On the morning of October 7, a strategic security concept that had been established for the past 30 years, since the Oslo Accords, collapsed. With even more shocking force, a cultural concept that had its roots in the dream of peace collapsed, under the illusion that the state could aspire to exist as a kind of Denmark. There was an earthquake here, with a magnitude that causes continents to move.
The concept of withdrawals: The support of former senior defense officials for the two-state solution was based on the assumption that even with a withdrawal to the '67 lines, the state would be able to defend its sovereignty and the security of its residents by itself. "Professional" authority has sought for decades to persuade that militarily the IDF can always ensure security even after withdrawals. Lt. Gen. (res.) Dan Halutz, for example, in his article striving for a two-state solution, criticized the Netanyahu government's demand for "defensible borders" and explained: "The IDF will be able to defend any border line defined by the political echelon. It is worth mentioning that the greatest military victory (after the War of Independence) was achieved in '67, from the border line that today is presented by the political leadership as indefensible..." (Yedioth Ahronoth, January 16, 1).
"Gaza is crowded, the enemy is preparing a lot of things there - but we are preparing for it too" // Photo: IDF Spokesperson
Ahead of the implementation of the convergence plan in Judea and Samaria in 2006, in dialogue with Ari Shavit, Haim Ramon presented a claim that today seems horribly delusional: "I believe there will be quiet (after a withdrawal), but suppose there will be a war. What kind of war will it be? The IDF, with all its capabilities, against 4,000-3,000 Hamas operatives equipped with nothing? If the Palestinians create any kind of threat against me, I occupy the West Bank in 24 hours. And how do I know that? Because that's what I did with Defensive Shield... I recaptured the territory and toppled the PA in a day" (Haaretz, June 18, 6).
The heart of the concept
The withdrawal approach is based on a concept of four assumptions: the first assumption is that spatial separation, including the evacuation of settlements, will define borders, reduce friction interfaces, and create a trend of stability. Together with Ambassador Martin Indyk, they quoted the proverb "Good fences make good neighbors."
The second assumption stated that if stability was undermined to the point of an intolerable security threat, the political leadership could send the IDF on the offensive to thwart the threat deep in the area from which they had withdrawn. The third assumption was that our withdrawal from the territory, together with the international community's agreement to recognize the end of the occupation, would give us legitimate leeway. And a final assumption: the IDF, with its constant superiority, will be able to meet this challenge and win in a few days.
For more than a decade I have been running against this concept in an effort to portray it as absurd and dangerous. The rigid border built around the Gaza Strip not only did not bring about a positive shift in stability, but on the contrary, it created the conditions for the strengthening of Hamas' military power as a strategic threat. In a historical test, since the disengagement in 2005, all other assumptions have been repeatedly refuted.
They wanted to explain that the Palestinian state that would also be established in the West Bank would be demilitarized. However, in all the changes that have developed in the nature of war, even in theaters of war around the world, and especially as Hamas' armament in the Gaza Strip can indicate, the promise and demand for demilitarization is proving hollow.
Senior defense officials who support the two-state solution have repeatedly argued that even if the demilitarization effort fails and a security escalation occurs, the IDF, with all its tactical and operational superiority, will be able to provide a full operational response, end the war in a short time, with domestic and international legitimacy. The changing nature of the war in the world – especially the war in Ukraine – shows that this assumption is out of touch with reality.
Those who adhere to withdrawals suffer chronically from an overestimation of the strength of the IDF and an underestimation of the strength of the enemies. The strength of the IDF as perceived by them leads them to believe that the IDF will always be able to repeat its achievements, as in June 1967. But the 1967 war was, in fact, the last military clash in World War II patterns. Since then, the whole world of war has changed. To ask again for victory in a similar format seems like asking again for the splitting of the Red Sea.
Long-awaited ambitions
In his seminal speech at Roi Rothberg's grave in Nahal Oz in April 1956, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan said: "We are the settlement generation, and without the steel cap and the muzzle of the cannon, we will not be able to plant a tree and build a house. Our children won't have lives if we don't dig shelters." The speech ended with the statement: "Roy - the light in his heart blinded his eyes, and did not see the corrosive lightning. The longing for peace deafened his ears, and he did not hear the sound of murder lurking."
In the midst of the War of Attrition, at the end of the 1969 POM course, Moshe Dayan presented his existential doctrine: "Rest and inheritance were our people's longed-for aspirations and not reality. And if we occasionally achieved them, they were only short stopovers – a spirit to continue the struggle."
On the necessity of an endless struggle consciousness, he explained: "The only basic answer we can give to the question 'what will happen' is - we will continue to struggle, as in the past and yes now. The answer to the question of 'what will happen' must focus on ensuring our ability to withstand difficulties, our ability to cope – rather than absolute and final solutions to our problems. We must prepare ourselves mentally and physically for a prolonged process of struggle."
These statements are distinctly different from all those made by the leadership in recent decades. In Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's speech at the United Nations, for example, he chose to emphasize that "what Israelis want is a good life for themselves and their families and a good future for their children."
Moshe Dayan also aspired to normalcy, yet he always emphasized existence with a consciousness of struggle. He expressed this mercilessly in a will that he read to his three children before his death: "The inheritance of the fathers was worshipped by each one and the sword from your bed, and on the eve of the day it is your turn to be an inheritance to your sons. And now each one will take his backpack and stick, to cross your Jordanians on his way" (Yael Dayan, "My Father, His Daughter," p. 207).
Yael Dayan, representing a generation that refused to accept the constant struggle, described her reservations in her book: "I had a feeling of being expelled from the Garden of Eden, a curse more than a blessing. We are all doomed to work the land and fight, and this we will command our children." On Saturday, October 7, the dream of Israeli paradise collapsed. With the war in Ukraine, Western Europe has also come to realize that with all the hopes for peace, man has no heaven on earth. War was and remains a fundamental state of existence. As my mother used to sing me a Negebi lullaby when I was a child: "There is no deep plowing without weapons, Numa son."
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