"We do not want escalation and we do not aspire to fighting, but if we are required to do so, we will not hesitate to act forcefully" – this is the essence of the message that Defense Minister Yoav Galant sought to convey to the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip in remarks he made this week on the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War.
In the background of this warning is the escalation of friction and riots at the border fence between Israel and the Gaza Strip, directed by Hamas. While Galant was speaking, the Shin Bet distributed another one of his messages that became part of our daily routine. This time for exposing a terrorist network that operated in Israel and Judea and Samaria and planned to carry out terrorist attacks. In this case, Iranian officials instructed them.
Preparing for escalation: IDF forces on the Gaza Strip border // Yaniv Zohar
This announcement landed on the desks of the communication systems even before the ink dried from the series of announcements over the past month. It was preceded by: an announcement about the seizure of detonators and standard explosives at the Kerem Shalom crossing during an attempt to smuggle them into Judea and Samaria, apparently by Hamas elements in the Gaza Strip; a report on the exposure of a network involved in smuggling weapons from Jordan for use by terrorist elements in the West Bank; and the publication of the exposure of a network of smugglers in Israel, which operated in the service of Hezbollah, and among other things, was supposed to receive weapons manufactured abroad and transfer them for use by various elements in our territory.
No adventure
The collection of these announcements, which no longer includes many incidents that are perceived as part of the security routine, illustrates the magnitude of the immediate challenge facing the defense establishment. Israel's adversaries invest great efforts in building terrorist infrastructures, equipping them with a variety of weapons, and preparing them for attacks and other missions.
Terrorists from the Hamas terrorist organization, photo: Majdi Fathi/TPS
The effort is carried out through various channels by many elements: Iranians, Hezbollah operatives, Hamas and Jihad operatives. It is managed from several arenas: Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza, Judea and Samaria, vis-à-vis Palestinians from Judea and Samaria and Gaza, and Israeli Arab elements. All this is happening in addition to local initiatives and inspired attacks that do not take place under the direct direction of the establishment elements, but are influenced by the incitement and the general atmosphere they seek to create.
Galant's statement reflects Israel's interest in avoiding escalation. Indeed, as long as it is not necessary, Israel has no interest in embarking on a military adventure in the Gaza Strip or Lebanon. The prospect of limited military confrontations in these arenas does not necessarily justify their security, economic, and political costs. To this it should be added that diverting attention and energies to these arenas will come at the expense of the necessary efforts vis-à-vis Iran, and at the very least will not help the regional ties that are being forged at this time.
This is also understood in Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon, and hence the challenge facing the political echelon in Israel: how to prevent the adversaries from interpreting this set of considerations by Israel as an opportune time for them. In other words: how to get them to restrain their activities, without being dragged into a military confrontation.
Security policy relies on basic deterrence between Israel and its adversaries. Added to this is a layer of defense, prevention, and preventive efforts, and nonviolent levers such as economic or political pressure.
The forces on the ground. fear of escalation,
These efforts achieve not low effectiveness, but are not enough to undermine motivation and strengthen deterrence. Moreover, efforts are routinely directed at immediate dangers and not against capabilities and infrastructure in Gaza or Lebanon.
The utility of political or economic leverage is also quite limited when it comes to Gaza or Lebanon. While the adversaries' system of considerations does not ignore the interests in these areas, it assumes that Israel's use of this will be limited in time or scope, and therefore the effectiveness Israel achieves with these tools is quite limited, regardless of the current reality.
Re-examination
The defense establishment would do well to reexamine its perception of the balance of profit and loss from the entry into Israel of thousands of Gazans every day, especially in light of the desire of senior Hamas figures in Gaza to incite terror in and out of the West Bank. In any case, this is not the answer to the Israeli dilemma.
Minister of Defense at the 22nd Annual Conference of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism Policy, Photo: Gideon Markowitz
What else can be done to strengthen deterrence and cause the snake leaders to conquer their appetite for Israel? Without going into details, it seems to me that it is right to increase Israel's offensive efforts with a low profile. First and foremost against the perpetrators of terror. The risks of this course of action are clear and therefore preparations must also be made for a possible deterioration, but the deterrent benefit from it is undeniable.
The writer is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem and former head of the National Security Council
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