One of the disturbing insights I formulated as chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee was that Israel "has impressive tactical capabilities, but it repeatedly mistakenly thinks that this is an adequate alternative to the lack of a national strategy."
For more than a quarter of a century, Iran has been trying to establish military forces in various territories, in an attempt to create a mortal and paralyzing strike capability against Israel. Alongside the effort to acquire unconventional military capabilities, Iran is building conventional capabilities in the region, through proxies, which, when ripening, will enable the provision of fire strikes with cumulative effectiveness, which mimics the results of a nuclear strike. Israel's response to this orderly Iranian strategy is a partial sequence of tactical actions that attempt to "postpone the end" and cover up the lack of adoption of a counter-geopolitical strategy. This was the case until October 7, and so there is concern that it will be on our northern border.
Is this the time for a change in the strategic reality in the north? Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, photo: AFP
About a decade ago, Israel decided to act on the Syrian front to thwart the entrenchment of the Iranian axis, in what later became known as the "campaign between wars." It took only tactical actions, without attempting to influence the shaping of Syria's governmental system. In Lebanon and Gaza, it gave up even continuous tactical activity, and made an irresponsible decision to allow the buildup of a significant military force and turn terrorist organizations into terrorist armies.
In Gaza, we assumed that the Iron Dome system provided a response to the missile threats, while intelligence was supposed to identify the ground invasion and the smart fence was supposed to stop. On 7 October, this response collapsed, resulting in the loss of some 1200 Israeli lives. This collapse significantly damaged the deterrence component and Israel's standing in the region.
The destruction in the communities near the Gaza Strip after the massacre of Hamas terrorists on October 7, Photo: Hanan Greenwood
In Lebanon, we borrowed time over the past decade, just as money was borrowed on the grey market. We had to initiate an offensive operation against Hezbollah's capabilities while it was mired in the Syrian mud, and maintain it at the level of tactical threat. Leadership laxity and military shortsightedness led to an ongoing decision not to act, and to consuate the establishment of significant military capabilities with almost no hindrance. In literary parlance, this could be called the "Israeli March of Folly." Instead of taking preventive action, we adopted the thesis that the balance of terror vis-à-vis Hezbollah will ultimately "rust" the terrorist organization's missile arsenal, and therefore there is no need to take proactive steps and pay a price.
At the same time, we took a geopolitical gamble that there could be no bloody alliance between Hezbollah and Hamas, and therefore it is unlikely that Israel will have to contend with both fronts at high intensity. This strategy, although seemingly no longer popular, nests deep in the minds of many good people to this day. They are still willing to accept the situation in which the Iranians will have the right to choose the manner and time of realizing the capabilities they have accumulated in Lebanon.
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, photo: uncredited
Leadership conceptual change
The defeat we suffered on 7 October in the Gaza envelope seemingly fractured anachronistic political perceptions. Israel is learning firsthand the price of giving up the "preventive strike" tool, and the price of doubting the idea of convergence of fronts. It needs to understand how limited the results of focusing investments on "intent predictive technology" and developing defense capabilities alone are. This requires first and foremost a change in leadership concepts, and the formulation of steps based on strategic proactivity, rather than tactical ones.
The challenge in the north presents Israel with a dilemma: Is this the time to change the strategic reality in Lebanon, as the leadership promised at the beginning of the war, or will it be deterred and settle for a tactical achievement in the areas near the border?
Hamas' success has created a perception among the Israeli public that the main strategic problem on the northern border is the Radwan force, which will invade communities near the border. Distancing the Radwan force from line zero of the border would be a tactical achievement, especially in light of the IDF's lessons learned from the events surrounding the Gaza Strip. But the most significant threat from the north is actually the ability to fire from rockets and missiles found in Lebanon. A threat that Israel continues to contain, and which will not be harmed even if there is a tactical withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani River.
Documentation: Direct hit by anti-tank missiles in the north
In other words, the balance of terror in the north will not change, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible for the refugees of the north to return to their homes. Paradoxically, it will allow Iran to maintain capabilities for a future fire strike, even though it seemed that Israel was changing the rules of the game in the Middle East, and even though the United States stood by us practically and militarily.
Israel may once again find itself relishing a tactical achievement, while the Iranians will once again continue to establish strategic strengths, and the day is not far off when they will be turned against us.
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