20 years of withdrawal and Col. Ronen Itzik, who commanded Beaufort, recalls a period of floor imputation painted with defeatist colors • Special column

• 7th Brigade tanks en route to Lebanon

  Photo: 

  Eli Leventhal

We are currently commemorating 20 years of withdrawal from Lebanon as well as a period that ended in "gate slamming" and a very controversial subsequent war. The narrative created is that we escaped from Lebanon and ordered the second intifada. Subsequently, our deterrence was compromised and our image of Hezbollah's vision was severely damaged. However, out of all this, the IDF's future commanders were saddened - and they are the ones currently sitting around the General Staff desk.

It is not easy to see a flag falling from a mast, folded and entered the crate. Don't just see a post that was a house and a fortress for you explodes a minute after you left. It is not easy to go back, and especially there is no extraordinary pride. The withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 was hurriedly, leaving us, the Israelis, with emphasis on those who fought in the security zone, a sense of story that ended sourly, not to say a sense of defeat.

Those who read the book "If there is a paradise" and also saw the movie "Beaufort", understand that the IDF came out of Lebanon bruised and battered, with great fear and poor motivation. Those who do not know the period of fighting in the security band think that this is really what it was - nights Soldiers are hiding in "rams" (hiding positions) and waiting to drop a barrage of mortar shells on them.

The real story is radically different. The security force shaped the IDF's future commanders - it was the central friction scene against the enemy and it led to the design of operational concepts and tactics that, many years ahead, helped to deal with threats. During this time, company commanders who were independent in depth and made life-and-death decisions To continue in the IDF, to be battalion commanders and brigades. Some today hold key positions in command of divisions, headquarters and around the IDF's senior command desk.

It was a time when the tactical level was upright. We waited for the moment when we encountered the enemy, mentally and professionally preparing ourselves for those moments that were moments of transcendence for us. The legacy of many units was painted in the Lebanese shades. The axes and positions we had were for symbols of heroism, for the real states we were just waiting for. And when we ended periods of activity, we walked away with tremendous pride and a sense of victory. Obviously it involved a price, which war did not raise prices?

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In perspective, though, this whole era has been defeated. The day of the retreat and its sights influenced the narrative, which also never warns in situations of withdrawal.

The decision to leave Lebanon was political. It also stemmed from public pressure that expressed many doubts about the need for the security band and the price it charged.

The situation was not in a vacuum. The security strategy in the Security Strip has also not evolved over the years. There was also a tendency to disdain Hezbollah as an enemy. The senior command moved the strip hand-in-hand, without considering in depth what was right and what should remain, what changes were needed and how things were changing. There were such and other operations, but the main thing was tactical, such as operating a walnut unit and catching such and other operations. Tactical operations were successful, but the strategy did not change. We found ourselves facing an intensifying enemy when we weren't really changed - tactical, systemic and infrastructure. In the end, we were pretty much driven away, that's the truth.

But the narrative does injustice mainly to warriors - those who exacerbated themselves, those who faced the enemy, those who defended their bodies on the northern border and the localities for many years.

We had no doubt. A quick look from Beaufort to the south - and we understood exactly what we were doing and why. In our sense, we reluctantly left Lebanon. We knew that if they had allowed us - we would have brought the result to Hezbollah. Only really, from the moment that Ehud Barak rates the stay for a year, the atmosphere of the end permeated quickly - for both the ranks of the fighters and the enemy.

The battalions, commanders and fighters underneath Hezbollah defeated him, causing him many casualties and casualties. All of our action was dictated by constraints that are mostly political. Many times we felt that our hands were bound, shared even the risk, and acted with the enemy even without permits, because we understood this to be the case. We did not wait for orders.

But in the end, three tragic incidents and the backbone of cynical politicians overwhelmed us. We were hungry but at a loss.

Learning from this case must permeate all levels, first and foremost, to understand that protecting a homeland is costly, that long-term stagnation leads to loss, and the lack of initiative leads to coma. You cannot be in enemy territory if you have no intention of winning.

And if you decide that you are in action - consider that this has consequences. In short, the end of the act at first thought.