The citizens voted last Sunday with a forcefulness that astonishes. It is an event that, among other causes, touches squarely on the crisis of representation of Western democracies. It cannot be understood among us without paying attention to at least two phenomena.
First, the scientific-technological mutation that is shaking the entire planet with the irruption of social networks and the explosion of communication; Second, the catastrophe suffered by millions of compatriots mired in poverty and destitution, and a declining middle class. The paralysis of an economy driven by the irresponsibility of a corrupt populism.
The coincidence of the two phenomena is explosive. Javier Milei is a product of this society populated by smartphones that are common to rich and poor, to consumers and marginalized, a society that represents itself in a heartbeat and erodes the established parties that are no longer what they used to be: they find it difficult to understand the sudden emergence of these new agents of discontent. masters of the image and of this new type of communication.
Nor did its leaders foresee this radically individualistic display of expectations, its speed and the awakening of citizen autonomy in the face of electoral apparatuses and machinery.
With these instruments and some basic, simplifying ideas, extracted from the fertile strands of the liberal tradition, Javier Milei won practically all the electoral geography of the country with the exception of three provinces. Not only has a lone leader triumphed; A type of democracy is also emerging, the effects of which we still do not know.
We have been highlighting this for years: the dizzying and spontaneous development of a democracy of candidates isolated from the established system of political parties, who capture a legitimacy of origin in the elections. Positioned on the right and left, these candidates wear down the center of the political regime and upset old balances. They are also part of an international network guided by Trump and Bolsonaro.
Of course, Milei would not have won the presidency just because he reflected the digital society or this twilight of party democracy. He did more, when he assumed the role of angry and hostile mediator of a social anger. For this reason, Javier Milei is the product of the third economic collapse that our democracy suffers (the first was between 1989-1990 and the second between 2001-2002).
The Executive Branch, its Minister of Economy, governors, mayors, trade unionists, social movements, Kirchnerism in general, intervened in this collapse, sheltered in heaps under the frayed mantle of Peronism (obviously, it is not a definitive fact since Peronism has mended that shelter with profit on other occasions).
The collapse has been going on for more than a decade and accelerated in recent weeks at the impulse of Sergio Massa, a prototype of the demagogue with a lie on his back, who wanted to trap the citizen's conscience by squandering resources, inflicting more damage on a failing economy and betting that this fictitious reality would be credible.
The strategy failed, and the suffrage peacefully sanctioned what was truly judged negative or unhealthy. The poll watchers did their job, as did the judges and chambermaids who guaranteed us the free and transparent casting of the vote.
Does this mean that caste, as Milei calls it, has been left behind? Not at all. The current institutions, which we owe to Alberdi among others, with the partial renewals of both legislative chambers every two years in the first electoral round and the staggered election of governors give rise to a contradictory scenario: a candidate unknown in the previous presidential elections of 2019, who now conquered the highest percentage of votes in these forty years, it lacks a parliamentary majority and political support at the federal level, particularly in the province of Buenos Aires.
Reasonably, this arrangement of powers, as it results from the combination of republic and democracy, could inspire policies of negotiation and consensus to support, as proclaimed, the change and reconstruction of a battered nation.
Some guideline to untangle this skein is provided these days by Mauricio Macri, who seems determined to fracture the Together for Change bloc and previously added fuel to the fire so that that coalition, which seemed destined for a certain victory, would wear itself out in an incomprehensible intestinal antagonism.
Javier Milei is also a product of that harrowing dispute. He reaped two fruits: from Massa, who pushed him to weaken Cambiemos; on Macri's part, which now enthrones him as an agent of change that he, he confessed, could not make.
This is where we are, witnessing an intrigue of beloved and unexpected effects that, in the end, favored Milei and open up serious questions. These are questions that confront us with questions about the governability of a democracy that, despite the time that has elapsed, has not been able to turn around this midwifery decline of so many frustrations.
Governability is an immediate challenge that results from the intersection of three powers: the power of the vote and public opinion that support Milei; institutional power, which restricts electoral support; and the power of the street or the direct participation of active minorities who hold subsidies.
In one case, the president will have to consolidate his leadership; in the second, in the context of an inevitable shock policy, laws will have to be passed and legislative majorities will have to be forged; in the third, the government's ability to regain control of public space and reaffirm the principle of authority without blind and ultimately inappropriate repression will be at stake.
Thus begins a period full of promises and signs of a storm, in which, we trust, democracy will continue to prevail.
Natalio R. Botana is a political scientist and historian. Professor Emeritus at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.