At any other time, the conflict in the north with Hezbollah would have developed into all-out war. But Israel, in coordination with or under Washington's guidance, has chosen an inclusive policy combined with measured responses. The handling of the northern front will wait for the day after Gaza, if at all. Hezbollah can be pleased – the organization earns points for aiding Hamas as part of its partnership in the "resistance camp," while at the same time keeping Israel deterred, knowing that it has no intention of opening a second front.
Does the Shiite terrorist organization have an interest in war? The answer is no. First, because of the internal Lebanese crisis, along with strong criticism of Hezbollah's actions on the northern front and opposition to its provocation of the IDF. Second, a war between Israel and Hezbollah is not in Iran's interest – at least not at this stage. So where is Nasrallah striving and what is the strategy guiding him? The answers are in the pages of history.
In the spring of 1967, Gamal Abdel Nasser's situation was dire. Egypt has reached a state of overpopulation with 29.5 million people. She was poor and very sick. The average life expectancy for an Egyptian man was 35 years. On the foreign front, Egypt also had no successes – the pan-Arab idea failed after the dissolution of unity with Syria, and nearly 70,1952 Egyptian soldiers were mired in a dud war in Yemen. The vision of progress of the Free Officers' Coup in <> was a mirage.
Nasser needed a victory, an achievement that would sustain his standing in Egypt and the Arab world. To help the depressed president, his advisers pulled an old plan out of the drawer: Egypt would send military forces into Sinai, expel the international monitoring force, and exercise full sovereignty there, violating the status quo with Israel reached through unwritten understandings in 1957. If Israel attacks Egypt, "we will be portrayed as a victim and receive broad Arab and international support," Nasser's associates claimed. And if Israel decides not to attack, they explained, "the profit is all ours - the Egyptian army will return to Sinai and we will win the war without firing a single shot."
Nasser followed the advice, but went one step too far. On June 5, 1967, everything turned upside down on him, leaving him without Sinai and without an army. In recent years, Hezbollah has been the focus of Lebanese attention, and not for the better. The official unemployment estimate is 14.8 per cent, more than a third of the country's population lives below the poverty line, 1.5 million Syrian refugees are straining the collapsing economy, and more than 60,8 residents of villages and towns in southern Lebanon have evacuated since <> October due to fighting with Israel. Add to this a paralyzed political system and the fact that there is no one in Lebanon who does not understand that Hezbollah is more loyal to Iran.
What tempts Nasrallah more than anything else is the discourse on the possibility of border repairs between Israel and Lebanon. Hence, if a diplomatic solution is found that leads to Israeli territorial concessions, Hezbollah's status will skyrocket
Nasrallah needs victory – and quickly, in order to prove that Hezbollah is still the "defender of Lebanon," that it has Lebanese interests in mind and that only it can make achievements against Israel. So far, Hezbollah has walked the threshold between fighting and war, announcing that the choice of whether to start an all-out conflict is in Israel's hands. But walking on the edge of a precipice can slip and fall. For this reason, Nasrallah left an opening for negotiations in his last speech: "We face a real opportunity to liberate every inch of our Lebanese land, and prevent the enemy from violating our borders and airspace."
This means that Nasrallah both shoots and speaks, threatening but attentive to the sentiments of the Lebanese public. He is aware of the American-French attempts to calm the situation, and what tempts him most is the discourse on the possibility of border repairs between Israel and Lebanon. Therefore, if a diplomatic solution is found that leads to Israeli territorial concessions, Hezbollah's status will skyrocket, and it will win a victory over Israel and completely change the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East arena. He will cement his status as the only one capable of dealing with Israel and managing a balance of terror against it, will be encouraged to bring about a political revolution in Lebanon, and will finally raise the question in the minds of the other neighbors: Is Israel still a regional power?
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