As in every year since the Yom Kippur War, in the Jubilee year we will focus excitedly on revealing an archive, drift into cycles of self-flagellation for everything we sinned that led to the "omission", tell the stories of battles and the heroism of the fighters, shift blame on those who this year seem more guilty, Golda Meir or Moshe Dayan, and read an interview with the chief of staff or head of Military Intelligence who will try to assure the public that the lessons of the failure have been learned. Meanwhile, in all these 50 years, we have not looked at anything beyond what happened then, a scrutinizing look at what the war did to Israeli society.
Throughout the years, we have not had time or attention to such a look. In the tenth year of the war we sank into the tangle of the First Lebanon War, in the 20th year we were caught up in the controversy of the Oslo Accords, and these days, with the struggles of legal reform, great anxiety envelops us for the future of the country. Nonetheless, it takes a closer look at the trends that the war has wrought, the way it envelops us in a cloud of national complexes that should have long been observed and dealt with.
Remarks by the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the Head of Military Intelligence at the Intelligence Directorate Assembly Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Yom Kippur War || Photo: Yaniv Zohar
To a large extent, this is the perspective offered by a new book edited by Gideon Avital-Epstein, "Day of Command," in a broad collection of essays focusing on what happened to us politically, culturally, and militarily before, during, and after the war. In all this, one central issue consciously shaped national consciousness, and it involves the fateful question – was war really inevitable?
Kipnis' claim
In his article in this book, historian Yigal Kipnis continues a personal line of research on the challenging claim that the war could have been avoided. According to him, if only Golda Meir's government had acceded to the proposals for arrangements mediated by Egyptian President Sadat in the year preceding October 1973, the war could indeed have been avoided. The clarification of this issue has wide-ranging implications for the political conduct of the Israeli leadership ever since.
Kipnis substantiated this claim in his book "1973: The Road to War," in his description of the political process in February-May 1973 in Golda Meir's rejection of the Egyptian "peace proposal." In the story he tells, the Israeli government becomes responsible for the outbreak of the war. True, already with the ceasefire, at the end of October 1973, the national leadership was blamed for the outbreak of the war, for failing, in the face of signs of war, to make the necessary preliminary preparations – such as mobilizing the reserves – but Kipnis' claim is a much more serious culpability in the consciousness of memory.
Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan during a visit to the base in the Golan, Photo: Ron Frenkel/GPO
She points to the national leadership, especially Golda Meir, as directly responsible for the outbreak of the war. Since the publication of his book, Kipnis' argument has been featured in every discussion of the war and has gained influence. If indeed the peace agreement reached at Camp David in 1979 could have been reached under the same conditions even before the war, in a way that could have saved its price, then it is a heavy accusation. Prof. Dan Schifften dealt with Kipnis' claim from its first presentation, and continues to deal with it in another study that is due to be published these days.
Schifften vehemently rejects and refutes the historical basis for Kipnis' claim. According to him, Sadat's "peace proposal" in its last version before the war, in February 1973, bore no resemblance to the commitment to peace that Sadat was willing to accept only after the war and the internalization of its results. It is true that Egyptian President Sadat has been in contact with the American administration since the beginning of 1973 and submitted proposals for an arrangement with Israel, but the proposals did not give it its demand for a real return for the withdrawal. In a detailed analysis, Schifften explains how and why "Sadat needed a war, without which his strategy would have had no chance."
The Yom Kippur War in the Sinai sector, photo: GettyImages
As he declared: "War was necessary to ensure the success of political activity..." Although Kipnis' claim is historically controversial, it has been adopted by elements in the US administration and assimilated into the public discourse to leverage support for all other peace processes, such as the peace agreement with Syria, which from the outset involved agreeing to a full withdrawal from the Golan. The argument made it clear that if in the end what was achieved in a post-war agreement could be achieved in a peace agreement even before the war, then the lesson of the Yom Kippur War should teach that it is right for the state to give up in advance in any negotiations and save the price of war.
This claim was explicitly presented by Ehud Barak both when he was prime minister and later when he was defense minister in 2013-2007. This argument, based on its logic, appeared again and again in the face of any political agreement that involved a demand for a political concession, such as the government's agreement in September 2022 on the issue of the maritime border with Lebanon. This is an influential national complex that deserves a critical look. At the same time, similar issues of substance are awaited.
Sadat's goal
But the sober and profound manner in which the Egyptian president defined the purpose of the war offers a starting point for a comprehensive look at the overt and covert trends that have been shaking and cracking the foundations of society ever since.
That was the purpose of the war in its formulation in a directive given by Anwar Sadat to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on October 1, 1973: "The strategic objective that I hereby set for the Egyptian armed forces... This can be marked by the language: to undermine the doctrine of security by carrying out military action in accordance with the possibilities of the armed forces, with the aim of inflicting the heaviest losses on the enemy... In the long run, undermining security doctrine may bring about changes that, when followed by one another, will lead to a fundamental change in the enemy's thinking, morale and aggressive tendencies."
IDF soldiers take cover during the Yom Kippur War, in the northern sector, Photo: Zeev Spector / GPO
In the history of wars, guiding such a goal is unique. For Israelis, it invites a deep and broad look at everything that the war has brought about – in its overt and covert tendencies – not only to the concept of security, but also to what it has done to the roots of the Zionist ethos and the Israeli consciousness of existence.
The roots of the crisis that has been raging in the streets since the rise of the right-wing government in December 2023 can also be traced back to the long-term upheaval that President Sadat sought to cause.
The achievement at the end of the war ended in a significant victory. To this day, the world studies the IDF's battles in depth. However, when it comes to the story of the war, by looking at what it did to the country, society has avoided an open and comprehensive confrontation with its consequences. It is precisely out of the tangle of problems that Israel is trapped in today with no way out that it needs a new look at the war.
Wrong? We'll fix it! If you find a mistake in the article, please share with us