In 2012, when Benny Gantz served as chief of staff and as soldiers' ombudsman, I received very serious complaints from observers about the inappropriate conditions in which they live in outposts, conditions that severely impair their operational capability.
IDF Spokesperson
I decided to go out and check on them with my own eyes, and for a month I visited almost all the observation posts in all sectors along Israel's borders, four hours at each post. I spoke with the observers, their commanders and commanders, and I saw the appalling conditions in which they lived, and I heard serious things that were beneath all criticism.
A shortage of observers according to the standards led to overtime work hours beyond what was allowed; Some of them had bladder infections because they had no replacements, and they sat for many hours in front of the screen unable to evacuate. They suffered severe back pain from sitting for long hours every day and all day on broken chairs. The minimal living conditions were also unfavorable: the showers were broken with no possibility of bathing in them; The windows in the living quarters were dismantled from their hinges, and sometimes there were no doors and air conditioners in the hottest places. The spotters preferred to sleep in a club on the floor at leisure.
Nahal Oz's observation room reopened, Photo: IDF Spokesperson
The regular battalions, which change once every six months, assumed administrative responsibility for the spotters in their sector, but did not provide them with their elementary needs, including cooked food. I found a very serious impairment in the operational ability of the observers.
A situation of lack of motivation was created to serve in an observer role due to the difficult and unacceptable conditions. Many of them preferred to be imprisoned rather than serve as an observer. I found that the observers, who are the eyes of the state, cannot provide what is required of them.
After seeing the collapse of the observation system, I issued a document to then-IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Naveh, and the army generals regarding the serious problems at the observation posts and the way I recommend dealing with them. I was summoned to a meeting by the General Staff, the Chief of Staff and the generals, and presented them with the difficult problems and my recommendations for solving them.
Hamas terrorists at the entrance to the gate of Kibbutz Kfar Azza, photo: AP.
The deputy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, said at the hearing that he was ashamed to hear that this was the situation in the observation system and even claimed that he would not send his daughter to serve under such conditions as an observer. He added that he accepted to improve the situation. Over the course of six months, the army corrected the failures by hundreds of thousands of shekels under the responsibility of the deputy chief of staff, according to my recommendations. The commanders of the observation posts called me to meet with them to thank me for my activity in rehabilitating the observation system.
Reckless conduct of junior commanders
Although they invested in correcting the failures I pointed out in the observation system, after a short time the situation began to deteriorate again. The dysfunction is clearly evident, especially in the wanton conduct of junior and senior commanders who did not respond adequately to the observation report, just as happened in the recent "ironclad" sword war in the Gaza envelope. These commanders have exceeded their duties and the public's trust in them, and therefore they must immediately take off their uniforms and leave the army before the war is over.
This sick evil shows the extent to which the ills of the IDF's organizational culture have become entrenched: there is a lack of operational discipline; Facts are ignored; think according to an analysis of the enemy's intentions, not according to his capabilities; The military organization does not learn. Organizational conduct under all criticism: no control and monitoring; No application to lessons; The investigations are not credible; There is a culture of lying and hiding the truth; There is a fear of expressing criticism lest you be swallowed up and lose your promotion; there is no functional continuity on routine days; New commanders do what they understand and reinvent the wheel, and they often change the direction of their predecessors.
Hamas terrorists crossing the border fence with Gaza, photo: Reuters
In this way, it is impossible to build a wall and prepare for the next multi-front war. Due to the faulty organizational culture, there is neither supervision and monitoring nor maintenance and handling of projects that have invested hundreds of millions of shekels (and sometimes even more).
The war currently being waged in Gaza, in which we see acts of heroism, fighting spirit, dedication to the mission and even many successes in cooperation between the land, air and naval forces, we all pray for its success: the release of the hostages and the overthrow of the Hamas regime. This war does not at all indicate the army's readiness for a multi-front war whose complexity and challenges will far exceed the fighting in Gaza.
The attempt by some military commentators to present the army as a body capable of dealing with any challenge it faces, including a multi-front war, is meaningless. Their foolish, irresponsible and sand-throwing experience in the public eye is based on commentators turned court reporters, who are frequently joined by debate members and retired generals on television channels.
Hamas terrorists breach the border fence with Gaza, photo: Arab networks
These are exactly the same reporters, commentators and retired generals who threw dust in people's eyes for many years and told the public that the IDF is strong and deterrent, and that there is no danger to the State of Israel until the war broke out in the communities near the Gaza Strip and in the Gaza Strip. These same commentators regard this terrible incident as a one-time mishap, and not something deeply ingrained in the army's genes, and continue to deceive the public even after the great disgrace of the political and security echelons since the establishment of the state some 75 years ago with the surprise of an "iron swords" war.
They say that we have a strong army that will meet the challenges of the future even in a multi-front war, and completely ignore the significance of the incident in the Gaza envelope and the very harsh reports of me and my friends adopted by the political and security echelons. They also ignore very harsh criticisms by the State Comptroller, the State Comptroller, the Defense Establishment Comptroller, and the IDF Comptroller that the army is not prepared for a multi-front war.
Creating an illusion in the eyes of the public will once again lead it and its leaders to apathy and lack of the necessary correction at the political and security echelons. If we do not correct what is necessary, we will suddenly find ourselves in the future that the enemy will strike us a blow that will cost us tens of times more than the terrible blow we received in the Gaza envelope.
Establishment of a team of experts
Two years ago, I established five teams of experts under the auspices of Reichman University, and the main partner in our work is Professor Boaz Ganor, who at the time was the head of the university's terrorism institute, and today serves as president of the university.
The five teams I established dealt with these areas: strategic security policy and security concepts that have not been updated since Ben-Gurion's time, the ground army's preparedness for a multi-front war that threatens to turn into a regional war.
Reference to the size of the order of forces, since in the last twenty years the ground army has been cut by thousands of tanks, artillery battalions, engineering battalions, regional brigades, intelligence unit battalions, and the list goes on. With all this, during those years the enemy grew tens of times stronger around our borders. The team found very serious gaps in our ability to defend and attack.
IDF soldiers near the fence with Gaza (archive), photo: AFP
The preparedness of the home front for war. The team showed very serious failures in preparing the home front for war (State Comptroller reports also warned about this), both in terms of preparing local authorities and cities for war against thousands of missiles, rockets and drones that will be launched daily on the Israeli home front, and in terms of conducting the war.
The army's readiness to defend the residents of Israel against the thousands of heavy and accurate missiles, rockets and drones that will be launched at the Israeli home front. The team also tested our ability to attack those enemy missile launchers and found very large gaps in the IDF's readiness to provide a defensive and offensive response.
The IDF's organizational culture, which over the years has become a broken culture. Organizational culture is the foundation of building a house, and when they are cracked and crumbling, it is impossible to build the house.
Finally, the report of the five expert teams I established under the auspices of Reichman University was submitted about a year ago to the Prime Minister, the National Security Council, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Minister of Defense, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of Staff. We were not satisfied only with submitting the report, which contained facts, conclusions and recommendations for a solution, but Prof. Boaz Ganor, myself and the team leaders met face-to-face with senior political and security officials, and presented them with the report in meetings that sometimes lasted about two hours.
The Chief of Staff with IDF soldiers, photo: IDF Spokesperson
The defense minister and the chief of staff adopted the report and even began staff work to implement our recommendations, and there is no longer any argument between me and the decision-making echelons. Now it remains to advance quickly the solutions recommended in the report and prepare the army as quickly as possible for the next multi-front war that will come sooner or later.
It is worth remembering that the war in Gaza is a drop in the ocean compared to the challenges of tomorrow that the IDF will face in the next multi-front war for which it is not prepared.
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