"It was very difficult for me to say what I said last time," he admits at the start of our second meeting. The truth is that you could see it on him. He was silent for long seconds, searching for the words, his face really tormented. Still, "I'm at peace with what I said," he stresses.
The heart says one thing and the mind another?
"Just like that."
His name is Ari Herro. For many significant years, he was the man closest to Benjamin Netanyahu. He is almost unknown to the Israeli public, partly because he has never given an interview, never given a public speech, and in fact escaped the limelight. The only times his name came up in the media were his police interrogations and his testimony in Netanyahu's trial – the most difficult chapters of his life, which we will get to later.
Now, after more than 20 years of behind-the-scenes public activity, he is publishing a book about his years alongside Prime Minister Netanyahu. He is the first of dozens of people who worked alongside Netanyahu as prime minister to write such a book. "My brother's keeper," Herro called the book, which is intended for American audiences and is currently published only in English. Alongside intimate moments with Netanyahu, Herro describes moments of military struggles against terrorism and political battles, especially against President Obama. For those who want to understand what happened here in the previous decade, it is very worthwhile to get their hands on it.
The writing of the book was completed in January 2023, that is, before the war that also changed what Herro thinks of the man who is still in his eyes a great leader. "I've never been to an anti-Bibi camp. I still love and admire him," he says as we sit in his home in Reut. Today he devotes his time to business, to advocacy for Israel – during our conversations he goes up for an interview on Sky News and receives a call from the Wall Street Journal. The war, and the aspiration for national unity that followed, brought him back to the public arena in Israel, and he is also working to formulate new organizations for the day after.
From the shelves of "My Brother's Keeper" there is tremendous admiration for Netanyahu. But this personal alliance, which had withstood the toughest tests, was broken for Herro following the Hamas attack. And these are the words that were so difficult for him to say in our first meeting: He believes that when the fighting ends, Netanyahu should give way, along with the entire political and security leadership.
"In the current reality of October 7, I definitely think it's impossible," he begins, pausing and searching for the exact words. "... There cannot be a situation in which the determinant of Israel's security policy, Mr. Security throughout his political career, will say at the moment of failure of that system, 'It's not just my fault.' It is true that all the heads of the defense establishment have failed, everyone agrees on this. But as a leader who has taken on the title of 'Mr. Security,' when there comes a moment when that policy fails, his centrality in that failure cannot be questioned."
Despite the disavowal of Netanyahu, to which we will return, and despite everything he went through as a result of his relationship with him – years of arduous work, terrible police investigations, prosecution, negative media imagery and divorce – Herro is neither embittered nor angry. Unlike most of Netanyahu's people who turned angrily against him, Herro looks back with satisfaction and pride.
"My dream since childhood was to contribute to the State of Israel and the Jewish people. I had the privilege of doing this in the most important place, the Prime Minister's Office, alongside a man who is still in my eyes a huge historical leader. Ask me, would I repeat it all over again, knowing that this is the price I will pay? My answer is yes."
Los Angeles - Golani - Likud
"Netanyahu lacked close friends – even with his former comrades from his army days, he did not feel comfortable. He found solace in his Cuban cigars, glasses of sparkling water with a spritz of grapefruit juice, and someone who was always in his room with him. Netanyahu was lonely, but he was rarely alone. He wanted and received the funeral of a man subordinate to him, even if that person sat still in the corner" (p. 60)
Ari Haro was born in Los Angeles in 1973, the son of a large Jewish family with a strong Zionist affinity. "At the Shabbat table in my home, as a young camper at Bnei Akiva Camp in California, the stories of brave young Jews sacrificing everything to establish a Jewish state in the ancient homeland filled me with pride," he begins his book.
When he was 12, his family immigrated to Israel and settled in the Neve Aliza neighborhood of Samaria. After high school, he enlisted in Golani. He later completed his bachelor's and master's degrees at Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv and Brooklyn universities. At the same time, he began to integrate into public life, first in the newspaper Makor Rishon and later in the advocacy organization Honest Reporting. His first encounter with Netanyahu was in 2002, when he ran against then-Prime Minister Sharon for the leadership of the Likud. Ron Dermer, who knew Herro in the Israeli Baseball League, recruited him, and you can see why.
Herro is quick-thinking, diligent and very dedicated to the cause, gentle and discreet but knows how to toughen, and speaks fluent English – qualities essential for working with Netanyahu. In the same round in 2002, Sharon won the contest. Netanyahu was appointed finance minister, and Herro returned to the United States.
"Regardless of Netanyahu and Dermer, I was offered to run an organization, which was quite ephemeral at the time, called Friends of the Likud in the United States. My goal has always been to return to Israel, and to contribute and influence policy here. I realized that building a power base in the United States, with a deep understanding of the political field there and of the pro-Israel and Jewish organizations, would help. That's why I went for it. One of the first phone calls I made was to Netanyahu, to understand from him how he sees my work abroad. He was still finance minister at the time."
Why did you call him, and not Prime Minister Sharon?
"I contacted all the Likud members, from Prime Minister Sharon down, and I also hosted them when they came for visits. But I was among those who read all of Netanyahu's books. I heard him speak at AIPAC. There was great admiration for him. As a native of the United States and someone who lived the American experience toward Israel, his advocacy abilities were second to none. His ability to stand up to hostile elements and the media and present Israel in this way gave great pride to most American Jewry."
Managing Friends of the Likud in the United States, to Netanyahu's satisfaction, has indeed forged the connection between the two. Herro prepared the couple's visits to the United States, arranged meetings for Netanyahu with influential figures and accompanied him to the talks. "He understood that he had someone to rely on in the United States," Herro summarizes of his time in the United States.
The person you saw from afar on the screens is the same person you meet privately?
"You see a very impressive person. Unlike most Israeli politicians who come to the United States, he feels at home there. It's not a foreign game for him. And hanging out with him in various places, and sitting next to him in meetings in various forums, was Israeli and Jewish pride. Even within the meetings, his messages are sharp, very Zionist and unapologetic. There is a feeling that they are sitting with a prime minister, even though he is not yet."
Did you have any questions about politics and personal conduct?
"In those years my influence was educational, to promote the ideology of Jabotinsky and Begin. That was the observation. I had nothing to do with Israeli politics, and later on I didn't like to deal with it. So what I saw definitely satisfied me."
Later, the police and some journalists would claim that "friends of the Likud in the US" were a conduit for transferring money to Netanyahu.
"This is an American educational organization from which not a shekel has ever been transferred, neither to Netanyahu nor to any other Knesset member. Technically, that can't happen either. In the United States, there are very strict rules about what a non-profit organization can and cannot put money on, what it is allowed to invest in and what it is not. Therefore, donations to public figures are something that never existed and never was created."
So, what were you thinking when you saw the publications?
"This isn't the first time the media has written the wrong things. You have to understand, at least in those years – I don't know what is happening today – there was no pro-Israel organization that did not host leaders from Israel, right and left. AIPAC, ADL, FIDF, etc., these are familiar things here in Israel. Former chiefs of staff, defense ministers and MKs, etc., would also fly at the expense of the organizations. My organization has complied with all the required laws on the matter."
The next phone call from Netanyahu arrived. In 2006, when Netanyahu is leader of the opposition with a shattered party of only 12 seats, he asks Herro to join his intimate team at the Malha Technological Garden and appoints him as an external relations adviser.
"That period was his lowest point. My job was to write speeches, work with foreign media and diplomats, and plan visits abroad. At some point, Ayelet Shaked and Naftali Bennett joined. After they left in 2008, I started filling their roles as well. That's how we got to the 2009 elections."
This departure cannot be skipped so easily.
Herro evades: "I'm not a gossip person, and I can't say exactly what happened. Especially in the political system there are changes regularly. In the Israeli media, when someone leaves a position, they make a big deal out of it. Like it's a juicy story. In the White House, the chief of staff changes every year or two. The roles are very demanding. So at some point we move on to the next thing."
But it wasn't just a departure. It's a personal explosion with Bennett and Shaked, which ultimately had national repercussions.
"When they left, there weren't huge consequences yet. They were staff members. Then they became central figures. The goal was to bring him back to power, and that seemed distant at the time."
Was there their subversion?
"There was nothing more than what I told you."
"Poison machine?
He rarely sleeps, expecting those around him—especially me—to keep up with his vampire hours. It didn't matter if it was giving a speech over and over again, or sitting with him on the balcony while he watched a football game. My day ended when he decided to call it a day. Netanyahu loved only a handful of people, but always felt the need to have a friend around him. Being focused on the task defined his every move. He did not believe in personal resentment; He rarely exhibited fits of anger or, for that matter, any kind of emotion. He never cursed. Senator Lindsey Graham once used the F word during a visit to the Prime Minister's House. For Netanyahu, this made him uncomfortable..."
2009, you win elections, after years in the desert of opposition.
"Exactly ten years passed between his terms (Netanyahu lost to Ehud Barak in 1999). There was great joy, but there was also an understanding that we were entering into a very heavy responsibility that now rests on his shoulders. The first operation in Gaza (Cast Lead) had just ended and Obama was elected president. He understood that we were entering a difficult period. He wasn't young anymore and knew what the job meant."
What lessons did he come with from his first term?
"Politically, he understood that everything starts with the base. The base starts with the Likud and expands to the right. He realized that his ability to implement policies began with staying in office. Therefore, maintaining his political and ideological home is, as far as he is concerned, a significant part of the ability to implement policy."
One of the arguments against him is that over the years the tables have been reversed, and that out of a desire to preserve political survival, he abandons the policy.
"I think there is a fundamental problem in Israel's parliamentary political system, in which your ability to carry out policy in any area depends on a coalition that can bring you down at any moment. In the United States, the president is elected for four years, at the end of which his policy is measured and he is up for re-election. In Israel, everyone knows that a vote of no confidence or the fall of a government can happen at any moment. Therefore, the political consideration is much higher."
So the problem is not with him but with the method?
"That's right. Everyone knows the example of Arik Sharon, with the dramatic change he made in disengagement from parts of the homeland. This gave him broad political backing in places he didn't have. In other words, the ability to survive politically influenced the political outlook. Speaking of Netanyahu, he learned that he must maintain his base. Sharon and Bennett abandoned the base and received a short-term mandate. With Sharon, it's impossible to know what would have happened (because he suffered a stroke, A.C.). But with Bennett, we know how it ends."
So what do you think of the statement that Bibi for survival does everything?
"The political system in Israel is structured in such a way that the political considerations of most MKs and ministers significantly influence their policy."
And is he more than others?
"We're looking for the unifying factor, so I don't want to express a position beyond what I said. The problem is the system. The critical issues at the forefront of his efforts have not changed over the years. He wasn't fickle with his mantras. Iran is always at the top, economy and so on."
Is there a poison machine? Soldiers sent on dirty missions?
"It's not something I know personally."
Does it not exist or do you not know?
"In the years I was there, until 2015, I didn't see such conduct, and if there was one, I would have known. He is a politician, and every politician is active on social media and mobilizes supporters."
How did you manage its reliability problem? In the end, are you supposed to work daily with a person who sometimes, let's put it mildly, deviates from the truth?
"In my dealings with him, you didn't feel it."
How could it be?
"Maybe that's the nature of our relationship. I didn't feel a credibility problem, and I didn't see it personally. Netanyahu is a very goal-driven man, and he does whatever it takes to reach it. If there is a need to use one way or another, he does it. He told you in the 2015 elections, 'There will be no Palestinian state,' and after the elections, due to international pressure, he maneuvered. I don't think he intends to be unreliable, but changes course when he comes to the conclusion that it's necessary."
You really left after the 2015 election. Why?
"I felt it was the right exit point. I've been doing this for several years now. I accompanied him during the election campaign. He asked me to join the coalition negotiating team and I understood that I would be pulled back into a full term. I decided it was time to retire. With Netanyahu, in order to end well, there are exit points. You don't want to give the feeling that you're jumping off the ship. Between terms, there is a more understandable exit route in interpersonal relationships. As I explained earlier, turnover is acceptable. Retiring in the middle of a term is less pleasant. And it's not just a professional matter. You are part of a small group that lives and breathes state affairs together 24 hours a day through the prime minister. These roles are drastically demanding. You're cut off from family, friends, and everything Something outside of work. I had bags under my eyes, so it was a very intense year and a half and I felt it was time to move on."
In the opinion of many, myself included, something else happened in 2015. Winning those elections seemed to free him, removed restraints, the hubris began.
"There were two things there. In the domestic political arena, the public and the polls gave Bougie and Tzipi the victory. After he won big, it changed his political outlook. It was the third election in a row that he won. There was a belief that 'we discovered the formula, that there is a formula, and as long as we stay in the same direction we will not lose.' It was kind of a wow moment. When all odds were against us and all the pollsters predicted a loss, we won. So apparently our formula is stronger than the polls."
I mean, a feeling that we're here forever?
"Yes, as long as we stick to the formula. The second thing was foreign policy, and that's what the book focuses on. At the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, the masks were removed in front of the Americans (details below, A.C.). After winning the elections, these two things came together."
I remember from that time an episode in which you were involved, and that was his desire to abolish the presidency in order to block Ruby Rivlin. It was already a kind of megalomania.
"I don't really want to get into it. But let's say diplomatically that the rationale for the move was to put someone in the president's house with more faces to the Jewish world, and less of a political role. Therefore, there was talk about changing the institution of the presidency, not abolishing it. I, all my years there, tried to escape politics as much as I could. There is the verse that Joseph's brothers throw him into the pit and Rashi explains that 'the cistern is empty, there is no water in it - but there are snakes and scorpions in it.' That's how I saw the political system. There are always other considerations, and other interests, and you should always be careful of the pit. That's one of the things I didn't connect with. My attitude was the opposite. My ability to deal with people was because they knew I wasn't playing games but telling the truth. That way they knew they could also conduct themselves honestly in front of me."
You sound very conciliatory, while most of the people who were in Netanyahu's first circle left angrily and slamming the door. Why does it always end like this?
"I don't want to talk about others, but about myself. I really appreciated his abilities and the person, and I felt that he let me contribute to Israel. The fact that there is friction in a political system and in a ministry that works so hard and in such an active system – people understand that. For me, gratitude was more than any other emotion. My only question is whether I'm contributing or not – so there was no room for feelings of anger or hurt. I had an opportunity, and I'm grateful for it."
Those who left slamming the door usually did so because of Sarah and Yair, right?
"I don't want to comment on his family."
Why? Their involvement is well known, and I'm sure you've seen it.
"I'm talking about the time I worked with him, not with his family. I also have a family and I saw how she experienced a difficult time for me, so I respect the need to keep the family out of the bush."
Doing an injustice to his family?
"I don't pay attention to that."
Iran, Iran, and again Iran
"It was uncharacteristic for Netanyahu to reveal his feelings. He wore a permanent suit of armor that prevented others, even the closest ones, from seeing them. There have been tragedies and terrorist crimes before; Soldiers killed in battle and training accidents. But the news of the discovery of the bodies of the three boys after 18 days of searching was different. He asked to be alone. For a moment, he was not a politician - he was a father, a simple man and a citizen. I could tell he was deeply shaken. We all got up to leave the office, but when I got to the door, Netanyahu called me. I walked back towards the table and pulled out a chair without breaking eye contact with it. His resilience collapsed in pain. I have sat across from him in thousands of meetings with tragic news. I've never seen him show so much pain. His eyes swelled with tears. "Avner is around their age," he said, choked. We knew that the heartbreak and pain would soon be felt in every home in Israel" (Page 149)
Your book is named after Operation Brothers' Keeper. You begin by abducting the three youths and devote a very significant part to everything that happened then and to Operation Protective Edge. Why, actually?
"In my opinion, 2014 was a turning point in which the masks were removed, especially between him and Obama. Since 2009, the line has been to try to give something to the Americans on the Palestinian issue, so that they will do what is necessary on the Iranian issue. I remind you of the construction freeze in 2009 and the process led by then-Secretary of State John Kerry in 2014. In June 2014, Mahmoud Abbas blew up the talks, but Kerry blamed both sides. This infuriated Netanyahu. Tzipi Livni, who conducted the negotiations at the time, was at first completely on Netanyahu's side, but then for political reasons she criticized him. That same month, the three youths were also abducted by Hamas. At the same time, we saw that the U.S. was advancing toward an agreement with the Iranians, which was reached in 2015. These two things (blaming Israel for the Palestinian issue and the American rapprochement with Iran) were a break of trust between the Prime Minister's Office and the Obama administration. The Israeli government found itself in a situation where it paid a lot, but they also blamed us and we didn't get anything on the Iranian side. The feeling was that they weren't backing us, and I also remind you of the delay in sending missiles to helicopters in Operation Protective Edge. Therefore, he decided that there were no more games on the Iranian issue. It continued with the fact that he went to address Congress in early 2015. On the Palestinian issue, note that since 2014 there have been no more talks with them. It's a dramatic change."
Let's go back to all this, but was the Shalit deal, which was contrary to Netanyahu's agenda, made because there was an opportunity or because of the social protests?
"Because there was an opportunity. As I explain in the book, already in 2009 he instructed the mediator at the time, Hagai Hadas, to strive for a deal because of the pilots' consideration that God forbid they would be captured in Iran. This is what I heard from him, that if Israel wants to attack Iranian nuclear sites and some pilots are taken prisoner, [they will know] that the State of Israel will do everything in its power to bring them home alive. He went for it against the political base."
This again raises questions: Is Netanyahu acting according to his own perceptions or in his survival political interest?
"There is no contradiction. It's very easy to sit in a research institute and write about policy, much harder to implement. There are many considerations and constraints that change the utopian reality. This is true of all prime ministers, and this is the power of democracy. If he went against the voters, they wouldn't come back and support him."
Those five years, from the Bar-Ilan speech in 2009 to the collapse of the Kerry process in 2014 – were they a strategic fraud and Netanyahu's way of messing up the Palestinian cause, or if Abbas had complied with the conditions, Netanyahu would have really signed an agreement?
"Netanyahu is a man who likes to keep options open and makes last-minute decisions. Always. He taught me that it had something to do with his days in the unit. Progress in talks with the Palestinians is not binding in itself. And if it advances the overarching interest, which is Iran, that's fine. He might one day have reached a point where there are no longer options. But it's not that he came with malicious intent to manipulate Americans. There was definitely an understanding that there was a dance with the U.S. You are helping us with Iran, and we are helping us with the Palestinians."
Let's go back to Operation Protective Edge and the current war. The one who allowed Hamas to grow was Netanyahu, and he defined himself as "the guardian of Israel."
"True, but the blame here is wall-to-wall. These are decisions made in those years around all tables. The security establishment did not push for action. Moreover, I tell in the book about that moment when then-head of Military Intelligence, Aviv Kochavi, pulled me to the side at the end of one of Protective Edge's cabinet meetings and told me, 'You need to get the prime minister to finish the operation.' So the heads of the defense establishment also failed. Everyone agrees to it. But whoever heads the pyramid is responsible. It's very hard for me to say that. Historically, he is a huge leader. But I will quote here my friends, the bereaved fathers, Dadi Simhi and Yehiel Leiter, who said, '150 people must be replaced – the leadership that was responsible for the greatest failure in the history of the State of Israel.'"
As someone who sat there during those years, where is the root of the failure in hindsight?
"What I saw in the cabinet was groupthink. Critical to mentally challenge the The system, and it doesn't happen. The second thing, let's call the child by his name, was arrogance. This connects to the Iranian issue. When you see our leaders talking about 'regional power, who will cause us problems? A small organization digging tunnels for us? We are technologically advanced,' and so on – this outlook must change. In retrospect, the Iranian issue was so central to Netanyahu's policy that we paid a price on the Palestinian level, and the fact today is that it was a mistake."
I mean?
"In order to promote a more aggressive policy towards Iran, Netanyahu's governments traded in the Palestinian issue. From a historical perspective, to give up a threat that the system believed to be 'small' and looming at our doorstep, in favor of a distant 'bigger' threat was a mistake. If we outwardly transmit clear parameters, the ability of Americans and other countries to accept them is much greater. Second, certainly the ability to mobilize much deeper support... Everyone is talking today about the Palestinian education system and about raising generations of terrorists – this is nothing new. That was also then. A decision was made then to close our eyes."
The reason for closing his eyes, Herro explains, is the same barter Netanyahu believed in, between the Iranian and Palestinian issues. "After all, a few months before that, he called during the election campaign for the destruction of Hamas," he recalls.
Did he feel bound by that statement?
"Fact no. The focus was a few thousand kilometers from here, instead of a few meters. If there had been an understanding of the magnitude of the problem, it would certainly have been handled differently. And I think that's a mistake on the part of the whole system."
"Even
in May, the air in Washington, D.C., was stuffy. Netanyahu suddenly grabbed my arm and led me in a sharp left turn toward Lafayette Square. The horrified security guard did everything he could to keep up with us. He walked me to the end of the block, far from prying ears, looked me in the eye and said, 'Ari, we're in trouble'... The president told him emphatically that he wanted a complete construction freeze in the West Bank. He used the term 'not one brick'" (p. 35)
Say, what disrupted the ties between Netanyahu and Obama? After all, you describe in the book how in 2008, when they met at King David before they took office, there was a good meeting and they agreed to work together.
"The problem was looking at the area, everyone had a different perception. Obama believed that the Islamic world, including the radicals, could be embraced. Netanyahu saw them and Iran as the greatest threat to Israel. We figured it out immediately. The world understood this when he traveled to the region, skipped Israel and gave the speech in Cairo. Netanyahu had a genuine desire to build a personal relationship with Obama, but his goals were different. When we left our first meeting at the White House in 2009, I was the only person in the car with him and I saw something happen. He didn't want to tell and gestured with his finger up, for fear of being listened."
Some argue that these are Netanyahu's paranoias.
"These are facts, he didn't invent this sentence. Obama had a clear policy and tried to promote it. What happened was not Netanyahu's fault."
Let's jump five years ahead to 2015. Comes an invitation from the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives to speak against the nuclear agreement. You supported the acceptance of the invitation. In retrospect, was that the right decision?
"I think so. Netanyahu saw the nuclear agreement as a real threat to the State of Israel. He thought that even in front of friends we had to stand up for ourselves, even if it negatively affected certain groups in Congress, and we knew we would pay a price. But, and this is a big but, our friendship vis-à-vis the United States and with any external entity is built on the fact that the relationship advances our interests as an independent state. During those years, Western policy toward Iran caused significant damage to Israel. On the other hand, I am convinced that this speech strengthened Israel's status, and also ultimately led to the Abraham Accords. The messages from the Arab countries started coming when we were still in the congress building."
So would you advise him to do it again?
"Yes. From a historical perspective, we also saw the results of the Western handling of the Iranian issue in the October 7 attacks. The ability of Hamas and Hezbollah to build such a large terrorist campaign on our borders, and to build the militias in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, is the result of the failed policy of the United States and the West in dealing with Iran. In our attempts to persuade us to oppose the agreement, we raised the issue of Iran's proxy. It was Israel's duty to warn from every platform of the danger."
A deafening
silence Six hours of conversation with Herro leaves no doubt that he is an honest man, but the Israel Police and the State Attorney's Office somehow missed it. A year after he left the prime minister's office, the police opened an investigation against him. Eight years later, the legal process is still not over, so Herro refuses to answer my questions. "The prosecution forbade me and all the witnesses to speak until the end of the trial," he says, referring me to his testimony in Netanyahu's trial as a state witness, and to earlier media reports about what was done to him. They clearly indicate that the purpose of his police interrogations was not to find out the truth about his actions, but to get him to open his mouth against his former boss.
He was arrested on the eve of his daughter's bat mitzvah and underwent four rounds of interrogation. His property was confiscated, and according to the transcript presented in court, interrogators told him, "It's like a bazaar here: Give us something, and get out of your mess." The something, although not explicitly stated, was supposed to be Netanyahu.
At one point, the interrogators even showed him a letter, seemingly signed by him, in which he allegedly confessed to a criminal offense. Herro remembered never writing such a letter, and in the midst of the investigation he recognized that there had been a spelling error in his own name. Thus he recognized that it was a fake and escaped the trap.
"Did you understand from them that they were tightening the rope around your neck, hoping that you would vomit something on Netanyahu?" asked Haddad, Netanyahu's lawyer in court. Herro confirmed that this is indeed the case. The police investigation shattered Herro's life. He went through a divorce and had to build his life from scratch. Today he is remarried and together they are parents of six.
"About a year after I left public service, I was dragged into a series of police investigations against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Initially, I was told that the matter involved alleged offenses related to the sale of my consulting firm, but during the lengthy investigation it turned out that I was just a pawn in a game with many much bigger matters. About 20 months after the police raided my home, I took refuge and entered into a plea bargain: the condition was that I should be a state witness in the criminal cases brought against Netanyahu. There is much to be said about the nature of the cases against me and Netanyahu, and about the investigation and justice system in Israel. But as this book is being written, I am still limited in what I can reveal publicly. I look forward to the day when these shackles are removed" (p. 13).
Expired and we will not pay.
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