The relations between the governments of Israel and Hamas are much more complex than the relations that existed between them and the PLO. While the Palestine Liberation Organization is perceived as a nationalist-terrorist movement whose goal (declared until 1988) was to make life miserable for us until we return to the countries from which our ancestors immigrated, Hamas is perceived as a religious organization whose sole concern is welfare for poor Muslims.
Israel needed time to understand the changes that took place in these two organizations in the late 80s: In late 1987, against the backdrop of the intifada, Hamas transformed from a Muslim welfare organization to an Islamist organization that rejects any arrangement with Israel and sanctifies the use of terrorism. A year later, the PLO changed its position and supported the implementation of the two-state principle on which the partition resolution stood, and which was rejected by the Palestinians and the Arab world in 1947.
The rapid strengthening of Hamas as an organization ostensibly free of corruption and loyal to its values, which is an alternative to the establishment PLO, which operates abroad and is tainted by Siob, was one of the motives for changing the PLO's policy regarding an arrangement with Israel and its willingness to agree to points it opposed in the past (such as agreeing to an interim agreement). Part of the criticism of this writer in the context of the Oslo Accords was directed against strengthening the PLO vis-à-vis the Muslim religious and welfare organization, which did not demand a state for itself. But while the PLO was ready to divide the land, Hamas denied Israel every square inch of Palestinian Waqf land.
It's not that the Israeli right was in love with Hamas; Some of its leaders (such as Ariel Sharon, who told me this explicitly) believed that there was no difference between Fatah and Hamas, while others (such as Shamir and Netanyahu) preferred Hamas because it seemingly had no national or territorial claims. They did not want to reach a historic compromise with a Palestinian national organization because it would mean dividing the land, but they did not understand that Hamas was playing on zero-sum and saw its mission as erasing Israel.
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The Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) of 1995 explicitly states that a person or organization that encourages violence cannot participate in Palestinian election processes. When President George W. Bush asked Israel not to prevent Hamas from running in the 2006 elections, despite the clause that would have prevented it, Sharon agreed, claiming that "there is no difference between the Arabs." Hamas participated in the elections, surprised everyone with its victory, and the rest is history.
The right tends to attribute childish innocence to the left and sees itself as representing real politics, but when referring to Hamas, the real naïve was the right, which was willing to buy Hamas's religious cover. The current conflict proves that Hamas is much closer to ISIS than to the PLO, that Sharon was wrong in not being willing to recognize the difference between the movements, that Netanyahu's policy of strengthening Hamas and helping finance it, in the face of Fatah's continued weakening, was a serious mistake, and that the way to deal with Hamas should be just like ISIS.
But that won't be enough. If decision makers are satisfied with neutralizing Hamas, this will not solve the question of filling its place. These days they have to look at all options. The most logical would be to suggest that the Palestinian Authority return to Gaza and run it, but it is hard to believe that it would be willing to do so and take this responsibility from Israel, which has just neutralized (I hope) Hamas. Another option is to turn to the Arab League, led by Egypt, to administer the territory for a limited period of time, or to another international body.
If it turns out that no one is willing to take on this problematic gift permanently or temporarily, Israel will have to – according to international law and because it wants to prevent a governmental vacuum – to return to administering Gaza. We will have to make every effort not to do so.
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