War was forced upon us. The immediate enemies are the barbarians led by Hamas, but there are clear signs that Iran is behind the attack in order to block the progress of the US and Israel into a strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia and to free itself from Israeli attacks on Iran in Syria. Israel must now uproot the Hamas regime in Gaza. But since Iran is pulling Hamas' strings, it is our duty to assume that an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza will be met with a missile attack and an invasion by the second Iranian corps, Hezbollah.
This means an existential war for the first time since 1973. And it may not be an asymmetric war, as we have been tempted to think for too long, that is, it will not be a war between a terrorist organization and the "strongest" army, and so on, as the cliché goes. This could be an existential war between us and two forward forces of a rival regional power, Iran, which has already had a significant hand not only in planning an attack on us, but also in the operation of drones and cyberspace.
Our situation is difficult. The IDF is too small, and there is reason to fear that it is not fully trained for such a broad campaign. Nor has he escaped the strategic outlook that led him to failure in 2006 and futile rounds from 2007. The responsibility for this lies jointly with the political leaders and IDF commanders over the past two decades.
Can the IDF occupy the Gaza Strip? Can we bear the grave consequences of the IDF's failure to occupy the Gaza Strip? To absorb waves of violence whose nature and scope are hard to imagine, which may arise upon us because of such avoidance? And can the IDF win the broad campaign that Iran initiates in response in the north, southwest, inland, or even in direct confrontation with it? These are questions that the public cannot decide. On such questions, we depend entirely on the quality of our political and military leadership.
A society that desires life comes together in such a state of affairs. We have no ability at the moment to replace either our political leadership, in the current coalition and opposition, or our senior military command. The fate of the elected leaders and commanders who failed entrusted them with pulling Israel out of the depression, and they had the responsibility to decide how to rescue them.
Such systems require a broad government, like those that led us in the War of Independence and the Six-Day War. Even in 1973, when there was no time to form a broad government, the opposition Gahal (Likud) effectively put their shoulders under the leadership stretcher. "Why didn't you bring the dishes closer?" Menachem Begin allowed himself to ask only later, when we were already in Africa and in the Rabbit Khan on the way to Damascus. It was impossible then to conceive of wanton accusations now expressed by those who were active partners in creating the situation that was revealed to us.
The leaders of the loyal opposition must immediately enter the government unconditionally; Certainly without demands to reduce the representation of other parties. We need a broader government, not any other narrow government, a government in which all circles of Israeli society will be represented.
Our situation is difficult. The IDF is too small, and there is reason to fear that it is not fully trained for such a broad campaign. Nor has he escaped the strategic outlook that led him to failure in 2006 and futile rounds from 2007. The responsibility for this lies jointly with the political leaders and IDF commanders over the past two decades
This is not the time for coalition negotiations over roles. The format of Begin and his colleagues entering as ministers without portfolio in 1967 is the correct one. It is clear that the strategic decisions will be made jointly by the coalition leaders and the opposition leaders who will enter the government.
It is also clear that it is essential to maintain the supremacy of the political leaders, representatives of the public, in outlining the strategy for extricating ourselves from the dangerous situation. There are reports that the heads of the state camp, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, are demanding that IDF commanders, whose ranks they recently withdrew, be the strategists.
Such a demand would mean a very damaging change in the democratic structure of the country's regime. Remember: a failed political leadership can replace it when the time comes, while the selection and selection processes of a failed military command are not controlled by the public except through its elected leaders. The "autonomy" of IDF commanders is a recipe for disaster. Whoever delays the establishment of a broad government with such absurd demands will bear a very heavy responsibility.
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