The dilemmas facing the War Cabinet are complex as never before. Each of them is critical in its impact on the achievement of war objectives and/or on the development of a broad regional multi-front war. In this column I will focus solely on dilemmas related to the move in the Gaza Strip.
Demolitions in the Gaza Strip after an IDF attack // Photo: Social Networks
Is the ultimate goal of war – the destruction of all Hamas military and governmental capabilities – achievable and consistent with existing constraints?
Achieving a goal will not only be achieved through airstrikes
Achieving such a goal cannot be accomplished only through airstrikes and targeted killings. It requires a ground entry into the Gaza Strip, in all its parts, for an extended period of time in order to cleanse and clean every hole, burrow, tunnel and assassination of senior officials. For this purpose, a reserve system of hundreds of thousands of fighters has been mobilized, which can be maintained for no more than a few weeks or a few months.
It must be remembered that even if a deep and broad ground operation is carried out with a very impressive operational achievement, there is no guarantee that Hamas and/or Islamic Jihad will not rehabilitate themselves, build new capabilities and return to being a dominant body capable of challenging Israel in the future. It must be assumed that at the end of the move there will be a prisoner exchange.
This deal will release thousands of prisoners in our prisons, and they will eventually become part of the new leadership of terror in the Gaza Strip. After all, we sat inside the Gaza Strip for many years, and we still live in Judea and Samaria, and yet we have not defeated Palestinian terror to the point of its disappearance.
A self-propelled cannon "galloping" around the Gaza Strip. Waiting to be commanded, photo: AP
Another dilemma is whether an IDF operational plan with the assistance of the Shin Bet knows how to meet such an ultimate war goal? If so, it is necessary to ensure entry into the process when the maximum necessary conditions exist: precise intelligence, objectives, operational capabilities, the readiness of the forces, understanding the scenarios and challenges that will appear during the execution, and more. But if there is any gap between the goal and its achievement, one of them must change!
Adjusting the goal to operational capability or waiting for gaps in capability to be filled. The question of the strategic purpose, the state of the end of the fighting, and the transfer of control of the Gaza Strip are weighty issues that require clear definitions at this time.
Constraints against a ground move: weighty
The constraints against a rapid ground operation also carry weight. Public and international pressure to resolve the issue of abductees and captives is very heavy. The level of dependence on the United States has become a major constraint over the past two and a half weeks. In the face of an unprecedented US stand with Israel, including the deployment of forces, a huge security assistance package, and the involvement of senior US administration and military officials, the cabinet cannot fail to take into account American interests and "requests" related to the outline of the war.
These "requests" include several key components: abductees first, humanitarian aid, adherence to international law, and refraining from being dragged irresponsibly into opening a front against Hezbollah that could ignite a multi-front and regional conflict.
The international room for maneuver will also play a fundamental role in the campaign. Usually in an opening situation such as 7 October, any quick action would have received a significant "window of time" from the international arena, but part of that window has already been eroded by the long wait and environmental damage in Gaza. Given a ground operation accompanied by massive air support, and assuming that no move ends only in the northern Gaza Strip but continues southward, the international constraint will become very heavy, and in the end very restrictive.
The ultimate goal cannot be achieved only by airstrikes, Photo: AP
In a scenario in which the decision is made on the return of abductees first, such a "deal" would include the release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails and international guarantees that the IDF would not attack the Gaza Strip unless provoked by the Gaza side. The meaning: canceling the offensive move!
If so, the current security incident may calm down, but Israel will emerge defeated and limited, and the goal of the war will not be achieved in the near future.
The implications of such a reality for Israel's security status and deterrence are severe. The same applies to its status among the Abraham Pact countries, which saw it as a "security power." The most serious consequences will be for the IDF, regular and reserve.
Ending with a sense of defeat and not exhausting an offensive move can create a lack of trust in the system and drastically reduce motivation. The severe consequences will be for the residents of the envelope and for the residents of the Lebanese border, who, together with a very large public, will lose faith in Israel's security response.
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