they care so much about preserving and strengthening, does not want and cannot grant effective rule to the residents of Gaza.
The left will continue to mark the settlements as targets for attack and condemnation. This is quite astonishing in light of the social picture that emerges from the combat units in the Gaza Strip. The war against a democratic society can become a kind of social revolution. There is no doubt that the public senses the prominent presence of a new pioneering social elite; This is the enormous percentage of those who fell from among religious Zionism and the settlements in the settlement periphery in Judea and Samaria and the field cities far from Gush Dan.
Their message is conveyed by News 12 commentator Amit Segal in a video that at first glance seems very strange. Unless you treat Segal's viral video as a videotaped publicist article. Totally legitimate. Amit Segal articulates the convincing narrative of the right, that the entire State of Israel is the envelope of Judea and Samaria, and the conclusions are that only an increased social and military presence in Judea and Samaria will allow minimal security for the home front, for the state. Not everyone at the National Library liked, to say the least, Segal's use of the wonderful, elliptical reading rooms of the citadel of Israeli culture in all its senses as a backdrop for conveying ideological political messages. The message has an incredible demand - more than two million views. It seems to me that only hits like The Eagles' "Hotel California" get more views. By the way, a faculty colleague forgot to mention that Ehud Barak, in his interview at Chatham House during the reform riots, said of Abu Mazen that he was just a good person. But he is not without mistakes. Barghouti warms up on the lines.
What the data on these positions show is that there is broad agreement around perceptions that were once considered right-wing. It is not relevant at the moment to make arrangements that would mean handing over territories. The Palestinians in their support for the October 7 massacre are really not seen as a partner. How many times will we return to this conclusion. But precisely because of the broad consensus, it seems meaningless in the realm of party voting or leadership choice. The differentiating factors may be quite different. For example, quality governance. What is this? It's a suit, a tie, it's a lawyer, concepts agreed upon in the papers of think tanks. These are parties that are connected to the establishments of the deep state and its dominant ideology. At a later stage, the Palestinian state will also return as an inexhaustible solution.
The Depth Concept
Moshe Dayan's speech from '73 reveals the extent to which the military-security leadership was trapped in an intellectual world of theories from the world of academia. Then – and today
One of the most important essays published on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War was published in Strategic Update, the journal of INSS, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Prof. Zaki Shalom does not dig into another protocol with gold knowledge or an amazing scoop by Ashraf Marwan, but analyzes a lecture given by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to the senior staff of the defense establishment on July 17, 1973. It turns out that less than three months before the outbreak of the war, Dayan became a commentator, perhaps a sociologist, and he diagnosed the Egyptians with "a state of apathy and helplessness that denies them the desire to invest effort in changing the situation, whether by war or otherwise."
"That means this incompetence... It leads to entrenchment behind rigid formulas, because there is neither there nor does this effort to make war, to organize, and to do the thing... There is no intellectual effort to find a way out to move things, to break the wall in my head (at least) mentally if not in action."
Prof. Maj. Gen. Yehoshaphat Harkabi claimed, for his part, that the Arab world is "a Venus world of loneliness." Arab society is incapable of collective effort. In the face of the weakness of the Arab Talmud, Dayan placed the glory of the Israeli fighter, especially in the form of pilots: the air force and armored forces are based, according to Dayan, "on small and select groups of people." In these groups, there is a phenomenon of higher volunteering than in the past. A significant portion of the pilots, Dayan says, come from agricultural communities, kibbutzim and moshavim, whose share of the population does not exceed seven percent.
Moshe Dayan during the Yom Kippur War, Photo: Hananya Herman, GPO
These things provide a new context that is also appropriate for today's operational and intelligence failures. Zaki Shalom claims that beyond the intelligence "concept" that led to the surprise of '73, the perceptions expressed by Dayan and Harkabi are the roots of the failure and the concept. That is, something deeper, with racist slurs. In the early 70s, the Arab world underwent a transformation of radicalization, in addition to earlier Nasserism and the Baath revolutions in Syria and Iraq. Hafez al-Assad and Muammar Gaddafi immigrated to Syria and Libya. The PLO rises to prominence in the international arena. Not to mention the processes Sadat is putting the Egyptian army through in preparation for the war. All this was nothing more than smoke in Dayan's eyes. This is the lecture in which he qualified himself and told the audience of senior security officials that if war did break out, he would schedule another lecture and explain why it happened.
The important thing is to see to what extent the military-security leadership is trapped in an intellectual world of theories from the world of academia. Today has also been added the trap of legalization and the seizure of privileges of that air elite. Aharon Yariv said of Rais Sadat that he was "a pale man, a weak man, and the jokes about him are many." Where did he get it from? From Shimon Shamir and his friends, plus graphological analysis...
Another stopwatch to your right
Netanyahu firmly rejects the old political solutions until "the day after." So why are members of the ideological right so quick to demand that he resign?
And here we can ask the publicists from the ideological right, mainly Ayelet Shaked Hasidim, why they are so quick to demand that Netanyahu resign. Or at least announce that at the end of the war he would resign. There is now some kind of coordinated blitz by some of the well-known writers in the sector or sector. They never forget that the conclusion from everything is that Bibi should go home.
The interesting point is that if Netanyahu had not functioned and made the right decisions and had not carried out his political, political and military duties, he would have already been forced or forced to go to Caesarea. Moshe Dayan, who had been defense emperor in the years preceding the Yom Kippur War, lost his authority within two days of the outbreak of the war, and his statements were treated as "ministerial advice." This was testified, for example, by Major General Shlomo Gazit. And there are similar and perhaps more serious testimonies by Shimon Peres, and of course by Dayan's rivals Haim Bar-Lev and Yaakov Hazan. Golda Meir Meron Madzini's bureau chief, in a recent interview, stated emphatically that Dayan never lost his temper, even with regard to the well-known Dimona choice. But the fact is that Dayan was indecisive in the days and hours before the outbreak of the war. He was not even the dominant factor in the decision to launch a successful offensive, nor in the decisions concerning the ceasefire at the end of the war.
Dayan's appearances before the public and in the foreign media left a bad and destabilizing impression. He was not an influential factor in the political system that accompanied the war and influenced American airlift decisions. Netanyahu, in a very difficult and complex war, made the right decisions that seem natural today, but not everyone would have followed in his footsteps, even with the immediate declaration that Israel is at war. The decision on the mobilization of the reserves. Focus on eliminating Hamas and fighting in one arena, Gaza. For three months now, it has served as Israel's political-diplomatic icebreaker. He brought Israel to recovery and revival of its military power; He has statements that sometimes annoy some people, but a large majority of the public receives the response from him in moments of crisis. Not a single word was heard from him that undermined morale and faith in the cause. All this, while the Israel of 2023 is devoid of spiritual leaders who stood up in the past in wars and were guides to the public. Haim Guri, Haim Hefer, Aharon Magd, Moshe Shamir and Naomi Shemer don't live here anymore. Those who show up are the singers and artists in their shades. They go everywhere, including on the battlefield and at funerals, to connect the public to their feelings.
I look at the leaders' headquarters, and I'm not sure there's anyone there whose judgment can weave in the overarching goals of defeating Hamas and returning the hostages. of setting the parameters of the "day after" and rejecting the old political solutions. But to Moshe Dayan's credit, he was still dealing with the real enemy, not the internal political enemies. Yitzhak Rabin, Dayan's successor as Mr. Security, constantly dealt with his rivals, the Likud and the settlers, who were at best "enemies of peace" or "obstacles to peace," and at worst "murderers of peace." Yes, "the Likud is a Hamas collaborator," Rabin said.
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