Over the past decade, Israel has refrained from fighting its enemies and has chosen to wage a campaign between wars against them. The achievements and successes of the war, and there were undoubtedly such, gave us the feeling, which later turned out to be mistaken, that we had the upper hand – operationally and intelligence-wise – and that the campaign preserves and strengthens our security and even deters our enemies.
The campaign was a collection of operations, mostly clandestine, that consisted mainly of targeted killings and targeted airstrikes on enemy targets, mostly in the Syrian arena but also on Iranian soil. The concept was originally intended to delay Hezbollah and Hamas' military buildup and Iran's transformation into a nuclear power.
After all, the story of the campaign is one of exploiting success and exploiting an opportunity that came our way in the Syrian arena with the outbreak of the civil war in that country. It seems that we preferred to look for the coin under the Syrian flashlight, and chose to ignore and not act in the face of what was happening inside Gaza and Lebanon. No wonder the campaign in Syria has become the best show in the city
The civil war in Syria has opened a window of opportunity for Israel to attack Syria without fear, as in the past, of the Syrian regime's reaction. The targets attacked were mostly arms shipments transferred from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. When Israel saw that it was good and that no one stood in its way, the attacks were extended to Iranian targets or those that served the Shiite militias sent by Tehran to Syria. These attacks are intended to sabotage Iran's attempt to hold on to Syrian soil.
The logic underlying the idea was clear. Israel was not interested in being dragged into an all-out war, and therefore preferred to keep a low profile and refrained from accepting responsibility for its attacks, assuming that this would make it easier for the enemy to avoid responding to these attacks. More importantly, this was a sequence of isolated and limited operations over months or even years, rather than a systematic campaign of high intensity.
But we didn't see the forest because of the trees, and instead of thinking in terms of a war that we should wage against the enemy, we perceived the struggle against the enemy as a chain of specific operations by special forces, as if such operations were the façade of everything. This thinking has a place when it comes to an elite unit sent on a limited covert operation. But when an entire army, and when the entire country moves to think in such terms, in terms of warfare, there is a fear that they will forget the big picture, forget that they must wage war against the enemy and even how to wage such a war.
There is no doubt that we fell in love with the war, we were deceived by the spectacular and astonishing successes of those operations, assassinations and attacks attributed to Israel over the years, but we forgot the main thing.
The campaign did not prevent the strengthening of Hamas and Hezbollah. And so, while we were basking in successful attacks on Syrian soil in the face of a Syrian regime that was barely standing on its feet, these two terrorist organizations turned into monsters with tens of thousands of missiles and a skilled fighting force – Hamas's Nukhba and Hezbollah's Radwan Force.
After all, the story of the campaign is one of exploiting success and exploiting an opportunity that came our way in the Syrian arena with the outbreak of the civil war in that country. It seems that we preferred to look for the coin under the Syrian flashlight, and chose to ignore and not act in the face of what was happening inside Gaza and Lebanon. No wonder the campaign in Syria has become the best show in town. Our activity ceased to be secret, since Israeli leaders and commanders made it public and boasted about it at every opportunity, and it also seemed that at least in Syria it was bringing results – halting the Iranian attempt to hold on to Syria, even though it did not prevent Hezbollah's buildup.
Thus, under the cover of the illusion that the war war on Syrian soil is the solution to Israel's fundamental problems, the threats we faced increased. Hamas and Hezbollah, seemingly deterred and beaten, have stepped up power and power.
The campaign is an example of creative and proactive thinking, the ability to seize an opportunity and demonstrate operational and intelligence capabilities. But when warfare becomes the main thing and its underlying logic becomes what guides our strategic conduct vis-à-vis the enemy, the result is the shock and surprise that gripped us on October 7.
Wrong? We'll fix it! If you find a mistake in the article, please share with us