"Tomorrow the inauguration ceremony of the underground barrier in Gaza will take place. An important project that has also proven itself in Guardian of the Walls. The IDF opposed this project, like Iron Dome, and wanted the money for the attack. Netanyahu pushed him against their position. It was wrong not to invite him to the event, there are a few more hours to fix."
This amazing announcement was published by Yedioth Ahronoth's military correspondent, Yossi Yehoshua, exactly two years ago, on 6 December 12. Jabotinsky's "iron wall" was replaced by an actual concrete wall, which cost about NIS 21 billion. Hamas has indeed despaired of invading Israel through tunnels. How it ended in the end - everyone knows.
The mocking perspective is honored in its place, but it misses an important detail: the need for legitimacy. It is common to talk about legitimacy mainly from its international perspective, meaning that Israel needs a green light from the international community, or at least from the United States, in order to wage a will-or-cease war against Hamas.
But more than the external one, Israel needs internal legitimacy. It needs reservists who agree to fight for a long period of time, a home front that will agree to absorb a long period, civilians who agree to aggressive fighting on their behalf, and a political system that will agree to try to swallow the disagreements in order to remain united in the campaign. Unfortunately, we couldn't get that before October 7.
Only the horror revealed that damn morning gave us the patience to grit our teeth and created a wall-to-wall consensus: there was no choice. We were not able to embark on this campaign before – not because of America, but because of us. Of course, we knew what Hamas was worth and what it wanted to do, but as long as it seemed to us to be nothing more than a nuisance, we couldn't find the justification for launching an all-out campaign, with all the costs involved.
Without abductees to return, without communities to rehabilitate, without the shock and anger of this brutal attack – we did not have the resilience to pay the price. Not only the heavy and terrible price in blood, but also the economic and psychological price. The government would have been accused of going to war for political purposes, and in such a situation, even President Biden's most pro-Israel statement could not have given Israel the legitimacy it needs.
Israel needs internal legitimacy. It needs reservists who will agree to fight for a long period of time, a home front that will agree to absorb a long period, civilians who will agree to aggressive fighting on their behalf, and a political system that will agree to try to swallow the disagreements in order to remain united in the campaign
The problem with preventive war is that it has to be proven. It is difficult to prove that a catastrophe would have occurred if we had not taken one action or another. If, for example, they had listened to Nahal Oz's spotters or that wise officer from 8200, the matter would have been closed with a meager internal ceremony and a commander who says they "prevented a major disaster." The public was yawning. Only when a major disaster is not averted do we realize in retrospect how much it was worthwhile to fight to prevent it, and it is always too late.
There isn't a single Israeli who wouldn't go back in a time machine to October 6. Armed with knowledge from the future, we would go out full of confidence to strike Hamas. Unfortunately, the war in Gaza is apparently not the last security challenge that Israel will face, and the question is only whether we will be wise enough to mobilize internal legitimacy for significant moves even before disaster strikes.
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