Is the case of Israel in 1982 in Lebanon about to repeat itself in Gaza? Operation Peace for Galilee began with broad public consensus. Following rounds of fighting in the summer of 1981, during which more than 1,200 rockets were fired from Lebanon at northern Israeli communities, the Israeli government understood that the situation could not be accepted. The war plans came out of the drawer, and a year later the pretext for the attack was the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to London.
The Begin government decided to put an end to Palestinian terrorism from Lebanon, and won both the support of the opposition, headed by Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, and the public. Only the Hadash party stood by and condemned the move. On June 6, 1982, the military operation began, with high hopes for the elimination of terrorism and the creation of a "new order" in the Land of the Cedars.
"It is good and pleasant to live in the State of Israel and to go through moments like this," MK Mordechai Ben-Porat (Telam Party) said in a Knesset session on June 8, 1982, the second day of the operation, "when 99.5 percent of the people identify with the government, the army and the security services. These are great days, which this nation does not always go through."
But as the operation continued and its objectives became more ambiguous, and the more pointless the war seemed, the more the public and its elected officials changed their minds. From a war of sweeping agreement, Operation Peace for Galilee became a national trauma and gained the currency of tongue - the Lebanese mud. Israel finally withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000, 18 years after that invasion, but Lebanon never left Israel.
The Iron Sword War is one of the most justified that Israel has fought since its inception. From a divided and divided public, the people of Israel became united and imbued with purpose after Hamas' murderous surprise attack. The civilian response and the mass mobilization for the war effort on the one hand, and for the well-being of the evacuees and abductees on the other, distinguish and unite us in times of crisis and uncertainty. But until when?
The question becomes clearer because we are approaching the 100th day of the war, and there is no horizon for its end. The momentum of the first few weeks diminished, and we entered a routine of war. They talk about moving to phase three of the fighting, but forget to explain when phase two was, and what its goals and achievements were.
Thus, the reports on the IDF's progress in the Gaza Strip sound the same, the achievements are slow and small, and the heavy costs accumulate. The explosive declarations about the crushing of Hamas and its leaders are fading, and in their place ideas are beginning to emerge about expelling its leaders and integrating terrorists into the Palestinian Authority apparatuses.
Slowly, anti-war demonstrations are also beginning. Here is a senior lecturer at the academy, where a famous director is. Now they are the sleepwalking fringes of society, but how long will it be before the margins expand and become the center? And finally, from many impressive declarations about "no power switch will be raised, no water bar will be opened, and no fuel truck will enter Gaza" – we are left with nothing and nothing.
The question becomes clearer because we are approaching the 100th day of the war, and there is no horizon for its end. The momentum of the first few weeks diminished, and we entered a routine of war. They talk about moving to phase three of the fighting, but forget to explain when phase two was, and what its goals and achievements were
Israel is once again discovering, as in previous wars, that due to international pressure, especially American pressure, it has to fight with its eye closed and with one hand behind its back. To pursue and get Hamas terrorists, but on the way to give them food and fuel to flee or fight back. Is there a greater absurdity than that?
In order not to find ourselves again in the story of 1982, a clear strategic plan is needed for Gaza, and no less important for the north: what are the clear goals for the war against Hamas (not empty slogans) and how to implement them, and what is the solution to the threat posed by Iran and Hezbollah in the north. The plan is essential not only for the proper operation of IDF forces, but also for the Israeli public: the home front, evacuees, business owners, enlisted students and anyone who has been in the circle of fighting since October 7. All of these – we, in fact – want to know where the country is headed and what kind of response the government is offering its residents.
If you will, the day-after plan is important not only as a strategic goal for shaping the Gaza Strip after victory, but also for the future of the State of Israel.
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