The Israeli public does not understand the magnitude and depth of the damage to Gaza, and it is doubtful whether it can. The human perspective is narrow: you see a specific frame at any given moment. A narrow segment of reality, from which it is difficult to learn about the full picture.
Naturally, we are self-centered. In the disaster that has befallen us, in the dead, in the abductees, in the refugees. less aware of the catastrophe that Hamas has inflicted on its people; The IDF machine has been running over and shredding Gaza for five weeks, first from the air and sea, and in the past two weeks also on and under the ground. Here and there images of destruction or refugees pop up, but they struggle to break through the mind. We are so disappointed in the Gaza Strip, so skeptical and worried about the current situation, that it is hard for us to discern what is happening before our eyes.
Let me say immediately: Gaza has not collapsed yet. Neither does Hamas. Still, what she's going through is unprecedented by any standard. The destruction, the intensity, the intensity - none of these have happened before. If Israel persists in them, it has a real chance of achieving the goals it set for itself in the operation. It will require many elements – focus, determination, difficult decisions, legitimacy, as well as time and luck – but it is achievable.
Even if Sinwar or Deif are eliminated, the war will continue. It will take months to break Hamas' governmental and military dismantling, and years of activity to ensure it does not recover
Victory in this campaign will not be achieved in one picture. Even if Yahya Sinwar or Mohammed Deif are eliminated, the war will continue. It will take months to break Hamas's governmental and military joint and years to continue working to ensure that it does not recover. This is exactly what Israel did in Operation Defensive Shield against Palestinian terrorism in Judea and Samaria: a targeted operation, followed by prolonged activity to preserve its achievements.
In Gaza, everything is more complicated. Because of the conditions on the ground, because of the poverty, because of the hostility. I don't know what the average Gazan thinks about Israel and Hamas. And to be honest - since October 7th I don't really care either. The poor of our city always come first, certainly this time. At the end of the war, their poor will have the opportunity to choose a better future for them, one that will truly keep war away for generations. We have to hope they do. If not, we will continue to fight. Fortunately, we are stronger, and we have also learned our lesson. "Never again" means never again.
Hamas seeks to maintain ambiguity regarding the identity of the abductees in order to increase the families' pressure on the government, Photo by Jonathan Zindel, Flash 90
Nothing in Gaza will look the same the day after. Not in it: the city is completely destroyed. It will take years, perhaps decades, to rehabilitate it. Almost a million of its residents migrated south, to the makeshift tent cities erected on the beach, where the Gush Katif settlements once stood. Many of them will have nowhere to return to. They will remain refugees, in an area that already has some of the best living conditions in the world.
Nor will anything look the same in front of us: the IDF will act and act differently. All methods of protection and protection will vary. There will be a security zone and a security zone inside the Palestinian territory, there will be freedom of action that will allow raids, and there will be suspicion that will take years to dispel. Nearly 20,<> Gazans worked in Israel until the Simchat Torah offensive. They pumped quite a bit of oxygen into Gaza's depleted economy. Hamas also cut off this lifeline, which did good for both sides. It will take generations to rebuild it.
Power, continuity and time
Last week I entered Gaza with the forces. I wanted to see and feel how things were going inside. What goes through our side, and what goes through their side. I admit that I was surprised: both by what we do, and by what happens to them.
On our side, what is defined on the "blue" side maps, there has been a lot of talk about lack of preparedness and lack of motivation and lack of means. What I saw with my eyes was the opposite. Motivation at the peak: It's not surprising after what we've been through, and in light of the understanding that this is a war for existence. Preparedness is also at its peak: the units are trained, skilled, well prepared for the mission.
I accompanied the soldiers of the infantry school. Not an organic unit, but a training center (for squad commanders) that became a combat unit. During the weeks of waiting, from the completion of the takeover of the envelope to the beginning of the ground operation, they underwent intensive preparation. The brigade commander, Col. Israel Friedler, gave them a series of company and battalion training, by fire, at night, so that they would enter Gaza fully prepared. This is felt in self-confidence, professionalism, manner of operation.
The IDF was surprised on Black Saturday and caught off guard, but once the machine went into operation it worked well. Whoever talked about a hollow army went too far. Israel has excellent fighters and commanders, and it has a professional army. After the war, it will have to be enlarged and strengthened and returned to the consensus and ensure that the best remain in it, but even today it is fully qualified to carry out the task. If only he gets time, he will also bring good results.
Which leads me to their side, the "red" side. No image on television or on social media can convey what you feel on the ground. Gaza is destroyed, shredded, lying on the ground. There isn't a neighborhood that the ramp hasn't gone through. The airstrike that preceded the ground offensive did most of the work, and facilitated the entry of forces in two aspects: it pushed most of the population out of the combat zone, and significantly damaged the defense systems that Hamas had built.
The Air Force's assistance continues even now. One part of it is offensive: Wherever troops need assistance, the air force stabilizes. Sometimes with combat helicopters or drones, and sometimes with fighter jets dropping heavy armaments. The coordination between air and ground forces is unprecedented. Bombs weighing one ton fall hundreds of meters from the forces to allow their further advance. The fact that for the first time both sides – air and ground – are using the same computer systems and maps, allows them to see the same picture and reduce errors and malfunctions to a minimum.
Global support will not withstand a humanitarian disaster. Distribution of supplies at Rafah Crossing, photo: EPA
The other part of this assistance is mainly logistical: from bringing in equipment to evacuating the wounded. Fighting in the Gaza Strip has a price, and it is not easy. In the dead and wounded. Hamas has been preparing for this war for 15 years, and it is taking advantage of everything it has. Attacks from tunnels and from hospitals and schools and UN facilities, without shying away from anything or sparing anyone. The main threat to the forces is anti-tank missiles and RPGs, but also explosive devices and mortars dropped from drones, and of course raid attempts, mainly tunnels.
This is complex combat in built-up areas where there is an inherent advantage to the defender, certainly when it is deployed underground. For this advantage to be eliminated, three things are needed: power, continuity, and time. The IDF currently has all three. The amount of forces it employs in the Gaza Strip is extraordinary, and it is doubtful whether even Hamas can understand it. Behind it stand all the air, naval and artillery firepower, which make it possible to act and strike in other ways as well.
The other two variables—continuity and time—are more elusive. They are also interconnected: the longer the operation continues without breaks, the better results it will yield. Not a day goes by when more Hamas commanders are not eliminated, more headquarters are damaged, its fighters are killed and more capabilities are disabled. Nor is there a day when the IDF does not bite into built-up areas a little more, approach the heart of Gaza City and complete its practical takeover – a first and necessary step on the way to harming Hamas' operational capability and governmental infrastructure.
The problem is that Israel is not operating in a vacuum. This fierce fighting has a price: in lives and damage. We are busy with our dead, but the world has long been busy with their dead as well. Gaza reports over 10,000 fatalities, a much higher number of injuries and thousands of houses completely destroyed. Even if the reports are taken from the Gaza Strip with a more limited guarantee (and they should be taken that way), the price the Gaza Strip pays is very heavy.
Complex pressure levers
The world is more attentive than we are to these sights and sounds, which shock parts of public opinion. It is possible to have a long theoretical discussion about the hypocrisy of the world, about the hidden anti-Semitism that is now bursting out, about the innocence and lack of understanding among entire audiences that we are not waging our war here, but also their war, and that what happened to us today – Hamas that became ISIS – will happen to them tomorrow too, if they continue to close their eyes and ignore reality.
Those who understand this well are the leaders. It is not for nothing that Israel enjoys such overwhelming support from all Western administrations, including in moderate Arab countries. But they also have public opinion, which they need to take into account. In an attempt to walk between the drops, they tell Israel this: Keep fighting in Gaza until Hamas is defeated. It's a worthy goal. But don't cause a humanitarian catastrophe that the world won't withstand, and that will force us to intervene or take you to the edge. Release some rope so you can continue using the stick.
Israel understands this. The public stomach, of course, says an automatic "no" to any relief, but it is clear to decision makers that we do not live in a vacuum. It is impossible to receive $14 billion from the Americans, and unprecedented political, military and public backing, and give nothing in return. The discussion now is about the details: what to give, and what to receive.
There are two immediate components on the agenda: abductees on one side and a humanitarian pause on the other. Israel wants to receive as many abductees as possible, Hamas wants to give as little as possible. Israel wants to accept the cases that hurt it the most: the children first, then the women and the elderly. Hamas will try to hold them in order to continue hurting and blackmailing us. Israel also wants lists: who Hamas is holding and how they are doing, who is alive and who has been killed. Hamas seeks to maintain as much ambiguity as possible in order to increase the public pressure that the families exert on the government.
The other side of this equation is in humanitarian aid to Gaza. Hamas wants as much as possible: food, water, fuel. Israel wants to give not as little as possible, but as much as necessary, and only for the civilian population. Therefore, it does not agree to bring fuel into the Gaza Strip, knowing that it will be used by Hamas to continue maintaining the tunnel network, which is its oxygen pipeline.
Israel wants to receive as many abductees as possible, Hamas wants to give as little as possible. Israel wants to accept the cases that hurt it the most: the children first, then the women and the elderly. Hamas will try to hold them in order to continue hurting and blackmailing them
Not only Israel and Hamas are preoccupied with this equation, but half the world. Qatar, which ostensibly serves as a mediator, but is an actor in every respect who fears that its Gaza protectorate will collapse, alongside Egypt, which fears a wave of refugees into its territory and the impact on its stability, and of course – any country that has citizens among the abductees. All these create complex levers at the edge, which act on both sides. It is likely that a partial formula will soon be found in which some of the abductees will be released in exchange for some momentary relief that will enable Gaza to acquire itself.
Israel should not fear such a move, nor similar moves that will happen in the future. It must agree to them on three conditions: first, that they serve the effort to bring the hostages home, which has been defined as one of the objectives of the war. The second is that they serve the war effort of defeating Hamas and toppling its rule, by buying Israel more time to continue fighting. And the third is that they will be momentary, that is, a pause, not a ceasefire.
No compassion, no responsibility
The offensive in Gaza alone cannot decide the battle. The full victory will be in Israel: in the rehabilitation of the envelope, and in the rehabilitation of its people (to the extent possible). In both of these, Israel continues to stutter. The delay in transferring money, the bureaucracy, the Jewish wars and the ego – all these are unnecessary sticks in the wheels.
In a civilized world, as early as October 8, the government would have decided on its own initiative to downsize. Get rid of all unnecessary ministers and ministries, and concentrate on work. Bring in all the Zionist parties, without politics. Barber less and do more. Work for the public, not for the chair.
Almost none of this happens. The government remains bloated and wasteful, with a host of unnecessary (and some of them harmful) ministers. There were parties left in the opposition that were supposed to lend a shoulder and chose not to. And our politicians don't keep their mouths shut, causing untold damage. First Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel with the wanton proposal to transfer the Gazans to Egypt, and this week Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu with the chatter about a possible nuclear attack in Gaza (in response to a particularly wanton question).
But the peak is the cowardly attitude towards those who paid the heaviest price. Hanoch Daum, not exactly a leftist, published this week his impressions of a visit to Be'eri refugees at the Dead Sea. He arrived there with Aviv Geffen and Udi Kagan, voluntarily of course, and met the disaster in full force: in every family killed or kidnapped or wounded, and sometimes all three together, and as a bonus also a burnt house.
Daum received a blow to the stomach when he heard that only five ministers had come to speak with them – Hili Tropper, Benny Gantz, Yoav Kish, Moshe Arbel and Yaakov Margi. You heard that right. Everyone else didn't see fit to get into the car we pay for, with the driver we pay for and the gas we pay for, and drive to Bari to look these people in the eye. Hold their hand. Hear, cry, be silent if necessary and speak when necessary.
They didn't do it, because they're afraid. Such are our elected officials: heroes on social media – and cowards in reality. Fortunately, there is a strong people here and a strong society that desires life, and a wonderful army that knows how to recover and turn a stinging blow into a powerful campaign that yields results. But even this does not obscure the sad reality that Israel has a hollow leadership that tries to fend off any criticism of it on the ridiculous claim that politics is not done in war.
The truth must be told: those who do politics are not those who criticize the government, but the ministers and Knesset members who do not do their jobs, who do not show compassion, who run away from responsibility. And all their words will not cover the simple and painful fact that the king is naked.
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