At a time when an attack was pursuing an attack in the West Bank, it mistakenly seemed that the message of quiet and calm would emerge from Gaza, and that the strategic goal set for itself by Israel – to separate Gaza from the West Bank, in terms of two areas or even two entities, each with its own logic and conduct – was achieved.
However, contrary to Israel's assessments and hopes, and seemingly against all logic, the quiet on the Gaza border was once again violated. In the meantime, this is a controlled fire, behind which Hamas clearly wants to keep the flames high. But past experience shows that this is not enough, and when you play with fire, it can also erupt into a broad conflict.
In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority lacks control, and the frequent terrorist attacks in this area are often the work of lone terrorists who have no guiding and organizing hand behind them. In Gaza, as we know, the picture is different. There is a landlord in it, Hamas, who wants to keep quiet and whose will is violated. After all, someone has to bring the masses of demonstrators to the border fence, and someone also has to allow, and even before that, organize and equip, the terrorist squads on their way to launch incendiary balloons or fire at IDF posts.
The events on the Gaza border raise questions above the assumption that Hamas has something to lose by playing with fire and that it is attentive to the sentiments of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip, which is crying out for quiet and calm. Perhaps Hamas actually believes that the way to consolidate its status in the Gaza Strip and ensure the welfare of the population actually requires playing with fire and not necessarily maintaining calm, as Israel wants and the Palestinian Authority does in the West Bank.
It is commonly claimed that it was the Lebanese Hezbollah organization that inspired and emulated Hamas in everything related to how to deal with Israel, whether digging terror tunnels along the border and abducting soldiers for bargaining purposes, or building an arsenal of long-range missiles that could deter Israel. However, it seems that Hamas is actually choosing to follow in the footsteps of the crime families in the Arab sector, whose path is one of violence and protection, and is learning from them how to deal with Israel in order to get what it wants out of it.
Hamas does not really want to change its skin and abandon the path of struggle and terror against Israel. But he wants to preserve and improve the cash flow, which Qatar transfers to him under Israel's half-closed eyes, and perhaps also ease Israel's closure of Gaza. The way, therefore, is to threaten and harm whenever something is not to his satisfaction or he thinks he can improve the conditions he receives in exchange for the quiet he gives us.
Israel's tendency to close the matter quickly and not respond aggressively only encourages Hamas to continue its efforts and raise its demands, thereby shortening the periods of quiet between escalation and escalation
This is the logic that guides Hamas, and this is its way of conducting, and it seems that it always has been. Frankly, playing with fire for him is a safe bet, since he perceives Israel as deterred, as evidenced by the IDF's restraint in responding to the escalation in the south.
It can be assumed that the limited round of confrontation on the Gaza border will end in the near future. Hamas will get its way, more money from Qatar and perhaps additional benefits and concessions, and quiet will return to Gaza until next time, which will not be late in coming. After all, contrary to Israel's hope that Hamas will act as a state entity, it behaves like a crime family that pockets protection money, but does not really change its path. In truth, Israel's tendency to close the matter quickly and not respond aggressively only encourages Hamas to continue its mission and raise its demands, thereby shortening the periods of quiet between escalation and escalation.
Hamas is not deterred and is willing to play with fire. The bottom line is that understandings and agreements based on payment of protection fees to Hamas do not really solve the problem in the south, nor do they put Hamas on a path of moderation that will eventually turn it into a partner for Israel. The next round of confrontation on the Gaza border is therefore a question of time.
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