Last Monday, only some 50 hours after Hamas terrorists first broke into Israeli territory, the IDF Spokesperson announced that full control of the Gaza envelope had been achieved. Now the IDF is planning the next and inevitable stage: a broad ground maneuver into the Gaza Strip.
In contrast to past confrontations with Hamas, this time it seems that the political echelon intends to order such a move, as can be seen both from the extensive mobilization of the reserves and from reports according to which Prime Minister Netanyahu informed President Biden of his intention to do so.
Reluctance to carry out ground maneuvers has been a fairly consistent feature of Israel's use of force policy in recent decades, especially when it comes to the Gaza Strip: for example, during the second intifada, the General Staff formulated the "Home Shield" plan, which was intended to be the Gaza version of Defensive Shield, but it was decided not to implement it due to concerns about an increased risk to IDF soldiers than in Judea and Samaria. It is true that within the framework of Cast Lead and Protective Edge there was a ground incursion of forces into the Gaza Strip, But in both cases it was short-lived.
The same fear of wallowing in the Gaza swamp was consistently justified, until last Shabbat. The murderous terrorist campaign led to a system overhaul, which led to the realization that difficult times require extreme measures.
A broad ground maneuver in the Gaza Strip as part of the current war will have several purposes:
The strategic purpose – past experience has proven that significant military achievements cannot be achieved through counterfire alone, and that there is no substitute for occupying territory in order to control movement to and from it. It should be emphasized that the release of the hostages in a military operation in ground combat seems, for the time being, an unlikely scenario, but the seizure of assets vital to Hamas, which is possible only in the framework of a ground operation, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the organization.
The moral goal – significant military achievements are now critical for restoring the sane national mood and public trust in the IDF. There is no need for opinion polls to gauge the mood prevailing in Israel: deep grief, wrath, helplessness and a crisis of confidence in the IDF. The Israeli public needs – and demands – to see a recovery in the IDF's ground warfare capabilities on the one hand, and Hamas' crushing to the brim on the other.
The release of the hostages in a military operation in ground combat seems unlikely for the time being, but the seizure of vital assets for Hamas, which is possible only in the framework of a ground operation, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the organization
The purpose of deterrence: Those who are also currently waiting for Israel's next step are Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinians in the West Bank. The IDF has significantly stepped up its airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, but it is reasonable to assume that making do with airstrikes, however huge, will be perceived as a weak response among Israel's enemies and may motivate them to join the war against it.
The human cost of a ground operation is heavy. Beyond the challenge of fighting in one of the most densely populated built-up areas in the world, it can be assumed that Hamas has prepared for the possibility of an Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip and has already prepared a "welcome" for IDF forces, underground and above. But there seems to be no escape. The sharp increase in Hamas' threat perception, along with domestic and international legitimacy, provide Israel with an opportunity to improve the grim situation.
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